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ABSTRACT 
This study is an exploration of medical mistakes involving interns and 
residents. Retrospective studies confirm the substantial number of hospital 
patients harmed as a result of their health care. Data from the Quality in 
Australian Health Care Study showed causes of adverse events included 
inadequate supervision of medical staff, pressure not to admit patients, to 
discharge them early, poor hospital systems and patient factors. My research 
builds on previous studies by examining junior doctors' experiences and their 
perceptions of the causes of mistakes by reference to their own mistakes or 
those they have observed. It adds new knowledge about the relationship 
between mistakes involving junior doctors and the underlying factors 
associated with these mistakes. 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 32 interns and residents from 
all departments in a Sydney metropolitan teaching hospital. Eighty-one 
mistakes were described by the 32 interns and residents (JMOs), 57 of these 
were examined in detail. Mistakes described by JMOs fell into four categories: 
treatment, patient management, medication errors and diagnoses. Junior 
doctors identified treatment mistakes more than other types and raised issues 
of timeliness, quality of supervision and preparedness. 
The JMOs in this study identified many causes of mistakes including 
misunderstanding of orders/instructions, lack of specificity of instructions, lack 
of opportunity to clarify instructions, competing demands, quick assessments, 
lack of assertiveness, fear and intimidation, lack of preparedness, and 
unavailability of senior staff. But Interns and residents believe personal 
individual factors are the main causes of mistakes. The work situation, 
hospital organisation, medical culture and the changing hospital patient 
population were all identified as factors in mistakes but were not thought 
significant in terms of either being the main cause or for the insights they 
provided for prevention. 
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Most informants had little understanding of how the system of health care 
contributes to mistakes or how improvements in the system of health care 
might improve patient outcomes and minimise opportunities for mistakes. This 
study also showed a low rate of disclosure of mistakes to patients and their 
families after adverse events. 
The problems highlighted in this study such as those associated with 
unfamiliar protocols, different ward routines and unfamiliar environments 
identify that further research is required, particularly around the merits of 
standardisation of work processes such as hand-overs and out-of-department 
consultations. This study identifies many opportunities for system 
improvement as well as improvements in the training and education of interns 
and residents. In addition the findings will help hospitals and clinicians 
confront the sensitivity surrounding medical mistakes in relation to the 
disclosure of mistakes to patients and their families. Finally the study will help 
hospitals, supervisors and educators to better understand how interns and 
residents manage their mistakes in the first two clinical years. 
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xvii 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
My professional interest in the impact of medical mistakes on patients and doctors 
dates from 1985 when I became the Director of the New South Wales Health 
Complaints Unit; and later when I was the NSW Health Care Complaints 
Commissioner.;; During the 15 years I spent investigating health complaints, it 
increasingly seemed to me that an important majority of complaints were associated 
with problems with the system in which health care was delivered rather than being 
simply explicable by the actions of individuals without reference to the contexts in 
which they occurred. The responsibilities of my position included trying to improve 
the standard of information provided to patients about their health care, encouraging 
better explanations of treatments and making health care processes more 
transparent, as well as encouraging the development and maintenance of 
professional standards. Investigations covered all types of complaints and all health 
workers. One area susceptible to complaints concerned medical treatment by 
hospital interns and residents who were required to make decisions and undertake 
procedures often without adequate preparation or supervision. 
As Commissioner I observed manifestations of a 'blame' culture, particularly when 
patients experienced unexpected outcomes. Often, these patients or their advocates 
thought 'incompetent' or 'unethical' doctors responsible for their bad result. I also saw 
health professionals and managers scapegoat individual health workers for problems 
where wider analysis would have implicated factors within the organisation of the 
health system. This focus on the individual as the problem rather than a willingness 
to examine aspects of the different systems of care may be a significant impediment 
to improving the quality and safety of the health system. 
1 I was the Director of the NSW Health Complaints Unit from 1985 to 1994. The Complaints Unit was 
responsible for managing and resolving complaints concerning health services and health providers in 
New South Wales. 
11 1 was Commissioner for the NSW Health Care Complaints Commission between 1994 and 2000. The 
Commission has statutory responsibility for investigating and prosecuting complaints concerning all 
health professionals (inc. medical practitioners) and investigating health services (inc. hospitals). 
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It was not always the case. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
doctors openly discussed medical mistakes with peers. Harvey Cushing;;; routinely 
published case reports in professional journals about both his successes and failures 
caused by mistakes.1 Such openness helped other doctors to think about mistakes . 
Routine reporting of medical mistakes enabled clinicians to analyse and learn from 
them. Reporting also reminded clinicians of their vulnerability to error. 2 After 1930 
case studies of individual mistakes were less commonly published in the journals3 
primarily because of the shift away from case notes to studies involving larger 
numbers of patients being treated_;v The development of practice standards and 
increasing litigation were also factors.34 Today there is a resurgence of interest in 
mistakes. 
How the community responds to adverse treatment outcomes has also shaped how 
doctors respond. News media reporting of medical errors typically focuses on single 
catastrophic events, usually connected to individuals who are blamed. 5 We also 
know that the medico-legal environment influences how doctors manage their 
mistakes_ s-a But whether these factors influence how junior doctors respond to 
medical mistakes is unknown. 
All health professionals make mistakes at some stage in their careers. In this study I 
focus on the experience of mistakes involving interns and residents Uunior doctors). I 
show in Chapter Three that junior doctors are a relatively understudied professional 
group in the context of mistakes. However, they are a major part of the health care 
workforce who regularly treat patients. Notwithstanding the importance of medical 
education throughout a doctor's career, junior doctors are still formally in training. Yet 
hospitals rely heavily on junior doctors to provide medical services. Heavy work 
schedules often exclude junior doctors from hospital-wide efforts to improve care and 
in some cases prevent them from participating in training and education. The nub of 
this thesis is that if there is to be a reduction in the number of patients harmed by the 
care and treatment they receive in hospital, we will need to change the hospital 
111 Dr Harvey Cushing (1896-1939) was a neurosurgeon. In 1912 he was appointed Professor of 
Surgery at Harvard Medical School and Johns Hopkins Hospital. 
'' Cushing changed from using individual case notes to large scale studies involving many patients. 
(See Eisenhardt L. Recent Advances in Neurological Surgery. Archives of Surgery 1935,18 (1927-
1935):1929 
environment in which interns and residents train and work, and in turn, the way 
interns and residents manage and think about mistakes. They will need to 
understand why they occur and how they are to be avoided and managed. My 
research builds on previous work about medical mistakes and junior doctors by 
examining junior doctors' perceptions of the multiple factors involved in mistakes 
through reference to their own mistakes or those they have observed. 
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In this chapter I outline developments in response to the reported high incidence of 
adverse events occurring in the health system. Research is only now beginning to 
examine the underlying causes of health care errors. While I detail the research 
associated with junior doctors and their involvement in mistakes in the literature 
review (Chapter Three), in this chapter I give a preliminary introduction to the 
historical and contextual factors that influenced me to study junior doctors' 
experience of mistakes. The work of junior doctors is integral to the delivery of patient 
care. Notwithstanding the awareness of errors in the health system and the 
recognition that health care must be redesigned to reduce the number of errors, the 
role junior doctors can play in error prevention has received little attention. My study 
seeks to redress this deficiency. This study of interns' and residents' mistakes 
requires an understanding of the nature and role of human error in mistakes. Later in 
this chapter I outline some of the main features of theories on human error. I also 
provide an overview of my study. 
1 How safe is health care? 
Studies confirm that a substantial number of patients are harmed by their health care. 
Table 1.1 below lists international studies and the adverse event rate in four 
countries. 
------
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Table 1.1: Data on Adverse Events in Health Care from Several Countries. World Health Organization 
Executive Board 1091" session. provisional agenda item 3.4. 5 December 2001 EB 109/9. 
~tudy !Study focus (date o !Number of Number of Adverse event 
!admissions) jhospltal dverse events rate(%) 
!admissions 
1 United States (Harvard Medical Practice f'lcule care ~0 195 1133 .8 
Study) hospitals(1984) 
2 United States (Utah-Colorado study) f<lcule care 14 565 75 .2 
UTCOS) ~osp~als(1992) 
3 United States (Utah-Colorado study) f'lcute care 14 565 87 .4 
UTCOS) 1 hospitals(1992) 
4 Australia (Qual~ in Australian Health Care f<lcute care 14179 353 16.6 
Study) (QAHCS) hospitals(1992) 
5 Australia {Quality in Australian Health Care f<>.cute care 14179 1 499 10.6 
Study) hospitals(1992) 
(QAHCS) 2 
6 United Kingdom f'lcute care 1 014 119 11.7 
hospitals(1999-2000) 
7 Denmark f'ltule care 1 097 176 [9.0 
rospitals(1998) 
-
-- -- --- ---- ---
1 UTCOS revised using the same methodology as the Quality in Australian Health Care Study 
(harmonising the four methodological discrepancies between the two studies). 
2 QAHCS revised using the same methodology as UTCOS (harmonising the four 
methodological discrepancies between the two studies). 
Studies 3 & 5 present the most directly comparable data for the UTCOS and QAHCS studies. 
Retrospective medical record reviews in the United States, Australia, the United 
Kingdom, Denmark and New Zealand v record the extent of patient injury as a result 
of health care. 9-14 
1.1 Responding to the evidence 
Governments in most developed countries have now initiated strategies for improving 
the safety of health care. In 1998 the US Institute of Medicine established the 
Committee on the Quality of Health Care in America to provide strategic direction for 
improvements to the health system in that country. Two major reports underpinned 
this initiative. The first report To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System 15 
(1999) focussed on patient safety and the environment in which medical mistakes 
occur. It highlighted a failure to observe, record, monitor, analyse and learn from 
mistakes because of the focus on individual health workers rather than on the design 
of the systems. The second report Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Heath 
'The New Zealand Study showed adverse events were associated with 12.9% of all admissions and 
that 4.5% of all admissions in NZ public hospitals were associated with highly preventable adverse 
events. Analysis of 850 adverse events revealed similar findings to the other studies in Table 1.1 
I 
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System for the 21st Century 16 (2001) described the inability of the health system to 
routinely translate clinical knowledge and new technology into practice. While 
patients expect timely, safe and appropriate treatment the report provided evidence 
that these expectations were frequently not met.17 Following these reports health 
services have developed strategies to reduce harm to patients by improving health 
care delivery services. More recent reports published by the US Institute of Medicine 
in 2001 and 2003 outline the key areas needing attention, methods for measuring 
and addressing them and a plan for the development of data standards for collecting, 
coding and classifying patient safety information.18 19 
In 1998 the US President's Advisory Commission of Consumer Protection and 
Quality in the Health Care Industry highlighted avoidable medical errors and rated 
this as one of the four major challenges in improving health care quality. On the 
Commission's recommendation the Quality Interagency Coordination Taskforce was 
formed in 1999 (and renamed the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality.) 
The need for more research on measuring errors, understanding why they occur, 
exploring the options for reporting errors, developing the means to reduce them and 
testing the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of various approaches to improving 
patient safety were priority areas of work.16 
In the United Kingdom, the publication of An Organisation with a Memory 20 (2000) 
prompted reforms to the National Health Service. This report, using the best available 
research, said that about 10 per cent of all hospital admissions, or an estimated 
850,000 hospital admissions per year in the UK, involved adverse events. 
The Australian Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care (ACSQ) was 
established by Australian Health Ministers in 2000 to improve patient safety and has 
lifted the profile of safe health care in Australia vi. All four strategies outlined in the 
Council's 2002 national action plan 21 focussed on reducing patient harm and 
minimising errors. The targeted areas were:-
vi Other agencies include The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) The Institute for 
Healthcare Improvement (I HI) The Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) The Joint 
Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) The Australian Patient Safety 
Foundation (APSF) The NSW Institute for Clinical Excellence (ICE). 
• The development of national standards for 'Open disclosure'. 'Open 
disclosure' is the term used to describe the provision of honest and complete 
information to patients or their families after an adverse event. 
• Reducing preventable patient harm associated with medication use 
• Reducing patient harm as a result of health care associated infections 
• Coordinated national action to apply lessons learned from adverse events. 
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Creating a safer health system requires many different strategies - redesign of 
hospitals and work routines, leadership, promotion of effective team functioning, 
clinical practice improvement, incident reporting and error management. 
Understanding and managing mistakes is central to these strategies. While health 
workers and policy makers in developed countries are learning about mistakes by 
reference to the experiences of mistakes in other industries, the applicability of many 
of those safety concepts are only now being tested in the health care environment. 
Copying strategies from the corporate and industrial sectors, without understanding 
the different contexts, is fraught with difficulty. 22 
1.2 Adverse events 
Even though the extent of adverse events vii in the health system has long been 
recognised, 23.30 the degree to which they are acknowledged and managed varies 
greatly across the health system and across health professions. Ignorance of the 
extent of injury, and the fact that most errors do not cause harm may explain the 
historical tardiness to make the health system safer. Outcome data are still not 
routinely published in journals or news media nor are they routinely collected by 
health professionals. Mistakes affect one patient at a time and staff working in one 
area may only experience or observe an adverse event infrequently. Mistakes do not 
all happen at the same time or place which can act to camouflage from staff the 
extent of errors in the system. 
Studies 29 31 32 show that most adverse events arise from preventable mistakes. 
Leape et al 32 found that more than two-thirds of adverse events are preventable. 
'
11 The term adverse event is of recent origin. Previously the literature used the word 'iatrogenesis' to 
describe the process whereby patients are harmed by their health care. The development and 
expansion of pharmacological therapies in the 1950s and 1960s led to a rise in iatrogenic 
complications. 
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Twenty-eight per cent were due to the negligence of a health professional with 42 per 
cent caused by other factors not related to such negligence. Bates et al 33 found that 
medication mistakes were harming patients at an overall rate of about 6.5 per 100 
admissions in large US teaching hospitals. Their research, based on self-reports by 
nurses and pharmacists and daily chart review, is a conservative figure because 
doctors do not routinely self-report medication errors. About two to three per cent of 
all hospitals admissions in Australian hospitals relate to medicines (under-use, 
overuse and adverse events) consumed either inside or outside hospitals.34 
1.3 Economic costs 
The precise costs of adverse events to the Australian health system are unknown. 
Inconsistencies associated with the collection and classification of hospital data on 
morbidity, mortality and hospitalisations have yet to be resolved. Although injury was 
identified as a National Health Priority area in 1986,V;;; insufficient data about the 
causes of specific injuries preventeda detailed analysis of costs of iatrogenic illness 
in Australia at that time. The Final Report of the Taskforce on Quality in Australian 
Health Care ( 1996) estimated the costs of adverse events to be $867 million per 
year and $4.3 billion over five years.35 
A 1999 report published by the Australian Institute for Health and Welfare of 1993-4 
of all injury data for 1993-94 showed that adverse effects of medical treatment 
accounted for 16 per cent of all injury costs - behind accidental falls (31%) but more 
than road traffic accidents (14%), homicide and violence (5%), suicide or self-inflicted 
injuries (3%).36 The costs are based on reported injuries and may be under 
estimates because while formal mechanisms for reporting incidents exist in most 
hospitals, not all nurses and doctors use them. 20 
One cost component of adverse events is that associated with medical negligence. 
Accurate data on the cost of medical negligence in Australia are not available 
because medical defense organisations say this information is 'commercial in 
confidence'. Nevertheless, the Final Report on Compensation and Professional 
,;u Injury prevention and control was endorsed as a National Health Priority Area by Australian Health 
Ministers in 1986 in recognition of the national burden of injury. 
http://www. health. gov. au/pubh lth/strateg/injury/ 
Indemnity in Health Care (1995) 37 concluded adverse events had significant cost 
implications for the health care budget. The human costs of pain and suffering, loss 
of independence and productivity for both patients and their carers is also a cost. 
Calculations by the Australian Patient Safety Foundation estimated the costs of 
South Australian claims and premiums on insurance for large medical negligence 
suits to be about $18 million in 1997/98.38 
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Costs of mistakes are also significant in other countries. The National Health Service 
in the UK pays out around £400 million in settlement of clinical negligence claims 
every year. 20 The US Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ) reported 
in December 1999 that preventing medical errors has the potential to save 
approximately $US8.8 billion per year. 39 
While debates40-43 within the medical profession about the methods used to 
determine the rates of injury and their costs to the health system continue, many 
countries have accepted that the safety of the health care system is a priority area for 
review and reform. 
2 An overview of doctors' mistakes 
While there is growing research on under-use, overuse and misuse44 of health care 
in the medical specialties and sub-specialities, little research has specifically 
focussed on the experience of interns (Post Graduate Year 1) or residents (Post 
Graduate Year 2) ix. Of the 152 references about overuse, under-use and misuse 
cited in Crossing the Quality Chasm, none covered the experience of junior doctors. 
16 Experienced clinicians were covered but no research specifically examining the 
clinical context of mistakes by junior doctors was included. 
Twenty years ago Bosk, 45 46 a sociologist, was one of the first to categorise medical 
errors. He classified the errors of young surgical trainees into technical errors, 
judgemental errors and normative errors. He defined a technical error as one where 
the trainee speedily acknowledged the error, reported it and treated the patient 
appropriately. Bosk observed that the trainee was 'forgiven' if all three activities 
;, PGY 1 stands for post graduate year 1 and PGY 2 stands for post graduate year 2. 
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occurred. Surgical residents were expected to make mistakes but not to make the 
same mistake twice. This typology reflected the prevailing knowledge about medical 
mistakes at that time; mistakes were made by people who had a responsibility to 
learn from them. 'Learning from mistakes' as a theme in educating clinicians was first 
questioned by Popper and Mclntyre47 in the British Medical Journal in 1983, when 
they observed that if doctors were expected to learn from their mistakes that this 
required a willingness to admit errors and discuss them.47 Gorowitz and Maclntyre48 
argue that a misunderstanding of fallibility in medicine is a major problem inhibiting 
reporting and learning from mistakes. They wrote 
"No species of fallibility is more important or less understood than fallibility in medicine. The 
physician's propensity for damaging error is widely denied perhaps because it is so intensely 
feared ... Physicians and surgeons often flinch from even identifying error in clinical practice, let alone 
recording it, presumably because they, themselves hold that error ... arises from their or their 
colleagues' ignorance or ineptitude." 8 
The proliferation of new drugs and technology, diagnostic tests, and invasive 
procedures significantly increases the opportunities for errors. With shorter hospital 
staysx there is also decreased opportunity for detailed discussions with and about 
patients and sharing of information among clinicians. Thomas and Helm reich 49 
surveyed 1033 medical personnel in five countries and found that only one in three 
thought errors were handled appropriately by their hospital. Two-thirds said they had 
experienced an adverse event with more than 59 per cent saying they found it hard 
to discuss their mistakes in the workplace. 
Fear of litigation, whether perceived or real, has had a major impact on mistake 
management by clinicians. 5° A publicised medical negligence court hearing can 
seriously damage a doctor's career even if the mistake was minor or an unpredicted 
complication of the treatment. Consequently, mistakes tend not to be seen as 
learning opportunities but instead as serious threats to reputations, careers and 
referrals. 51 
The notions of perfectibility and infallibility within the medical culture can mean 
individuals are reluctant to be open about their mistakes for fear of censure. 52 In 
addition, the 'blame' culture in medicine discourages candour about mistakes. 52 
' The NSW Department of Health reports the same-day surgery rate in June 2004 was 58.3 per cent 
and the day of surgery admission rate was 87.4 per cent. 
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These factors militate against doctors disclosing their mistakes to patients and other 
health professionals. 53 54 
2.1 Junior doctors and mistakes 
A study by Harrison55 noted that level of experience and supervision of junior medical 
staff, pressure not to admit patients, or discharge them early, poor hospital systems 
and patient factors all caused errors. Her results suggest there are inadequate 
mechanisms to support junior doctors. Harrison analysed data collected for The 
Quality in Australian Health Care Study 12 and isolated 'failure to act on available 
information' as a significant cause of adverse events. She found that 88 per cent of 
adverse events due to 'failure to act' resulted in either a delayed, wrong or failed 
management in respect of diagnosis, treatment or therapy by the treating medical 
officer. Thirty-three per cent (n=153) of adverse events were due to incorrect 
diagnosis on admission, 24 per cent (n=112) related to poor judgement, 16 per cent 
(n=73) concerned delay or failure to seek more diagnostic information, and 12 per 
cent (n=57) concerned medication errors. Because her study used secondary data 
sources she was unable to be specific about the factors involved in the errors as 
perceived by the people making the mistakes. 
The traditional apprenticeship model for training junior doctors is today straining 
under pressures from health care technology, increasing patient expectations and 
demands for greater efficiency. 56 An intern's or resident's relationship with a 
consultant, once core for learning and characterised by daily contact during and after 
rounds, is now largely a thing of the past in most Australian hospitals. Interns once 
could expect to make up to four rounds a day: two rounds by the intern alone for 
checking the status of patients and another two rounds with the consultant and senior 
registrars. 57 
Despite significant changes in hospital organisation and management, the method for 
training and educating interns and residents has changed little. The apprenticeship 
model still exists but an intern or resident today will work with many consultants and 
interact with multiple clinicians on a daily basis. The one-on-one relationship 
underpinning the 'old' apprenticeship is rare. Junior doctors are now required to 
understand the unwritten rules of each consultant from whom they take instructions 
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and to ensure orders are followed for each consultant's patients. 58 The use of 
multiple consultants often leads to fragmented supervision, fewer instructions and 
more frequent sub-standard performances.57 This, and the lack of standardisation of 
roles and duties, makes junior doctors more vulnerable to errors. 59 
The apprenticeship model relies on reports from supervising clinicians about the 
performance and development of young doctors. Junior doctors in training are low in 
the medical hierarchy and dependent upon supervisors for their instructions and 
learning. Their progress depends on favourable reports from supervisors: their 
relationship with senior clinicians often influences how successfully they move up the 
medical hierarchy. 
Maintaining the confidence of a supervisor is paramount. Progression up the medical 
hierarchy depends on favourable reports based on informal and formal feedback and 
subjective and objective assessments about their competence and commitment. 
Disclosing mistakes to supervisors may have repercussions for the junior doctors 
involved. Interns and residents may hold founded or unfounded fears that disclosing 
mistakes may lead to unfavourable reports or decreased employment opportunities 
or reduced chances for gaining access to training programs or all three. 
From a junior doctor perspective a good relationship with supervisors is crucial. But 
over-reliance on supervisors for teaching and assessment may also encourage junior 
doctors to conceal their mistakes and to perform clinical tasks when requested 
knowing they are not competent in those tasks. They may be reluctant to admit to 
their supervisors their inexperience. Junior doctors who have been working long 
hours and feel fatigued may also be reluctant to advise their supervisors for fear of 
receiving an unfavourable report or being seen as 'lacking in commitment'. Given the 
significance of this relationship it is surprising that it has seldom been studied. 
Anecdotes by junior doctors to the Postgraduate Medical Council of New South 
Wales xi characteristically depict internship as a survival course, with education and 
information-sharing low priorities. Time pressures and constantly changing work 
,; I am the Faculty of Medicine University of Sydney's representative on the Postgraduate Medical 
Council of NSW (appointed 2002) The Council regularly holds junior doctor forums. 
routines are barriers to junior doctors accessing hospital information networks that 
disseminate organisational and clinical information. Rarely are they engaged in 
quality improvement activities that involve investigation and analyses of mistakes. 
What they think about medical mistakes and their underlying causes remains 
unrecorded. Hospital investigations of mistakes that may involve a junior doctor for 
example, may not necessarily obtain the full picture from the junior doctor who may 
be concerned that candour will have a negative affect on his or her career. While 
methods are being developed to measure and capture information about adverse 
events, there has been very little attempt to understand medical mistakes from the 
perspectives of those closely associated with them. If junior doctors are not part of 
the communication network their participation in service improvement is limited or 
non-existent. 60 61 
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The outcomes of care for a patient or whether a mistake has been made may often 
be unknown to JMOs because patients often move between wards or are 
discharged. Ever-changing rosters limit their capacity to know the outcome of 
treatment decisions. Understanding the many factors involved in mistakes by interns 
and residents will help us better understand how the work environment and medical 
culture impact on safe practice. A reduction of mistakes by junior doctors will involve 
them understanding and learning from their own and others' mistakes. 
If we do not pay attention to what individual clinicians think about their mistakes, we 
may misunderstand the role played by mistakes in the hospital environment. What 
clinicians think are the main causes of mistakes may be of fundamental importance 
for better understanding the dynamics of medical mistakes. Whether they see 
mistakes primarily as system errors or as evidence of 'incompetence' is instructive for 
both educational programs and organisational improvement. 
Clinical experience is central to doctors' education. Biographical accounts by US 
interns and residents62.s7 of their early medical years are typically disparaging about 
medical training';;_ They routinely describe the loneliness, overwork and negligible 
guidance from senior clinicians. x;;; 
,;;There are no similar Australian publications. 
~" See Chapter Three for a more detailed discussion about their accounts. 
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3 Theoretical framework for this study 
3.1 Learning from other disciplines 
Even though researchers who have attempted to synthesise the nature of medical 
mistakes concur that no one body of knowledge can adequately explain medical 
mistakes, medicine has tended to focus on the individual performances of 
clinicians68-70 as the main factor in mistakes. It has paid little attention to knowledge 
from other disciplines. Lessons from other industries show that analysing mistakes at 
least involves an understanding of psychology, sociology, anthropology, process 
theory and organisational theory. 
The day-to-day experiences of clinicians described in anthropological medical 
ethnographies can provide a context to understand the work of clinicians. 
Sociologists and anthropologists have long been writing about medicine and have 
established bodies of knowledge about the doctor-patient relationship, professional 
power and autonomy, the uncertainty in medicine particularly in clinical decision 
making and the socialisation of young doctors into medical culture. 46 71 -77 
Ethnographic studies46 77 78 have emphasised the role medical culture has on the 
management of mistakes. 
Paget's79 phenomenological study of medical mistakes focuses on the language of 
mistakes. The clinical process, she observed, is one of discovery involving trial and 
error where a mistake is not seen as a failure but an inevitable part of medical 
practice. She views medicine as an 'error- ridden activity'.79 How junior doctors view 
medical mistakes and whether they view them as inevitable has received little 
attention. 
These above studies demonstrate that the way doctors handle their mistakes cannot 
be understood without reference to professional behaviours, attitudes and values. 
Process and systems theories provide a means of examining and measuring medical 
work and its inter-relationships with other parts of the health care system. Cognitive 
psychology provides ways of understanding human error, problem-solving and the 
impact of stress and the environment on individuals. All these areas help to provide a 
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deeper understanding of mistakes. Lessons from continuous quality improvement 
theory developed by the manufacturing industry have facilitated different ways of 
understanding clinical care. Early pioneers of continuous improvement theory include 
Walter Shewhart80 who invented statistical process control, and W. Edwards 
Deming81 who developed the plan-do-check-action cycle. More recent work in the 
1970s by Joseph Juran82, Armand Feigenbaum83 and Kaoru Ishikawa 84 resulted in 
Total Quality Management. For them, quality was not something controlled at the end 
of the production line but an integral concern to be applied throughout the work 
process. This shift from quality control at the end to quality assurance /management 
throughout also means a shift in the design of systems to allow such integration. 
The health system, using knowledge from quality management, has introduced a 
variety of methods for analysing adverse events. (Root Cause Analysisxiv, Clinical 
Practice Improvement methods are widely used.xv) These rely on identifying and 
measuring all the steps in a given process, not just those relating to the outcomes of 
care. 
3.2 The uncertainty of medicine 
Eric Cassell, 85 Clinical Professor of Public Health at Cornell University Medical 
College, wrote while reminiscing about his early medical education in the 1950s that 
his training was underpinned by four assumptions. The first was that the disease 
explained the illness. The second assumption was that the same disease in a 
different person produced the same illness. The final assumptions were that to know 
the science of disease was to know diagnosis and treatment and to know medical 
science was to know medicine. Cassell asserts that even though these are erroneous 
assumptions, doctors are still trained as if they are valid. 85 Popper and Mcintyre 47 
agree that such assumptions were never valid. They argue that because medicine 
mistakenly believed that knowledge grows by accumulation, by collecting more and 
more facts, scientific knowledge was certain knowledge which could be acquired and 
stored in a person's mind. The authors assert that far more knowledge is acquired by 
recognising errors- a process which is critical for learning. Nearly 50 years ago Fox77 
•v Root Cause Analysis is a process for identifying the most basic or causal factor or factors that 
underlie variation in performance, including the occurrence of an adverse sentinel event. 
""Clinical Practice Improvement (CPI) is the practical application of continuous quality improvement 
theory developed by the manufacturing industry. CPI is concerned with improving processes of care 
and reducing variation so that everyone's performance progressively improves. 
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identified two types of medical uncertainty: incomplete or imperfect mastery of 
available knowledge and the limitations of current medical knowledge. Regardless of 
the expertise a clinician has in any one area it is impossible to have complete access 
to information for 'perfect' decision making. Therefore mistakes are an inevitable part 
of the practice of medicine. 
Further uncertainty arises with the difficulty in distinguishing between personal 
ignorance and ineptitude and the limitations of medical knowledge86. How do junior 
doctors view mistakes? Do they see them as evidence of incompetence or as an 
inevitable part of medical practice? How do they react to and how do they manage 
mistakes? Even though junior doctors have limited knowledge and experience, the 
design of hospitals and their work schedules often places them in situations where 
lack of knowledge is not taken into account. 
In 1984, Hilfiker53 observed that physicians are trained in a way that assumes they 
can always perfectly diagnose and perfectly treat patients. At the heart of the 
perfectibility model is the belief that if only doctors and nurses would try harder and 
were more knowledgeable and skilful then errors would not happen. This view does 
not take into account the role played by other factors such as the organisation and 
human factors. The study of human factors concerns the interrelationships between 
humans, the tools they use, and the environment in which they live and work. Early 
human factors work in the military and industrial sectors87 concentrated on human 
interactions with physical devices or appliances. But today it has broader application. 
The technological revolution in health care has increased the relevance of human 
factors because the potential for harm when technology is mishandled or misapplied 
can be greater than without technology. Using human factors, one Harvard Medical 
School study 88 89 analysing anaesthetic mistakes, found that 82 per cent were 
caused by human error and 12 per cent from equipment failure. At the core of human 
factors analysis is the belief that understanding the environment is central to 
improving human performance and resolving human-machine interactivity problems. 
Awareness of the importance of the environment on performance though is not a 
recent development. In 1949 Chapanis wrote 
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" ... Our human requirements and our expectations of what a man can do in a system depend to a great 
extent on the kinds of environment into which the system is thrown. Too little attention has been given 
to this problem in the past, and it seems almost certain that a considerable amount of improvement 
can be made by altering many characteristics of the environment in which men work. "90 
3.3 Applying knowledge about mistakes to health care 
Leape, an Adjunct Professor at Harvard School of Public Health, was one of the first 
clinicians to use a multi-dimensional framework for understanding medical errors. 
Extracting cases from the Harvard Medical Study, Leape and his colleagues 32 
developed a typology of errors with four domains: diagnostic errors, treatment errors, 
preventive errors and other errors caused by failure in communication, equipment 
failure and systems failure.xvi Leape has written extensively about the importance of 
viewing errors as system failures rather than as evidence of 'guilt' of individual health 
professionals. This is a useful approach given what is known about human error. 
System theoristsxv;; argue that mistakes are more often caused by pre-existing 
organisational factors (poor processes, poor designs, poor teamwork, 
financial restraints and institutional factors) than by human blunders or negligence. 
We know that hospitals are complex organisations comprising multiple components 
and relationships which are prone to dysfunctionality yet we do not know how interns 
and residents experience this environment in relation to mistakes they make or 
witness. Health professionals have difficulty applying systems theory to health care 
delivery because typically, they are not trained to think in the concepts or language of 
systems theory nor do they use its tools to make sense of the systems in which they 
work91 . 
The role played individually or collectively by inadequate design of medical or 
hospital apparatus, poor teamwork, inadequate supervision and training in medical 
mistakes may be recognised by clinicians but awareness of strategies to address 
such problems is lacking. Systems and organisational design theories enable 
different perspectives on the complexity of health services. Plsek92 argues that the 
machine metaphor on which much of medicine has relied is the wrong metaphor for 
thinking about hospitals. The machine metaphor, which implies that a problem in one 
"" A more detailed discussion about the types of errors is found in Chapters One, Three and Four. 
,.,;; System theory is an interdisciplinary field which studies systems as a whole. System theory focuses 
on complexity and interdependence. 
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part can be easily fixed without reference to other parts, is inappropriate because the 
health system is complex, dynamic and adaptive. 
Major barriers to improving quality of care have been the lack of information,9394 
credible data95 and comprehensive measurement tools, 16 96 but professional fear and 
resistance to performance scrutiny and accountability are also factors. 97 98 There is 
strong evidence that better health outcomes are achievable when data collection and 
measurement is integrated into everyday clinical practice.95(p.5B1) Americans Tom 
Nolan, Brent James and Don Berwick are leading the way by incorporating quality 
improvement principles into clinical improvement methods. The identification and 
examination of each step in the process of health care delivery is the core of quality 
improvement activities. 
These methods are important for identifying areas for improvement but they assume 
that all the organisational and environmental factors will become evident through 
asking the 'what' and 'how' questions when investigating and analysing medical 
mistakes. 
The health system is now attempting to use this knowledge and learn from other 
complex organisations about managing and understanding mistakes and accidents 
caused by human error. In 1990, NASA developed an accident investigation method, 
Man-Technique-Organisation (MTO), taken up the Swedish National Board of Health 
and Welfare.99 The principles of MTO have been adapted for analysing medical 
process problems and include an examination of these factors: oral communication, 
written procedures, workplace design, physical environment, working environment, 
task supervision and training.99 
4 Underpinning assumptions and knowledge about human error 
4.1 Human error 
Human error is a complex subject. Errors occur in different parts of organisations or 
systems and require a variety of solutions for remediation. 45 A universally agreed 
system for classifying errors has yet to emerge. Another reason for the lack of 
consensus is that human error can be characterised from several perspectives: task 
characteristics, behavioural characteristics (errors of omission, commission or 
substitution), environmental factors or human psychological mechanisms.100 
Since the 1920s a number of accident causation modelsxviii have emerged. The 
organisational accident model developed by James Reason is the central model on 
which I rely. It has also been used by Vincent101 and others 102 52 for analysing 
mistakes in the health system. 
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Reason developed three categories, slips, lapses and mistakes to help analyse and 
understand the nature of errors. He defined errors as planned sequences of mental 
or physical activities that fail to achieve their intended outcomes, when these failures 
cannot be attributed to the intervention of some chance agency. 103(p.9J Errors may 
occur by doing the wrong thing (commission) or by failing to do the right thing 
(omission). The definition contains three elements: first, a plan or intervention that 
includes a goal and the means to achieve it; second, a sequence of steps or actions 
initiated by that plan; and third, the extent to which the steps or actions are 
successful in achieving their purpose.45 
Slips and lapses are defined as errors resulting from some failure in the execution 
and/or storage stage of an action sequence regardless of whether or not the plan 
which guided them was adequate to achieve its objective. 103 James Reason defined 
mistakes as deficiencies or failures in the judgmental and/or inferential processes 
involved in the selection of an objective or in the specification of the means to 
achieve it, irrespective of whether or not the actions directed by this decision-scheme 
run according to plan. 103 
Irrespective of whether errors are described as slips, lapses or mistakes, they all 
involve a deviation from the goal. When a person making one of these types of errors 
is in direct contact with another person, equipment or system, Reason calls these 
active failures. The origins of the events leading to an active failure may have 
commenced days, months or even years earlier. Reason 104 says two primary 
elements are always involved in accidents: active failures and latent conditions. 
I<Viii 1920s Heinrich's domino model, 1960s Bird's loss control model, 1970s Hale & Hale's model and 
James Reason's organisational accidents model which was developed in 1990. 
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Active failures are errors made by humans (for example, pilots, taxi drivers, crews, 
factory operators) which have an immediate adverse effect. Latent conditions involve 
poor decisions, poor designs, poor supervision, inadequate tools and equipment and 
actions by humans long before a given adverse event. 
Reason likens latent conditions to 'resident pathogens' which may or may not lead to 
an adverse event. Management decisions, instructions by designers, builders and 
clinicians all have the potential to lead to future errors. 
Reason 105 distinguishes violations from errors. Violations are intentional deviations 
from protocols, standards, safe operating procedures or rules. But he theorises these 
are rare 106 with the majority of errors arising from aberrant mental processes (poor 
attention, memory lapse, distraction, poor motivation, forgetfulness) rather than 
intentional unsafe acts. 
Reason argues that lower-order errors, commonly referred to as slips or lapses 
usually involve attentional, perceptual or memory failures usually associated with 
execution of an activity. Higher order failures involve mental processes such as 
misjudgement, miscalculation, or misunderstanding leading to a failure in formulating 
the intention or the plan (planning failures). He categorises mistakes into rule based 
mistakes and knowledge based mistakes.Xix He theorises that three separate 
cognitive stages exist for each type of error. 'Mistakes' involve the cognitive stage of 
planning, 'lapses' involve the cognitive stage of storing and 'slips' involve the stage of 
execution. 
~x Rule based mistakes cover the misapplication of normally good rules, application of bad rules, or 
the failure to apply a good rule (violation). Knowledge based mistakes occur when prepackaged 
solutions fail and the operator has to think out for themselves the solutions. 
_ 1 Attentlonel •liP• 
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Diagram 1 James Reason: Summary of the principal error types.•5 
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Norman,107 using a similar taxonomy to Reason, distinguishes slips and lapses from 
mistakes by simply stating that an error is a mistake when the intention is not 
appropriate and if the action is not what was intended it should be considered a slip. 
Norman, building on the work of Meringer,108 Mayer109 and Freud, xx classified three 
main sources for slips: the formation of the intention, activation and triggering. 
At the centre of Reason's organisational model of human error is the belief that errors 
(being symptoms revealing latent conditions in the system) are best viewed as 
consequences rather than as final causal events. He argues strongly that even 
though human-system interfaces are present as significant factors in most post 
disaster investigations, the causes of catastrophes are set in motion well before the 
actual disasters by a combination of a number of causal factors that alone are 
insufficient but when combined lead to the disaster. 
Rasmussen 100 agrees with Reason and adds that it is impossible to define errors 
alone by looking at the performance of humans or equipment in isolation. A 
multifaceted approach is necessary because one can only define an error as an error 
after detailed examination of the behaviour of the total man-task system. He 
observes that humans may think their intentions and actions were appropriate but 
their selected goal may not be appropriate in the context of the whole system. 
xx Sigmund Freud gave an early theoretical account of slips in 1901 . 
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4.2 Organisational safety culture 
The development of organisational frameworks for safer workplaces and safer 
organisational cultures was assisted by the impetus provided by a number of large 
scale technological disastersxxi in the 1980s.The core principle underpinning these 
frameworks was that not one but multiple factors are invariably involved in accidents: 
individual situational factors, workplace conditions and latent organisational and 
management decisions. The more complex the organisation, the greater potential for 
a larger number of latent errors in the system. 
Turner's 110 111 examination of organisational failures in the 1970s set the scene for 
accident analysis throughout the 1980s and 1990s. He was first to appreciate that 
tracing the 'chain of events' was critical to an understanding of the underlying causes 
of accidents. Reason's work on the cognitive theory of latent and active error types 
and risks associated with organisational accidents builds on his work. Reason 104 112 
analysed the shared features of many of the large scale disasters occurring in the 
1980s and noted that latent human errors dominated rather than technical failures. 
Even when faulty equipment or components were present he observed that human 
action could have averted or mitigated the bad outcome. 
Pidgeon, 113 who analysed the findings of the investigation into the Chernobyl 
catastrophe, observed that some large scale investigations failed to examine the 
wider organisational cultural issues. He argues that organisational errors and 
violations of operating procedures are often viewed as evidence of a 'poor safety 
cultureo1 14 rather than organisational characteristics contributing to the incident. 
Another lesson arising out of investigations of large scale disasters is the extent to 
which the prevailing organisational culture tolerates violations of rules and 
procedures. Vaughan's 115 historical analysis of the events prior to the Challenger 
crashxxii show how violations can become the rule rather than the exception. 
"
1 Spacecraft, ferries, off shore oil platforms, railway networks, nuclear power plants, chemical 
installations. 
""'The viton 0-ring seals failed in the solid rocket boosters shortly after launch. The Rogers 
Commission also found that other flaws in shuttle design and poor communication may have also 
contributed to the crash. 
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Vaughan described how violations are the product of continued negotiations between 
experts searching for solutions in an imperfect environment with incomplete 
knowledge."";;; This process of identifying and negotiating risk factors, he suggests, 
leads to the normalisation of risky assessments. Vaughan terms this process the 
'normalisation of deviance.' 115 Turner 111 referred to such negotiations as 'trade offs' 
which can make organisations vulnerable to breakdown. Reason 106 theorises that 
these conditions are systemic problems caused by 'upstream' factors. 
While the relationship between organisational failure and safety outcomes has been 
examined, 113116 there is no consensus on the components of this relationship and 
how it plays out in the real world. The necessary interdisciplinary nature of the 
research means that much of the work on safety cultures is fragmented and 
disconnected. Zhang et al's 117 literature review of 'safety culture'""iv noted that a 
majority of articles (30) appeared to share a number of features. First, safety culture 
is a concept defined at the group level referring to shared values, including a concern 
with formal organisational issues (management and supervisory systems). Second, 
everyone, at every level, is required to participate in efforts to maintain a safe 
environment. Third, safety culture impacts on behaviour and is usually reflected in a 
reward system based on monitoring of safety performance. Fourth, there is a 
willingness to develop and learn from errors, incidents and accidents. Finally, safety 
cultures are relatively stable and resistant to change.)()(V 
Reason 106 theorises that only a systems approach (as opposed to a person 
approach) will create safer work cultures because it is easier to change work 
conditions than human actions. He supports his theory with evidence from the 
xx1u For nearly a year before the Challenger's last mission the engineers were discussing a design flaw 
in the field joints. Efforts were made to redesign a solution to the problem but before each mission, 
both NASA and Thiokol officials (company who designed and built the boosters) certified the solid 
rocket boosters were safe to fly. (Challenger: A major malfunction. Malcolm McConnell Simon & 
Schuster 1987.p.7 Challenger had previously flown nine missions before the fatal crash. 
""'• The term 'safety climate' was included in the search term because the authors noted it was often 
used in conjunction with safety culture. 
""" I use Zhang and his colleagues' definition of safety culture which is defined in the definitions of 
terms section in Chapter One. 
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technological hazard industries showing the benefits of built-in defences, safeguards 
and barriers.xxvi 
For Reason, the pivotal post incident/accident question is why safeguards fail, rather 
than who caused it. Reason created the 'Swiss Cheese' Mode145 to explain 
how faults in the different layers of the system lead to incidents. 
Defences-in-depth 
•• 
•• 
•• 
•• 
Gaps or weaknesses 
in the defences 
Accident trajectory 
passing through 
corresponding holes 
in the layers of 
defences 
Diagram 1.2: The 'Swiss cheese' model of how defence barriers and safeguards may be penetrated by an 
accident trajectory.118 
Reason's diagram shows that a fault in one layer of the organisation is usually not 
enough to cause an accident. Bad outcomes in the real world usually occur when a 
number of faults occur in a number of layers (for example, rule violations, inadequate 
procedures, faulty equipment) and momentarily line up to permit a trajectory of 
accident opportunity. To combat this happening Reason invokes the 'defence in 
depth' principle.45 Successive layers of protection (understanding, awareness, alarms 
and warnings, restoration of systems, safety barriers, containment, elimination, 
evacuation, escape and rescue) are designed to guard against the failure of the 
underlying layer. 
4.3 The blame cycle 
When failures or mistakes occur it is common for individuals to be singled out and 
held accountable. This act of 'blaming' in health care is commonly referred to as the 
'blame culture'. Since 2000 there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
references to the 'blame culture' in the health literature.119 The pervasiveness of a 
xxvl Engineered defensive systems include automatic shut-downs (alarms, forcing functions, physical 
barriers). Other defensive mechanisms are dependant on people such as pilots, surgeons, 
anaesthetists, control room operators. Procedures and rules are also defensive layers. 
'blame culture' is thought to be one of the main constraints on the health system's 
ability to manage risk.45120"123 
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A demand for answers as to why 'the event' occurred is not an uncommon response. 
It is easier to blame someone than undertake complicated detailed analysis of the 
factors surrounding an adverse event. 
Charles Perrow 124 in 1984 was one of the first to write about the need to stop 
'pointing the finger' at individuals when he observed that between 60 and 80 per cent 
of system failures were attributed to 'operator error' .124 At that time the prevailing 
cultural response to mistakes in the workplace was to punish individuals rather than 
address any system problems that may have contributed to the error(s). 
Underpinning this practice was the belief that, since individuals are trained to perform 
tasks, then a failure of that task must relate to the failure of individual performance, 
thus deserving punishment. But to Perrow socio-technical breakdowns are a natural 
consequence of complex technological systems. 112 
Douglas, 125 an anthropologist, partially agrees with Perrow's analysis but she argues 
that his analysis concentrates too much on an industry typology and ignores the 
human factor at an individual and institutional level. The general structure of 
institutional authority, symptoms, clues, lines of communication, incentives and 
sanctions all involve humans and separately and individually are worthy of separate 
investigation and analysis. How humans experience or manage these factors have a 
bearing on the perception of risk in an organisation. 
Pivotal to blame sentiment is the belief that punitive action sends a strong message 
to others, that errors are unacceptable and that those who make them will be 
punished. The problem with this assumption is that it is predicated on a belief that the 
offender somehow chose to make the error rather than adopt the correct procedure: 
that he/she intended to do the wrong thing. Because individuals are trained and/ or 
have professional/organisational status we think that they 'should have known 
better' .118 Our notions of personal responsibility play a role in the search for the guilty 
party. Expressions such as 'the buck stops here' or 'carrying the can' are widely 
used. Professionals accept responsibility for their actions as part of their training and 
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code of practice. It is easier to attribute legal responsibility for an accident to the 
mistakes or misconduct of those in direct control of the operation then on those at the 
manageriallevel.118 
Reason,45 building on the earlier work of Perrow 124 and Turner, 111 provides this 
rationale for managing human error: 
• Human actions are almost always constrained and governed by factors 
beyond an individual's immediate control. 
• People cannot easily avoid those actions that they did not intend to perform. 
• Errors have multiple causes: personal, task-related, situational and 
organisational factors. 
• Within a skilled, experienced and largely well intentioned workforce, situations 
are more amenable to improvement than people. 
Reason warns against being wise after the event because most people involved in 
serious accidents are neither stupid nor reckless, though they "may be blind to the 
consequences of their actions". 112 He counsels against 'fundamental attribution 
error' and 'hindsight bias'. 
Today most complex industrial/high technological managers realise that a blame 
culture will not bring safety issues to the forefront. 102 Safe organisations do not 
depend on finger pointing or cover-ups but on open communication to identify failures 
or breaks in the 'defences'. Safe organisations routinely examine equipment design, 
procedures, training and other organisational features. 126 But in non-industrial fields 
such as health, the attribution of blame and punishment dominates management 
philosophy. 
4.4 Using knowledge about errors in this study 
The theoretical underpinnings of this study draw principally on the work of Reason 
106 and Leape52 127 who identify failures in the design of processes, tasks, training, 
and conditions of work that make errors more likely. The literature, summarised in 
greater depth in Chapter Three, identifies factors associated with medical mistakes. 
In my study I have categorised factors associated with mistakes as: Intern and 
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resident factors (the individual junior medical officer); patient factors; and the system 
of medical training and health care delivery. Intern and Resident factors include both 
personal (stress response and personality factors) and professional factors (medical 
knowledge and skill level). Patient Factors concern the complexity and severity of the 
patient's illness and personal demographics such as gender, age, and language 
spoken at home. System factors include the type of resident or intern training 
program (level of responsibility and degree of supervision), the hospital setting 
concerns organisational variables, scheduling of work, and unit cultures. Other 
external factors are likely to be also relevant such as Department of Health 
guidelines and regulations, the medical culture, budget constraints, and professional 
standards. Diagram 1.3 below describes the framework I use for my study. 
Diagram 1.3 Factors influencing junior doctors' mistakes 
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5 Outline of the thesis 
5.1 This study 
This is an in-depth study of interns' and residents' experiences and perceptions of 
the causes of medical mistakes using the framework outlined on the previous page 
and in Diagram 1.3. The literature about error causation provides a multidimensional 
approach for analysing accounts of junior doctors' experiences. Theories of error 
assume there is rarely one discrete cause but several interactive causes of any one 
error. The application of this principle to medical mistakes then must assume that any 
analysis of medical mistakes will need to elicit and explore that complexity. 
Complexity is best explored using qualitative investigation. 
5.2 Aims of this study 
The purpose of this research is to reach a deeper understanding of the experience of 
medical mistakes involving interns and residents. Adverse events research to date 
has focussed on either select patient groups (diabetes, stroke, mental illness) or 
places of work (for example, whole hospitals or hospital departments such as 
emergency departments and surgical theatres). There is little research examining the 
experience of junior doctors which takes its starting point from their perspective or 
experience. What they think about mistakes and how they handle them are important 
because their accounts may identify circumstances in which patients are more 
vulnerable to mistakes and provide insights into whether they are sufficiently 
prepared to handle mistakes. Whether interns and residents advise patients about 
mistakes and their reactions to patients suffering adverse events will indicate the 
level of support available to junior doctors. 
The sensitivities surrounding any open discussion of mistakes have been a 
significant barrier to research involving the examination of actual cases. Research 
into mistakes has relied heavily on the use of hypothetical cases studies. But 
hypothetical cases only gauge informants' imagined responses. They cannot 
examine context. 
A review of methods used to study mistakesxxvii shows that no studies have involved 
in-depth interviews to investigate the multiple factors underpinning mistakes by 
"""; I critique these methods in Chapter Four. 
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interns and residents. Nor are there published studies of any in-depth interviews for 
analysing actual mistakes using a multifactorial framework for exploring the 
underlying factors that may have been present or contributed to their occurrence. 
Anonymous surveys have questioned doctors about their mistakes but because they 
provide no opportunity to further question informants about their responses, these 
studies tend to yield superficial, condensed accounts of what the informants thought 
were the main problems. My study is the first to try to rectify these shortcomings and 
use in-depth discussions with interns and residents to explore mistakes in which they 
have been involved. We need to better understand their experiences to identify what 
areas we need to improve. 
An understanding of interns' and residents' experience with mistakes requires an 
appreciation and understanding of the origins of hospital training for junior doctors 
and the experience of junior doctors in the health system. In Chapter Two I provide 
an overview of the historical and environmental factors that impact on the work of 
interns and residents today. This context is necessary to understand the particular 
vulnerability of junior doctors caused by the training system. I review the research 
literature on mistakes including the experiences of interns and residents in Chapter 
Three. I describe the research method used in this study in Chapter Four. Chapters 
Five and Six present the results in six sections - total mistakes described and the 
factors identified, acknowledging and reporting mistakes, responding and discussing 
mistakes with others, avoiding mistakes, the environment and awareness of 
mistakes. In Chapter Seven I discuss my conclusions and the implications of my 
findings. I conclude with recommendations for improvements and further study. 
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Chapter Two: The environment 
In this chapter I outline some of the historical and organisational 
developments that have had an impact on junior doctor employment and 
training in Australian hospitals. The role the environment plays in mistakes, 
the impact of hierarchical training structures on education and training, ever-
changing health care needs of the population and the workforce needed to 
deliver care all play a role in health outcomes. The history of junior doctor 
training and education helps to explain some of the structural problems 
associated with the medical hierarchy and its impact on supervision and 
training of junior doctors. Many organisational issues associated with training 
and education relate to the origins of junior doctor employment and the 
development of public hospitals. I also summarise the medico-legal 
challenges because the organisation of training and current attitudes to 
litigation are important contextual features associated with junior doctors and 
mistakes. 
Hospitals' development 
Today hospitals fulfil two principal social purposes: they provide a centralised 
institutional setting for the provision of specialised medical services and they 
protect the family from the disruptive effects of caring for the sick at home. 1 2 
Early hospitals treated injured soldiers and date back to Roman times. 1 
During the Middle Ages hospitals expanded into the monastic centres, looking 
after monks, religious followers and the poor. The dismantling of monastic 
infirmaries in England 11 between 1536 and 1539 led to thousands of sick and 
infirm people being evicted into the streets which in turn led to the birth of 
non-profit hospitals for the curable and work houses and almshouses for the 
poo, homeless and incurable.3 
1 Hospitium means a place for guests and expanded in meaning during Roman times to also 
mean 'needing shelter'. In Roman times the military buill and controlled hospitals. (1994 The 
Oxford Medical Companion edited by Walton J Barondess J and Lock S. Oxford University 
Press 
11 King Henry VIII instigated the dismantling. 
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It was not until the eighteenth century that doctors gained ascendancy in 
hospitals. Reports of unsafe practices gave doctors a helping hand in their 
quest for patient responsibility. Inspecting Europe's hospitals in 1780 John 
Howard reported surgical mortality was three to five times higher in hospitals 
than in the home.4 But the status of doctors remained low into the next 
century due to competition from quacks and the need for patronage4 5 . Public 
debate in England about the role of hospitals came to a head in 1860 when 
London's consultants successfully lobbied for the rebuilding of St Thomas's 
Hospital opposite Parliament House.111 
In the UK 397 hospitals were built between 1851 and 1900, triple the number 
built between 1801 and 18506 . In the US the number of hospitals grew from 
170 to about 7000 between 1875 and 1925.7 Australia's first hospitals mainly 
treated convicts and the military with doctors also providing free care to 
settlers and the poor. The first non-government New South Wales hospitals 
were established by the Benevolent Society in 1821; by the 1880s New South 
Wales had 38 hospitals.8 In 2000, 748 public hospitals operated in Australia 
and 302 private hospitals.9 
Organisational changes in hospitals were accompanied by a changing 
medical profession. In the US four distinct groups of doctors emerged during 
the late nineteenth century 10. The first comprised 'distinguished' consulting 
staff who had no regular day-to-day duties. Visiting or attending staff, the 
second and most important group, supervised treatment. Resident or house-
staff (the third group) were young doctors in training who on the instructions of 
senior doctors carried out the details of treatment. The fourth group comprised 
dispensary staff (doctors) who saw outpatients. No doctors in any group were 
paid because of the benefits they received from accessing theatres, patients 
and services. By 1919 successful lobbying by professional medical 
associations saw US hospitals transformed into structured hierarchical 
organisations 10 reflecting the doctors' arrangements. 
111 The alternative was to be built in the country. 
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In the UK a similar hierarchy developed with the consultant at the pinnacle. 
London's Guy's Hospital was at the forefront of many of these changes. With 
advances in clinical medicine, physiology and pathology, the ability to 
describe clinico-pathological entities now dominated hospital practice.3 Guy's 
Hospital created the first 'registrar' position1v in 1853. Changing clinical 
practice required clinicians to pay more attention to hospital patients. This 
increased workload forced consultants to give junior doctors more 
responsibility for their patients. 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, consultants convinced governing 
boards that in addition to their responsibilities for patients they should also 
appoint the medical staff. 
The medical structure and hierarchy in Australia mirrored that in the UK 
except that from the start some doctors were employed as salaried medical 
officers. By 1947, 14 per cent of medical practitioners were employed in 
hospitals. This increased to 29 per cent by 1971. Of the 4800 doctors 
employed in hospitals 19 per cent (912) were interns, 49 per cent (2352) were 
registrars or residents and 16 per cent (768) were staff specialists. 11 By 
199812 15,385 salaried medical officers were employed in public hospitals. 
The number of Interns and residents (comprising 21 per cent (3165) of this 
group) appears to have stabilised. 
Porter4 dates the development of medical specialisation with the growth of 
hospitals in the nineteenth century, and a natural outcome of scientific, 
institutional and therapeutic developments. Specialist hospitalsv developed 
despite ambivalence about their merits 13 and spread to Europe, USA and 
Australia; all developing along similar lines as the British voluntary teaching 
hospital. In Australia specialist hospitals emerged in the last half of the 
IV The registrar's job was to make a written report on all hospital cases. Many other hospitals 
followed suit with similar appointments between 1860 and 1880. See S. Sinclair Making 
Doctors: An Institutional Apprenticeship 1997 Berg. 
v English hospitals included Moorefield's Hospital (1805 -Ophthalmology), Royal Ear Hospital 
in Soho (1816), Royal National Orthopaedic Hospitals (1841), Great Ormond Street for 
Children (1852) and the Throat Hospital in Golden Square (1863). 
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nineteenth century and were the forerunners of today's children and women's 
hospitals. 14 
During the nineteenth century doctors transformed hospitals from 
multipurpose centres 13 (charity work and sheltering the sick and poor) to 
institutions for the treatment of patients, vi medical research and education of 
medical students.1 By the twentieth century doctors were the primary 
providers of medical care. 1 
By 1900 specialisation began to affect hospital organisations: separate 
departments and research centres emerged with their own medical 
hierarchies and career paths. These specialties were added onto existing 
structures without reference to the needs of patients.4 
This increasing subdivision of medicine into specialties and sub-specialties 
changed relationships between patients, hospitals and other health providers. 
The haphazard medicalisation of hospitals resulted in duplication and 
inefficiencies, a system designed for the work routines of busy clinicians. 15 
Medicine, once an individualistic, intuitive and personal enterprise, had by the 
second half of the twentieth century become a complex inter-dependent and 
impersonal social service.3 Yet the system for admitting and treating patients 
remained essentially unchanged. Patients are still admitted under an 
individual clinician who usually makes decisions about admission and 
discharge. While clinicians may 'own' their patients, the day-to-day needs of 
patients are managed by a hierarchy of nursing staff and medical staff. 15 The 
roles of the Visiting Medical Officers and/or Consultants have not changed 
substantially since the nineteenth century:v11 they still spend most time away 
from the hospital treating private patients and depend on junior doctors and 
nursing staff to treat their hospital patients. But their role teaching junior 
doctors is diminishing.16 
VI By the end of the nineteenth century hospitalised patients came from all socioeconomic 
classes not just the poor, but it was not until the beginning of the 20'" century that 
occupational distribution was similar to the general population. (Starr P. The Transformation 
of American Medicine 1982 Basic Books page 159.) 
vn In 2004 The UK started reforming the hospital system by implementing a consultant-led 
health service. This requires senior doctors to be present on the wards at all times. 
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2 Teaching hospitals 
Once medical students and trainee doctors could only access patients in 
teaching hospitals.v111 Early teaching hospitals required patients to participate 
in medical education as a condition of their treatment. 13 IX The features of the 
modern teaching hospital can be traced back to the Flexner Report (USA) of 
191017 and the Haldane Commission of 1911 18 (UK). Today teaching 
hospitals are usually centres of excellence,x with an array of complex 
technology for diagnosing and treating patients 19 and conducting research. 
Patients can choose whether or not to participate in medical education. 20 
Medical education and training remain distinctive features of teaching 
hospitals.x1 Technology is costly as are the salaries of trainees, supervisors 
and related overheads.21 22 But despite significant changes to hospitals and 
increased costs for teaching hospitals, the organisational structure for doctors 
in the hospital workforce remains substantially unchanged.23 24 
The 1988 Report Australian Medial Education and Workforce into the 21 51 
Centurl5 identified the dichotomy between the training requirements of junior 
doctors and the provision of 24-hour medical service as a significant issue for 
teaching hospitals. The report identified three problems. First, the mix of 
disorders affecting patients in the major hospitals was often inappropriate for 
training. Second, the method for allocating salaries forced hospitals to use 
rosters which are not ideal for training or service. For example, night interns 
and residents who admitted patients at night often had poor supervision and 
no opportunity to continue their care or obtain the sequential view of treatment 
outcome. Third, the decreased number of medical graduates caused a major 
vm Many hospitals involved teaching of students and doctors through seminars, lectures and 
personal instruction but the term teaching hospital is reserved for hospitals with university 
affiliations. 
IX The first teaching hospital in Australia was established in 1883 when Anderson Stuart 
opened the University of Sydney Medical School with the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital 
established as the first clinical school. 
x 1 say 'usually' because in 2002 The King Edward Hospital in Perth, Western Australia (a 
teaching hospital) was the subject of a major report outlining inadequate organisational 
structures and poor patient care. 
XI There are 28 teaching hospitals in Australia. (Australian Council of Deans) 
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mismatch between the number of residents posts required for service needs 
and the number required for training purposes.25 
Hospitals in developed countries tend to follow the pyramid organisational 
model which historically has changed little.26 This model groups individual 
positions and clusters of positions into a hierarchy (pyramid).27 The chain of 
command commences at the top of the pyramid passing down through the 
organisation via department heads. Specialisation is superimposed onto this 
model. 
Until the 1990s local governance and non-medical hierarchical structures sat 
along side autonomous clinical hierarchies. Organisational structures today 
blur these traditional boundaries as a result of clinical governance which 
attempts to link clinical practice and management.26 28 Another problem is the 
different structures used by professional groups (doctors, nurses, allied health 
workers and administrators) to organise themselves. Different education, 
aims, methods and documentation systems create parallel systems of care in 
which continuity of care becomes a professional issue not an organisational 
collective concern.29 30 Separate professional cultures create more 
discontinuity and less consistency in patient care. xu 31 32 
3 Medical training in hospitals 
Until the nineteenth century, medical education, commonly known as 'medical 
improvement', involved the acquisition of knowledge by the already 'morally 
and intellectually disciplined adult'.33 Rosner 33 identified two types of medical 
improvement in the nineteenth century. The first involved university study of 
medicine leading to a doctorate of medicine. Graduates called themselves 
physicians of internal medicine. The second type of formal training involved 
the apprenticeship to a surgeon or apothecary. 
xu When I was Commissioner for the Health Care Complaints Commission I raised with the 
Colleges the high number of complaints concerning the lack of continuity of care for patients 
treated by multiply providers with no one talking full responsibility. This was directly related to 
the development of sub-specialisation in hospitals. 
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The apprentice was required to enter a legal contract which obliged himx111 to 
serve the surgeon or apothecary (his master) for seven years.x1v 34 In return 
for labour the apprentice was given the opportunity to acquire a set of manual 
skills. Attending lectures or reading text books was not required: instead they 
worked as servants as well as prepared for practice. 
A Swedish apprentice writing in 1737 said 
"The first years are mostly spent doing small tasks and waiting at table ... until ... he gradually 
becomes accustomed to wielding the razor, opening veins, applying plasters and at most 
bandaging a wound or fracture, and he may, in addition now and then be permitted to see a 
few operations performed by his master." 35 
Apprentices were sometimes exploited but they were also protected from 
dismissal during their apprenticeship. On completion of their contract they 
could practise as a surgeon-apothecary. Sinclair4 noted that the 
apprenticeship model guaranteed a level of competence in qualified adults, 
and it also controlled the number entering the profession. 
Students could have an apprenticeship and attend university, depending on 
their social status and economic support. Informal methods for medical 
education depended on relationships with various types of practitioners. 
Bedside teaching was common in both apprenticeship and university training. 
At the close of the seventeenth century medical students from Leiden 
University were examining patients in the local hospital and studying case 
histories_xv 
The one-on-one apprenticeship model was unsustainable and dissolved as a 
result of a guild rule that permitted each surgeon to take on only one 
apprentice.36 Massive population increases and the impact of the industrial 
revolution 4 created demand for more places but because of the one 
XIII Women apprentices were very rare. 
xlv Throughout most of the eighteenth century apprentices in the United Kingdom served 
seven years. 
xv At the end of the seventeenth century Hermann Boerhaave (1632-1723) gave clinical 
lectures on the diagnosis of diseases by their signs to students in a small12 bed ward of the 
Caecilia Hospital. He was a Professor of Medicine and Botany at Leiden University. 
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apprenticeship rule students began searching out other places for 
opportunities such as hospitals and private schools. Surgeons had no option 
but to accept multiple apprentices.36 
Hospitals continued to be the focal point for medical education and training xvl 
because of the ready supply of patients for examination and cadavers for 
dissection.37 University-based medical degrees were also becoming the 
standard qualification and preferred by the public. 
The University of Sydney Medical School was established in 1883. The 
attached clinical school at the Royal Prince Alfred Hospital provided bedside 
learning for students who were required to spend 6 months 'walking the 
wards'. Students would buy a ticket which permitted them access to the wards 
to see different types of patients and also access the ward journals (medical 
records). Today medical training involves a combination of formal scientific 
curriculum, scientific investigation and an apprentice relationship with 
experienced clinicians. 38 Although hospitals have become centres of high 
technology the method for training doctors continues the apprentice phase 
known as 'clinical medicine'. 
4 Internship 
While internship was a universal model around the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the appearance of a second model known as 'residency' was new. 
Residency is the period of hospital service after internship for physicians 
wanting to specialise.39 Johns Hopkins Hospital, as early as 1890, demanded 
resident physicians, surgeons and gynaecologists have at least 18 months 
hospital or equivalent experience.5 The first medical resident working at the 
Prince Henry's Hospital in Melbourne was appointed on condition that he 
forego his first year's salary.40 This was standard. Most hospitals did not pay 
their house officers. 5 
xv' Their competitors were private medical schools and colleges. 
42 
The American Medical Association's Council on Medical Education 41 
recommended as early as 1905 that internship become a formal part of 
medical education, but it was not until 1910 that formal hospital medical 
training began. Continuous service contracts with attending physicians, and 
integrating appointments and examination schedules of the medical schools 
were established, but were not universal. Lectures, conferences, seminars 
and formal and informal instruction were more common. Flexner42 estimated 
in 1925 that about 50 per cent of medical graduates did an internship. The 
affiliation with the universities provided medical students for teaching as well 
as opportunities for clinical research.39 
After World War 1 the changing profile of hospital patients, development of 
emergency departments, and expanding out-patient clinics created demand 
for 24-hour medical care3 . Hospitals met this by employing junior doctors-
interns and residents.xvn The number of interns employed in US hospitals 
increased from 28,000 in 1950 to 45,000 by 1960.43 44 
US universities believed the additional year in hospital essential for rounding 
out medical training.39 Graduating medical students accepted offers of 
internship because many were ill-prepared to treat patients in private practice 
without additional hospital experience. As specialisation in US hospitals 
flourished the attractiveness of standard 'rotating' intern positions diminished. 
By the 1970s post graduate training programs in the US were linked to 
specialist residency training.41 All post graduates are now called residents, 
reflecting the emphasis and preference for specialist training from the 
beginning. 
Bad working conditions, low or no pay and uneven educational experiences 
had always been a part of the US junior doctor experience. This led to the 
formation of the Intern Council of America in 1936. In 1941 this group 
expanded to include medical students and renamed the Association of Interns 
XVII Before WW1 hospital appointments in the US used the terms 'intern' 'extern' 'house pupil' 
'house physician' 'resident' and 'resident physician' : all provided 1-2 years living and working 
in the hospital but with little or no pay. 
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and Medical Students (AIMS). Political allegations made by the American 
Medical Association about AIMS' left wing affiliations during the post war 
(McCarthy) years saw its demise.45 Other groups emerged and unionisation 
crossed borders and emerged in Australia, Canada, and the UK.45 Campaigns 
around safe hours and competency based education programs for junior 
medical officers are now actively pursued in those countries.xvlll 
While there was some early interest (1918) in England for post graduate 
training XIX it was not until1950 that UK graduates were required to undertake 
a pre-registration year as a House Officer working for one or more 
consultants.34 The British Medical Association's Committee on Medical 
Education lobbied for the introduction of universal post graduate training 
during World War 1 and recommended in 1934 that newly qualified doctors 
should not be granted full registration until 
"Satisfactory evidence was produced of further clinical experience under supervision and of 
certain further instruction over a period which would normally extend to nine months and 
which should in no case be less than six months" 46 
Prior to the English Parliament introducing legislation making pre-registration 
training compulsory, the Ministry of Health in 1948 ordered that consultants 
were to be responsible for all in-patient beds and out-patient sessions similar 
to that at teaching hospitals.47 Sinclair4 describes the work arrangement 
between junior doctors and consultants as an extension of the 'firm' with its 
origins in the fee paying arrangements medical students historically had with 
their surgeons or teachers.xx Unlike US doctors, the English opted for a 
twelve month pre-registration period that included six months each in general 
medicine and general surgery which was to be undertaken in an approved 
XVIII I am on the Curriculum Development Committee for the Postgraduate Medical Council of 
NSW. This council is designing a curriculum based on core competency modules for Interns. 
Other countries are also implementing formal curricula for junior doctor training, see Chapter 
Three. 
XIX Sir George Newman, Chief Medical Officer, prepared a number of reports after a visit to 
Germany and the United States stating that post graduate education was necessary. He 
restated the need in 1932 and in 1939 but died before anything was formally adopted. 
xx Sinclair uses the term 'firm' to describe the hierarchical groups of trained doctors and 
doctors in training in one specialty. They are headed by consultants who give their name to 
the firm. See Sinclair S Making Doctors: An institutional apprenticeship 1997 Berg 
Oxtord:197 
hospital.xx1 These posts were to be salaried positions. While internship was 
not mandated for British doctors until 1953 compulsory internship was 
introduced in Australia as early as 1930.xx11 
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The obligatory pre-registration training of graduates in hospitals, known as 
internship, reflects both university and hospital traditions39 and is today the 
basic structure in the UK and Australia. Interns wanting to specialise 
undertake a further several years study as trainees or training fellows. While 
complaintsxx111 about the working conditions of interns irrespective of place 
had been recorded from the beginning48 modern activism by junior doctors 
began in the 1970s when American house officers targeted training, levels of 
pay and hours of work. 39 Similar trends are evident in the UK and Australia. 
The dual functions of education and service provision even in a time of less 
technology and complexity was always a potential problem. Today the dual 
roles of trainee and service provider present a significant tension in hospitals, 
along with the tension between the ideal world of the university and the 
apprenticeship traditions.3 39 Dr Jon Cohen, the chief medical officer for New 
York City Hospital, acknowledged the problem when he said "The big culture 
change is (that) the institutions have to recognize and treat residents as 
students"49 
Many of the problems identified with compulsory pre-registrationxx1v training in 
the 1950s remain. The 1944 Goodenough Report which recommended 
compulsory post graduate training singled out supervision as a major benefit. 
Poor supervision, inadequate learning opportunities and limited responsibility 
were major complaints reported in a survey of pre-registration employees 
done two decades later. 5° Almost all the 1961-2 cohort of pre-registration 
officers believed they had insufficient time for reflective thinking during their 
XXI As of 2003 the 12 month training period must include 3 months in medicine, 3 months in 
surgery, and may include up to 4 months in general practice. See Chapter Three which 
p,[ovides additional information about training conditions. 
11 Legislation making pre registration year mandatory appeared in the ACT Medical 
Practitioners Registration Ordinance in 1930 and in the NSW Medical Practitioners Act in 
1938. 
xxm See the section on reports of internships and residency training in Chapter Three. 
xxlv Pre-registration is the first year after graduation and the same as internship. 
employment50. This theme of inadequate teaching (poor learning) and 
supervision repeats itself through subsequent surveys of pre-registration 
house appointees. 51 
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Medical education today involves three distinct groups: undergraduate or 
graduate medical students, interns and resident medical officers (junior 
medical officers) and graduate training (specialty and sub specialty). 52 In 
Australia educational responsibility for these groups belongs to the university 
medical faculties, postgraduate medical councils in each statexxv, and 
specialist colleges respectively. 
Thirty years ago Fraser53 identified three principal functions of internship. The 
first was the establishment of the link between the dependence of students 
and the autonomy of practising clinicians. The second function was the 
provision of opportunities to independently practise skills and knowledge. The 
final function was the facilitation of apprenticeships. Roghmann et al54 
narrowed the function of internship to one solely relating to the acquisition of 
technical skills in handling disease. Yong and Collie55 were less prescriptive 
about the intern year observing that it was a period of training in general 
clinical method and patient responsibility. 
The rapid growth of technology in the 1960s and beyond XXVI contributed the 
development of high technology hospitals and increasing costs.xxvu Today 
most large metropolitan teaching hospitals are designed to provide advanced 
technology and skilled medical, nursing and allied health care. The three main 
tasks of hospitals outlined in the nineteenth century remain true today: 
treating patients, medical research and medical education. But Ludmerer9 
points out that that harmony among these functions is illusionary. He doubts 
=The Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW was established in 1988. The Council 
established a dedicated position called Director of Clinical Training (DCT). DCTs were 
~ointed in hospitals to act as advocates for junior medical officers. 
1 Technology includes drugs, equipment, operating theatres, surgical procedures, intensive 
care units, medical devices and instruments. 
'lXVII In relation to imaging, for example, ultrasound was introduced in the 1960s and 
successive decades have seen the development of Computerised Tomography (CT) 
scanners, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) Positron Emission Tomography (PET). 
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whether there ever was any integration. The bulk of most hands-on care in 
acute hospitals is still provided by interns, residents and nursing staff. 56 The 
dependency of hospitals on junior staff brings into stark contrast these 
competing functions. While the work of junior doctors and their training 
demands have been the focus of inquiries25 the role and work of consultants 
have also recently come under scrutiny. 57 Technology, specialisation, patient 
demand, and reduced hours for junior medical officers have had 
consequences not only for hospital organisations but also the work of 
consultants. Registrars have largely replaced consultants as the principal 
trainers of junior doctors. 58 Pressure is mounting on consultants, particularly in 
the UK, to do more clinical work in the hospitals and to take part in auditing, 
managing and contracting services. 59 These changes in the work environment 
have consequences for medical education yet training and education 
programs for junior doctors have not acknowledged this shift. Many of the 
problems associated with education of junior doctors in hospitals today can be 
tracked to the changes in medical practice, developing specialisation and sub 
specialisation. 
For more than a century the apprenticeship/service provider model has 
endured, despite a number of problems. First, the immediate needs of 
teaching hospitals often dictate the make up of the physician workforce. 
Second, the training needs of the interns and residents are often secondary to 
the need of the teaching hospitals to provide services. Third, most junior 
doctors do not work in a primary health care setting.60 Specific concerns 
about junior medical officer training in Australia include: multiple stakeholders, 
no accountability framework for medical training, no objective measures for 
training posts, no reporting of educational outcomes, training roles 
undervalued by hospitals, inadequate selection and recruitment procedures, 
training confined to the public system, no clear links between training posts, 
service needs and workforce planning, inflexible work practices and 
inadequate training for unstreamed residents. 51 
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5 The medico-legal environment 
Notwithstanding the complexity of the environment in which mistakes are 
made, blame and culpability inevitably appear. But an understanding of the 
underlying factors which contribute to mistakes is not paramount in medical 
negligence. Injured patients are entitled to explanations about their treatment: 
patients are entitled to explanations particularly when their claims involve 
culpability. But in ascribing blame patients (and clinicians) often fail to 
distinguish negligence from mistakes, natural variations, complications or a 
bad outcome. Yet in some cases bad outcomes are an inevitable 
consequence when dealing with the human body. 
The current medico-legal environment is a coalescence of three powerful 
forces: uncertainty in medicine, medical mistakes and patients' desire for 
compensation. The public interest demands that patients receive appropriate 
compensation, that professionals are held accountable, and incompetent and 
unethical practitioners are prevented from practising. The belief that someone 
must be responsible for a bad outcome facilitates the attribution of blame, 
encourages the notion that medicine is a perfect science and that mistakes 
only happen because of someone's culpability.xxvlll Under such 
circumstances community acceptance of the inevitability of some mistakes 
diminishes. Another factor implicated in the 'blame game' is tort law,62 the 
basis of compensation. Tort law requires a determination of blame or fault 
even though studies show that some juries award damages to injured patients 
based on sympathy instead of proof of negligence. 63 64 65 
The relationship between adverse events and culpability manifests in medical 
negligence actions, criminal negligence or manslaughter charges. Such 
community sanctioned mechanisms are believed to hold people accountable 
for their actions and deter others from similar acts. Some have argued that the 
tort system is irrational,6667 damaging to the community 68 and inadequate for 
holding doctors accountable. 59 Lessons from negligence cases rarely are 
XXVIII See Alan Merry and A McCall Smith Errors, Medicine and the Law 2001 Cambridge 
University Press pp 127-136 for an analysis of culpability and blame. 
used to improve care and indefensible decisions are settled confidentially.69 
'Non-negligent' doctors have also been sued.7e-72 
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The first reference to medical negligence was made by Sir William Blackstone 
in 1768 in Commentaries on the Laws of England.73 He used the term mala 
praxisxx1x to describe the relationship between negligence and doctors and 
defined it as "injuries ... by the neglect or unskilful management of (a 
person's) physician, surgeon, or apothecary ... because it breaks the trust 
which the party has placed in the physician, and tends to the patient's 
destruction."74 
The first reported case of malpractice in the US (1794) concerned Dr 
Benjamin Rush, who was also a signatory of the Declaration of 
Independence. He issued a libel suit in response to a malpractice allegation 
concerning his treatment of yellow fever victims. 75 Few actions reached the 
courts then because of the difficulties proving cases against practitioners 
(including quacks), who had varying levels of skill and knowledge. 73 It was not 
until the mid-nineteenth century that medical negligence became a part of the 
US legal landscape. 
The rise of malpractice in the US happened alongside two non-related 
developments: a sharp decline in religious fatalism and improved personal 
health and hygiene.10 73 Aggressive (and false) advertising at the time helped 
to create an environment in which the public did not accept 'God's will' in 
circumstances where many practitioners promoted wondrous treatments.76 
Between 1840 and 1860 malpractice claims increased in the US by 950 per 
cent.77 Editors of the medical journals wrote strong editorials about this new 
problem. 73 
XXIX The word malpractice is derived from the term mala praxis. 
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Malpractice litigation in the mid 1800s included many orthopaedic cases 
easily won by patients.xxx Ironically 20 years earlier patients who had their 
legs amputated due to incompetence had no case for compensation because 
there were no standards to judge care. Advances in medicine and the 
declaration of standards had opened the way for patients to demonstrate that 
their bad outcome was directly related to their surgeon's departure from the 
standard of care and treatment expected at that time. Many surgeons 
responded by refusing to fix broken limbs.76 
Animosity between lawyers and doctors dates from the mid 1800s?8 79 Mohr76 
described that medico-legal environment at that time: bitterness about 
ambulance chasing, touting for clients, dismay about the delay in bringing law 
suits, concern about the scope of negligence (being sued for what they did as 
well as for what they failed to do). But then physicians' concerns about 
litigation were not shared by the community generally. 
While problems with the tort system have existed for more than a century, 
medico-legal problems expanded with rapidly developing technology and the 
rise of the consumer movement in 1960s. XXXI A report published by the US 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare in 1973 outlines the events and 
changes in medicine at that time. 
During the 191h century and the first two or three decades of the 201h there was essentially no 
such thing as a malpractice 'problem' in the United States. On the whole sickness was 
accepted as a usual and expected thing ... The first significant change began in the 1930s. 
California, then ranking only sixth in population, suddenly surpassed all other states in the 
number of malpractice suits. Similar jumps were soon noted in Ohio, Texas, Minnesota and 
the District of Columbia. Thereafter, the number of malpractice suits continued to grow until 
World War II when the number of cases temporarily declined. In the 1950s litigation 
increased, in part because of the increasingly availability of medical care for all Americans 
and the rapid increase in the complexity of medical knowledge. New diagnostic techniques, 
therapeutic procedures and powerful drugs were developed, all of which were accompanied 
by new risks to the patient and practice challenges for the physicians80 
xxx Malpractice law suits come under Tort law initiated by patients seeking compensation for 
damages. The function of the Tort system is to provide compensation to those injured as a 
result of another's negligence and to deter future practitioners from negligent actions. 
XXXI The word 'tort' is drawn from the Latin word for 'wrong' 
The 1970s crisis led to several US states reforming the insurance industry 
and the legal system.xxx11 Doctors, responding to perceived legal threats, 
began to practice defensively: ordering tests, undertaking procedures, and 
providing treatments beyond those immediately indicated clinically as a 
precautionary measure in case there might be a risk, no matter how remote, 
of something wrong for which their patients might hold them liable. 
The second crisis in the 1980s provided further opportunity for tort reforms; 
malpractice claims were limited and damages capped.81 Retrospective 
analysis of these statutory reforms shows little positive impact. 82 
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English law differed to laws in the United States in that "strict liability" applied 
until the nineteenth century;83 the person causing the injury was liable whether 
or not they were at fault. But few actions were initiated because limited 
remedies were available; many treatments depended on 'nature taking its 
course' .84 Horace Smith in his 1880 Treatise on the Law of Negligence 84 
noted the paucity of actions against doctors and solicitors. 
Patients began winning their court cases in the 1940s.85 But generally medical 
negligence actions in the UK were the exception rather than the rule until the 
1970s.67 By the 1980s patients' claims had dramatically increased due mainly 
to the availability of expert opinions to back their claims. Action for Victims of 
Medical Accidents (UK), formed in 1982, was instrumental in putting patients 
in touch with experts willing to provide their opinions. 
Lochart, 86 writing about malpractice in Australia, said few negligence cases 
reached the courts before 1980. He favourably compared Australia with other 
English-speaking countries. Claims reaching court in the 1970s mostly related 
to 'failure of treatment' cases while in the eighties most claims concerned 
'failure to warn or inform'. XXXIII The number of claims significantly increased 
during the 1990s and mainly concerned 'failure to diagnose'. 57 Doctors' 
xxxu Proposals to limit awards, cap damages, use screening panels, apply alternate dispute 
resolution methods. use payment schedules and better reporting systems were all debated. 
xxxm Rogers v Whllaker is the benchmark Australian case that involved failure to warn of risks. 
insurers claimed the likelihood of a general practitioner being sued in the 
1990s increased from 1 in 160 in 1990 to 1 in 84 in1994.88 
51 
Whether a litigation crisis exists in Australia has been debated since the early 
1990s.89 Consumers and legal professional bodies point to the lack of data on 
the number of medical negligence cases and the medical profession and their 
associations point to the rising number of complaints and claims made. 
Unpublished 1991 statistics90 show claim numbers were low throughout the 
1980s. Rice91 estimated the number of medical lawsuits filed to be 0.35 per 
cent (250 out of 70,000) of lawsuits filed for injuries per annum. The 
Professional Indemnity Review92 undertaken in 1991-95 noted that much of 
the evidence suggesting a litigation crisis was anecdotal and assessment of 
the current position was difficult without data. The review did not find a pattern 
across the various jurisdictions of a massive increase in claim numbers. A 
1997 Victorian parliamentary inquiry93 also found no evidence of a claims 
crisis during the 1990s. But a study in 2002 by Insurance Statistics Australia 
on behalf of the medical indemnity funds in Australia found that the medical 
defence organisations at the end of June in 1992 had 485 claims of more than 
A$500,000.94 
The current medical indemnity crises, assuming they exist, in the US, the UK 
and Australia centre on affordability and availabilityXXX1v. Malpractice 
premiumsxxxv in these countries have greatly increased. 95-98 Governments in 
the US and Australia are responding by further reforms to their tort system 
such as capping damages and screening panels. (The reasons for these 
increases are complex and not explored in this thesis.) 
XXXIV The problem of availability relates to medical insurance organisations going out of 
business. In 2002 United Medical Protection, an Australian based defence organisation went 
into voluntary liquidation. 
xxxv For the year 2003 Florida obstetricians' premiums range from $143,000(US) to 
$203,000(US) per year. In Australia the premiums for obstetricians in New South Wales is 
$97,412 ( Aust) 
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The current systems of law in the US, UK and Australia have serious 
implications for clinical practice. In addition to the high costsxxxv1 of 
negligence 99 there are other serious consequences. Obstetriciansxxxvu are 
abandoning practice because of legal threats and high insurance premiums,97 
100 honesty with patients has been compromised by a fear of litigation, 101-105 
defensive medicine exposes patients to added risks and increased costs,69 106 
107 and impacts adversely on the doctor-patient relationship. 108 
6 Reporting and learning from mistakes 
The need for medical students, interns and residents to know about medical 
mistakes and adverse events was recognised in the literature in the early 
1980s, coinciding with a malpractice crisis in the US, and again in the late 
1990s as part of the safety and quality focus within the health system. The 
value of incident reporting, recognised as far back as the 1950s, remains 
important for identifying problem areas- medication errors,109 patient falls, 
mis-identification of patients 110 and retained swabs in operations. 111 
While there is a growing literature112 on the importance of reporting adverse 
events, few studies address the difficulties doctors have in reporting adverse 
events. 
The blame culture 113-115 in medicine affects interns and residents in terms of 
how they manage and learn from medical errors including whether or not they 
discuss them with more senior colleagues. 116 Unlike nurses, medical clinicians 
tend to under-report medical errors.115 117-121 The existing methods (mortality 
and morbidity conferences, peer review and grand rounds) used by doctors 
for discussing mistakes are often conducted in a 'blame' environment, 116 122-124 
which would deter junior doctors from speaking up or reporting. Self-reporting 
methods have been suggested for improving reporting, including using the 
'morning report'125 to enhance adverse event detection and encouraging self-
xxxv'ln the USA more than US$10 billion is spent on malpractice and legal costs. (WR Brody, 
President Johns Hopkins University). There are no publicly available data on the frequency, 
cost (payouts and legal fees) and causes of medical negligence actions in Australia. But the 
Personal Injury Lawyers Association (Australia) estimates costs to taxpayers are 
~roximately A$4.17 billion annually. 
11 The main reasons given by doctors for ceasing obstetrics were intention to specialize in 
gynaecology, fear of litigation, high indemnity costs, family disruption, and long working hours. 
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reporting of mistakes.126 But other than the use of the morning report there is 
no evidence suggesting better ways to encourage reporting or for junior 
doctors to learn from mistakes. 
Given the substantial information available about the inadequate training and 
the difficulties faced by junior doctors, the dearth of research about junior 
doctors' experience with mistakes is perplexing, notwithstanding the 
sensitivity of the topic and medico-legal fears. 
7 The present position of junior doctors in Australian hospitals 
One of the reasons stated for the reticence of doctors to be open about 
mistakes is the fear of exposing themselves to complaint or litigation.127 128 
This perception is valid even though there are doubts about the accuracy of 
doctors' assumptions about the law and the legal system. 129 Junior doctors 
are not immune from such medico legal pressures and the 'fear of litigation' 
culture that pervades many hospital corridors and theatres influences their 
perceptions of mistakes and litigation risks. 
Fear of litigation whether real or perceived remains a barrier to junior doctors 
understanding and learning from their mistakes. Patients may not be 
sympathetic to a defence of inexperience if they suffer an adverse event; 
inexperience is not an antidote for complaints or medical negligence actions 
involving junior doctors. The current environment treats mistakes as 
something shameful and to be hidden. While patients need to acknowledge 
their vulnerability to bad outcomes, doctors also need to acknowledge their 
fallibility as human beings in the context of uncertainty in medicine. 
Junior doctors will not be open about their mistakes if they do not see their 
supervisors or seniors routinely discussing their mistakes without 
consequence. Yet interns and residents are still expected to make and learn 
from their mistakes (in the context of their education) but in the context of 
litigation their role models, senior clinicians and clinical supervisors, express 
fear of disclosing mistakes.130 
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Chapter Three: What do we know? Literature review 
Introduction 
In the introductory chapter I outlined some theories about human error 
developed by human factors researchers and cognitive psychologists. The 
literature reviewed in this chapter is primarily concerned with mistakes in 
health care. The literature shows that interns' and residents' direct 
experiences of medical mistakes are under-researched with few published 
studies. The studies involving junior doctors are mainly about education and 
training, hours of work and working conditions. These provide important 
information about the training, experience and the work environment of junior 
doctors. The first two years of junior doctors' training has also been the 
subject of many government enquiries and reports about hospitals generally 
and the medical workforce in particular. While there are references to the 
potential for errors, few studies and none of the inquiries directly address 
junior doctors' experience of adverse events. 
In this chapter I show that while much of the literature on junior doctors 
highlights workplace issues and problems (inadequate knowledge, 
inexperience, inadequate training and education, poor supervision, fatigue 
and stress}, detailed investigation of the actual experiences of interns and 
residents with mistakes has not been undertaken. This gap in research means 
that programs designed to reduce the number of adverse events in hospitals 
may fall short because they fail to take into account the experience of interns 
and residents with mistakes. We do not know the types of mistakes they 
make, why they make them or what the junior doctors think will help them 
avoid mistakes. An analogous situation would arise if pharmacists were not 
asked about medication errors as a step in designing programs to manage 
and minimise adverse events arising from medication errors. It would be 
inconceivable that pharmacists would not be included in developing or 
designing programs to reduce medication errors. 
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I have included in this literature review any randomised and non-randomised 
controlled studies, observational studies, descriptive studies, analytical 
articles, opinions, case studies, protocols, autobiographical accounts and 
books. I searched MEDLINE (1966- December 2004) PsyciNFO (1984-
December 2004) CINAHL (1982 to December 2004) Sociological Abstracts 
(1963 to December 2004), EMBASE, Expanded Academic ASAP International 
1980 - December 2004. I also searched The National Reference Center for 
Bioethics Literature (NRCBL), Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown 
University, Washington, DC, USA, on its bibliographic databases.; I assessed 
the studies and references to be included using a methodology developed by 
the US Preventive Services Task Force (1996) 1 plus the additional rating to 
cover protocols on disclosure developed by organisations. 
The literature on junior doctors and medical mistakes is all Level Ill and IV; 
evidence, comprising descriptive studies, reports, opinions of respected 
authorities, protocols and standards. 
This literature review is in five sections. First I review the articles that directly 
studied junior doctors and their experience of mistakes. I then review the 
literature outlining the ethical responses to mistakes. The third section is a 
review of all the studies and articles on junior doctors such as training and 
education, knowledge and experience, supervision, fatigue and stress. While 
these studies do not directly study the association or relationship with 
mistakes, they are important because they show the potential vulnerabilities of 
junior doctors to make mistakes. The fourth section is a brief review of the role 
communication plays in mistakes involving junior doctors. The final section is 
a review of all the inquiries and major reports about junior doctors. 
; The databases are maintained by the NRCBL with support from the National Library of 
Medicine and the National Human Genome Research Institute, both at the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health). 
'
1 Levell evidence is randomised controlled trials, Levelll-1 is non-randomised controlled 
trials, Level 11-2 is a well designed cohort or case controlled analytic study from more than one 
research centre/group and Levelll-3 is evidence obtained from multiple time series with or 
without intervention. (See Eisenberg John M. What does evidence mean? Can the law and 
medicine be reconciled? Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law;2001 ;26(2):369-81.) 
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1 literature on junior doctors' experience with medical mistakes 
The disciplines of medicine, anthropology and sociology have studied doctors' 
experiences of medical mistakes. Anthropological and sociological literature 
on doctors' mistakes mainly concentrates on the use of language, and the 
characterisation of the medical profession and culture. These studies, like 
mine, accept errors as a given and explore the emotional responses and the 
social context within which errors occur. But none examine the underlying 
causes of medical mistakes involving interns and residents. 
The medical literature on junior doctors and mistakes includes studies 
examining frequency of mistakes, 3"5 types of errors, 6 7 responses to mistakes, 
8 9 problems faced by junior doctors, 10 11 12 experience of mistakes, 13 14 
competency 15 and prevention of errors. 16 
The literature on doctors and mistakes according to the level of experience of 
the health care providers giving the care and treatment is in its infancy. My 
study is only concerned with junior doctors and excludes mistakes by more 
senior clinicians. Common sense suggests that level of experience is a 
relevant consideration in mistakes. My study includes level of experience 
(knowledge and/or skill) as one of a number of factors that may be involved in 
mistakes. 
Fourteen studies (all qualitative) were found that concerned junior doctors and 
their direct experience of mistakes. But only three studies812 14 involved 
interviewing junior doctors about mistakes. Unlike my study none of these 
involved interviewing the doctors about the underlying factors or causes of 
mistakes. 
A 1973 Australian article by Bates was one of the first to connect patient 
safety with junior doctors. 11 Bates, a sociologist, did not plan to examine 
medical errors; the junior doctors themselves raised their fears of making 
mistakes in the context of preparedness for hospital practice. Ninety-five 
resident medical officers from 16 hospitals;;; in New South Wales were 
interviewed in groups or individually. Their main concerns related to 
inexperience in performing basic procedures such as suturing, intravenous 
injections, putting in drips and taking blood. Many reported they were required 
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to perform these procedures on patients without prior instruction or training. 
The study provided no data on mistakes, and we do not know whether the 
self-doubts about the junior doctors' skills resulted in any mistakes. The 
residents reported a reluctance to call for help which Bates attributed to their 
fear of being seen as 'incompetent'. One resident in a peripheral hospital said 
'It's quite possible to go right through the year making mistake after mistake 
and not knowing about it.' 11 This telling remark highlights the importance of 
finding out the experience of junior doctors and what they think about 
mistakes. Bates suggests that errors by junior doctors were more easily 
identified in teaching hospitals because of better su~ervision, while errors 
made by junior doctors in peripheral hospitals may go undetected because of 
inadequate supervision. 
But Bates' study, like others below, makes assumptions about the training and 
work environment for junior doctors which are questionable. If there is no 
attempt to investigate the underlying causes of mistakes by junior doctors 
whether located in the personal, patient or system domains, it is difficult to be 
conclusive about junior doctors' reactions to mistakes. Bates did not 
investigate mistakes either separately or in relation to supervision. She makes 
no reference to the need for better understanding of medical mistakes. 
The first study to examine the direct relationship between adverse events 
involving junior doctors was a UK study published by Steel et al in 1981.3 This 
medical record review study found that if a patient suffered a complication it 
was likely to have occurred either during their admission when the accuracy of 
house officer's assessment of the patient's clinical condition was a factor or 
from a house officer's incorrect diagnosis. The study showed a strong 
correlation between major complications and house officers' inaccurate 
assessments. 3 
Because this study relied on the medical records for information about 
adverse events, associated factors such as working conditions or time 
pressures would not have been considered. 
Recent studies on the reliability of medical record review have suggested 
there is poor inter-reliability among physicians trying to identify adverse events 
iii My study hospital was included in Bates' study. 
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using this method.1718 A significant factor appears to be the reliability of the 
doctors' judgements about whether an adverse event occurred in the first 
place. My study avoids this problem because I rely on the informants and not 
a medical record review to identify mistakes. One study comparing the 
effectiveness of house staff physicians reporting adverse events with 
retrospective medical record review found that doctors' reporting of adverse 
events uncovers as many adverse events as does a record review and is less 
costly. 19 
One of the first studies to use the interview method to ask junior doctors about 
their mistakes was undertaken by Mizrahi 13 in 1984, but she studied the 
coping mechanisms of junior doctors, not the underlying causes or factors 
associated with, or contributing to, their mistakes. This US study was part of a 
larger longitudinal study on the impact of graduate medical socialisation of 
interns on the doctor-patient relationship. 12 In-depth interviews were 
conducted with 74 house staff over a three-year period. Mizrahi found that one 
half of the house officers questioned said they had made serious, sometimes 
fatal, mistakes during their internship. 13 
Mizrahi found that internists used three methods for handling mistakes: denial, 
discounting and distancing. Denial occurred when mistakes were redefined as 
non-mistakes. Because Mizrahi observed senior residents deny mistakes she 
thought that the defence of 'denial' was entrenched in the discipline of 
medicine.13 Discounting occurred when interns, unable to deny a mistake 
because of the gravity of the situation, tried to discount their responsibility and 
exonerate themselves. Externalising the blame to the bureaucracy, superiors, 
subordinates, or colleagues as well as blaming the patient or the disease was 
common. 13 Mizrahi believed distancing mechanisms were used when denial 
and 'blaming others' failed. Interns practised distancing when they made a 
direct admission of 'guilt' by invoking norms of professional behaviour 
conduct; 'I did everything I could.' These responses, she argued, were used 
by interns to protect themselves from the repercussions of serious mistakes 
and to lessen their sense of guilt and responsibility. This study assumed that 
mistakes were mainly caused by the actions of individuals. 
The second half of Mizrahi's study concerned interns' attitudes to 
accountability. She concluded that interns believed mistakes were a matter of 
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opinion and that no one was able to (or should be able to) judge them for their 
actions and decisions.13 This study did not say whether the interns saw their 
supervisors as adjudicators or arbiters. This study helps us to understand the 
possible responses interns and residents have after mistakes and provides 
insights into doctors' attitudes to mistakes. The knowledge we now have 
about human error and the underlying systemic factors substantially alters the 
context in which mistakes involving doctors can be analysed. 
Paget's 1984 book 20 on medical mistakes is based on in-depth interviews of 
40 US physicians either in residency training or in medical practice. While 
junior doctors were not her focus she explored physicians' emotional 
responses to their own and others' mistakes. Paget thought mistakes in 
medicine inevitable and did not seek to establish their causes or underlying 
factors. Paget concluded that medicine was a process of discovery; an 'error-
ridden' activity. 
Studies have also focussed on specific activities known to be associated with 
mistakes. Lesar et al's study 21 in 1990 reported prescribing errors in a US 
teaching hospital (Albany Medical Center). They found first year post graduate 
residents had a higher error rate (4.25 per 1000 orders) than other prescribing 
classes. Why this was the case was not explored. The study was not 
concerned with underlying causes other than the time, place and the 
prescriber status of the person making the error. The frequency of prescribing 
errors is now well documented but strategies to improve junior doctors 
prescribing other than using computerised order entry with decision support 
are yet to be described. 
Another US study about mistakes by Wu et al 8 in 1991 involved an 
anonymous survey study of 254 (45 per cent return rate) internal medicine 
house officers on an internal medicine training programs located in three large 
academic tertiary care hospitals. Sixty-eight per cent were junior residents. 
This study categorised mistakes into errors of diagnosis (33 per cent), 
prescribing (29 per cent), evaluation (21 per cent}, communication (five per 
cent) and procedural complications (11 per cent).8 House officers were asked 
to describe their most significant medical mistake, their response to it, the 
subsequent events and what they attributed the mistake to. There were no 
questions about the events leading up to the mistake. 
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Wu selected three factors to describe the causes of mistakes: - inexperience, 
job overload and case complexity.8 The house officers in Wu's study usually 
attributed mistakes to more than one cause, but once the causes were 
identified there was no further inquiry or analysis of the underlying factors. For 
example, 51 per cent (58) reported a cause of the mistake as 'too many other 
tasks'. There was no discussion of why there were too many tasks or any of 
the organisational or system problems associated with overwork or fatigue. 
The premise of both Mizrahi's and Wu's studies appears to be that mistakes 
are inevitable and their underlying causes known. But what is known is 
unclear. The studies imply that mistakes are caused by individual factors 
(inadequate knowledge and skill) without explicitly saying so. 
House officers in Wu's study discussed the mistake with their supervisor in 
54 per cent of cases. The patient (or family) was involved in discussions about 
the mistakes in 24 per cent of cases.8 Wu's results showed that in 1989 house 
officers held themselves solely responsible for mistakes. In 76 per cent of 
cases the respondents said they 'promised to do things differently the next 
time.' Sixty-two per cent were self-critical and gave a 'lecture to themselves'. 
Another 21 per cent said they would apologise or 'make up'. The emotional 
responses ranged from remorse (81 per cent), anger at themselves (79 per 
cent), guilt (72 per cent) and inadequate (60 per cent). Twenty-eight per cent 
feared negative repercussions from the mistake. Since this was an 
anonymous questionnaire there was no opportunity to question the doctors 
about why they thought they were responsible or what they thought about the 
role played by the organisation or system in mistakes. 
As with Mizrahi's study, Wu's study shows that mistakes were mainly viewed 
as a personal responsibility requiring personal solutions. Ninety-eight per cent 
of house officers identified remediation as the appropriate response to a 
mistake such as making adjustments to their own practice. Doctors were more 
likely to make positive changes in their practice if: (1) the doctors were female, 
(2) the outcomes for the patients were serious, (3) the doctors were 
inexperienced, and (4) the case was complex and the house officer accepted 
responsibility and discussed the mistake with seniors.8 There was a significant 
correlation between defensive reactions to the mistake and perceptions of job 
overload and a judgemental institution. 
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Wu et al recommended that house officers should continue to accept 
responsibility for their mistakes and also discuss their mistakes with attending 
physicians. He recommended research about the reluctance of house officers 
to disclose mistakes to their supervisors. 
Caiman et al's 10 interview study in 1991 of 'approximately' 200 pre-
registration house officers, consultants, registrars, nurses and others from the 
West of Scotland sought to determine the major problems faced by trainees in 
their first three years after graduation and whether these problems affected 
service provision and patient care. This was done by examining intern 
involvement in a review of all reported critical incidents (adverse events). Of 
the 200 interviewed, 85 were pre-registration house officers. Informants were 
asked to provide examples of incidents (mistakes) that had occurred in the 
recent past. Key words identified from hand written notes were used to 
categorise responses. The analysis shows that a number of factors were 
identified as significant in the critical incidents. Personal aspects (degree of 
personal involvement and need for supervision) rated the highest in terms of 
the number of key words. The study reported that many junior doctors said 
they were not listened to and were unsupported by senior clinicians who gave 
little feedback about their progress. In addition, deficiencies in supervision, 
poor feedback on performance, inadequate induction and skill in practical 
procedures and poor organisational skills were identified by junior staff. 
A study by Baldwin4 22 et al documented frequency of errors in a 10 year study 
of a cohort of over 400 junior doctors in the United Kingdom. During 1993-96, 
77 per cent of the 400 junior doctors reported making one or more mistakes in 
the past month. The respondents ranked their mistakes into one of three 
grades; minor mistakes in the past month (where the patient suffered no pain 
or discomfort), moderate mistakes in the past two months (where the patient 
suffered pain, discomfort, temporary or permanent disability or both) and 
major mistakes in the past year (where the patient had been endangered or 
died). Minor mistakes were excluded because the authors said they were too 
frequent. Their high number does not fully explain why they were not 
examined because minor mistakes can also be costly to an organisation and 
inconvenient to patients. The proportion of doctors making moderate and 
major mistakes by year were: 1993 (moderate 39 per cent, major 43 per cent), 
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1994 (moderate 44 per cent, major 44 per cent) 1995 (moderate 46 per cent, 
major 30 per cent) and in 1996 (moderate 24 per cent, major 16 per cent). 
The main causes of moderate and major mistakes identified by the doctors 
were ignorance and inexperience. The authors concluded that doctors' 
increasing knowledge was being outpaced by their increasing autonomy and 
hence greater opportunity to make mistakes. 4 
The major problem with this study was that the data were extracted from an 
anonymous survey about doctors' working conditions which included 
questions about mistakes. There was no opportunity to question the doctors 
about their experiences of mistakes or elaborate on underlying causes. The 
definitions for the three categories of mistakes (minor, moderate and major) 
were problematic because they required the respondents to know the 
outcomes of their mistakes. Shift work, changing rosters, patient discharges 
and transfers might stop some doctors knowing they had made a mistake. 
Outcomes of their mistakes in terms of seriousness or planned treatments for 
patients might be unavailable. The other difficulty is that we have no idea of 
the numbers involved; only percentages of doctors reporting mistakes were 
reported. 
In an editorial in the British Medical Journal 23 (2000) nearly a decade after his 
first study was published, Wu restated the necessity of being open about 
mistakes, and while he was still concerned that doctors accept responsibility 
for their mistakes he was less optimistic about this happening because of the 
blame culture within medicine and the community. Wu appears to maintain 
that junior doctors owning-up to their mistakes is still the central issue even 
though he acknowledges the difficult medico-legal environment. Honesty is a 
professional responsibility and owning-up is just one reaction to mistakes. 
Unless we examine the multiple factors that contribute to mistakes we miss 
the opportunity to learn how mistakes can be avoided. There is little evidence 
that 'trying harder' and 'doing better' reduces adverse events. 
An interview study by Pearson et al 7 in 2002 on prescribing mistakes of ten 
interns from two NSW teaching hospitals concluded that traditional forums for 
information exchange such as morning hand-over of patients and grand 
rounds failed to provide adequate 'field experience' in prescribing. The interns 
identified a variety of positive and negative influences on their prescribing 
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practice. Registrars had a positive influence while consultants were perceived 
negatively, being seen as authoritarian, inflexible, and unavailable and 
'tending to stick to their old ways'.7 
Interns' responses to prescribing errors fell into two categories. The first 
involved the intern being told about the mistake in a non-confrontational 
manner, being provided with clear explanations of why a prescribing decision 
was flawed and being guided in the appropriate course of action. The second, 
described by the interns as 'personal nightmares', involved confrontational 
communications between the intern and the clinician without clear 
explanations for better prescribing.7 Other negative learning factors included 
time pressures and the structure and organisation of the medical and hospital 
hierarchies. 
2 Ethical responses to mistakes 
The quality of ethical responses by interns and residents to mistakes has not 
been widely studied even though honesty and integrity are commonly 
considered hallmarks of the medical profession. The public trusts health 
providers to put the interests of patients firsf4 25 and when other interests 
dominate, public trust is damaged.26 27 28 Deceiving and avoiding patients who 
suffer because of medical errors offends two main ethical obligations - respect 
for autonomy and putting the patient's welfare first.29 Interns and residents 
usually have underdeveloped ethical reasoning abilities for managing ethical 
dilemmas on a day-to-day basis so as they progress in their training they are 
expected to develop ethical reasoning skills from their supervisors and 
mentors. Learning how to tell patients and families about medical mistakes 
depends on exposure to these activities.30 
The literature 30"38 shows that mistakes are not routinely disclosed to patients 
or their families and is silent on the issue of junior doctors' communication 
with patients or their families after adverse events. One could deduce that 
junior doctors have few opportunities to observe and learn from supervisors 
about how to communicate adverse events to patients or family members. 
The ethical duty to disclose a mistake to patients is clear but the obligation to 
formally report one's own mistakes to one's colleagues or a supervisor is less 
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so. Interns' and residents' willingness to report mistakes to their employing 
organisation have been studied. A 1999 study by Vincent et al 30 in the UK 
examined why formal reporting mechanisms for adverse events were not used 
by junior staff. An anonymous questionnaire was given to 209 staff working in 
an obstetric unit with 198 participating: 42 (84 per cent) doctors and 156 (98 
per cent) midwives. Fear that junior staff would be blamed was one of the 
main reasons given for non-reporting. Other reasons included high workload 
and judgements that the 'reportable incident' did not need reporting. The 
study concluded that staff do not report incidents just because the hospital 
requires they do so but mediate their decision to do so by considering other 
aspects of the case before deciding to report. Junior midwives were much less 
likely to know which incidents to report or their reporting responsibilities. High 
workload and worries about litigation influenced junior doctors not to report. 
The authors recommended that there be fewer clearly defined 'reportable 
incidents'. Modifying the list of 'reportable incidents' may result in improved 
reporting but we also need to know how mistakes are managed by junior 
doctors and the barriers to their being reported. We need to understand why 
junior doctors are reluctant to report mistakes. Because Vincent's study was 
an anonymous survey of staff working in two obstetric units the authors were 
not able to explore such questions with them. Staff in obstetric units are also 
sensitive to mistakes or complications because of their association with birth 
injuries and medical negligence verdicts. The views of the respondents may 
not represent the views of junior doctors working in other departments. 
Studies3841 about the motivations of physicians in their decisions regarding 
the disclosure of medical errors suggest a variety of reasons for not telling 
patients. Fear of litigation41 37 was the most common, while a concern for the 
patient's right to know the truth of their condition39 was the main reason for 
disclosing. More recent studies in 199739 and 200040 investigated clinicians' 
responses to disclosing medical mistakes. Sweet and Bernat's studl9 used 
three fictitious case vignettes involving medical errors. Each vignette was 
designed to assess whether the physician would tell the patient about the 
error and the factors most influential in that decision. Surveys were distributed 
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to 50 medical students, 50 house officers, and 50 attending physicians at 
Dartmouth (US) Hitchcock Medical Centre, a medium-sized rural academic 
medical centre. Subjects were randomly selected from a list of 310 attending 
physicians, 263 house officers, and 310 medical students. Of the 150 surveys 
mailed 106 were completed (71 per cent) consisting of 46 (92 per cent) 
attending officers, 27 (54 per cent) house officers and 33 (66 per cent) 
medical students. The results showed that a decision to disclose a medical 
error involved consideration of the following competing conflicts: personal 
morality, professional obligation to prevent errors, concern that disclosure 
would damage their relationship with other colleagues, the patient's right to 
know the truth and concern that information would cause more suffering for 
the patient and damage to the patient's confidence in doctors. 
Physicians were generally willing to admit errors to patients, but as the 
severity of the injury increased their willingness to admit errors decreased. 
Willingness to disclose errors of other treating physicians was far lower than 
their willingness to admit their own errors. In all three cases physicians who 
indicated they would tell the patient about the error cited their personal ethic to 
be truthful and their concern for the patient's right to know the truth of their 
condition as the most important reasons for disclosure. 39 
A second study using hypothetical cases by Green et al40 in 2000 showed that 
even though physicians recognise that lying is morally problematic they would 
use deception with their patients and third parties. This US study examined 
whether and in what circumstances, resident physicians would deceive other 
physicians. Three hundred and thirty surveys were distributed with a response 
rate of 67 per cent. Two versions of a confidential survey using vignettes were 
randomly distributed to all internal medicine residents in four US teaching 
hospitals in 1998. Survey versions differed by introducing slight variations to 
each vignette in ways the authors hypothesised would influence the 
respondents' willingness to deceive. The likelihood that residents say they 
would use deception in response to each vignette was compared between 
versions. 
Most respondents indicated that it was wrong to deceive colleagues, even if 
no one was hurt or if one was not caught. But many also indicated that under 
some circumstances they were likely to deceive colleagues. Thirty-six per cent 
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said they were likely to use deception to avoid discussions with a colleague; 
15 per cent would misrepresent a diagnosis in a medical record to protect a 
patient's privacy; 14 per cent would fabricate a laboratory value to an 
attending physician; six per cent would substitute their own urine in a drug test 
to protect a colleague and five per cent would lie about checking a patient's 
blood to cover a medical mistake. 
A difficulty with hypothetical studies is the reliance on what residents said they 
would do rather than on what they reported doing in actual cases. In carrying 
out my research I have endeavoured to avoid this weakness by asking the 
informants questions in relation to their own mistakes, what they think caused 
the mistakes and what actually happened as a result. 
3 Situations in which junior doctors are vulnerable to mistakes. 
My study asserts that any comprehensive analysis of mistakes involving junior 
doctors must take into account the many situations and circumstances that 
create opportunities for mistakes. In this section I analyse different situations 
associated with the work of junior doctors. The literature is growing in relation 
to the activities of junior doctors and the challenges work-related demands 
pose for them. Knowing how fatigue, stress, poor communication and 
inadequate knowledge and skill affect junior doctors is important because it 
helps us understand predisposing characteristics that may be associated with 
mistakes. 
3.1 Training and education 
The literature on training and education of junior doctors demonstrates the 
need to improve the quality, content and delivery of medical education. 
lnquiriesiv dating back to early last century have identified the need for 
enhanced education and training for junior doctors. 4245 But they rarely 
discuss its relationship with the potential for iatrogenic injuries. 
Statutory and administrative arrangements in North America, the United 
Kingdom and Australia require doctors in the first two years after graduation to 
iv I discuss these inquiries later in this chapter. 
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receive in-house (hospital) training and education. Training and education 
programs, while having a variety of formats, have these aims: provision of a 
supportive supervised learning environment; opportunities for the 
consolidation and development of knowledge; development of skills and 
professional attributes; preparation for eventual independent medical practice; 
preparation of doctors to assume responsibility for the safe care of patients; 
and assistance with career planning and life-long learning. 
The high service component of junior doctors' roles has been criticised and is 
partly responsible for the continued low rating by junior doctors 46"50 and 
senior staff 51 of the quality of the JMOs' educational experience. 52-591n 
addition to high service demands, other factors undermining training and 
education include the increasing role of specialisation in medicine and 
inadequate reward systems for faculty and clinical teachers.60 61 
Many studies62-75 have evaluated the different educational interventions used 
to prepare interns and residents for independent practice. One postal survey76 
of all interns in NSW teaching hospitals ( 67per cent response rate, n=195) 
found that training during the intern year was poor in terms of allocated time 
and teaching strategies. Interns identified more training in technical skills than 
interactional skills,V and reported inadequate assessment of interactional skill 
competencies. Only 50 per cent of trainees considered their training for key 
technical skills (cardiovascular examinations and inserting IV lines) adequate. 
Gaps in education programs have been identified75 77 with many studies 75 44 
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64 supporting the provision of additional skills training for interns and 
residents. In addition to the consolidation of clinical skills other skills such as 
teaching, communication, working in multidisciplinary teams, showing 
compassion, dealing with confidentiality issues, evidence-based practice, 
quality improvement and interviewing skills 80 81 and patient advocacy have 
been identified as necessary for producing well-rounded doctors.83 
How doctors are taught in the hospital environment is gaining attention from 
medical educators, interns and residents. Teaching requires time commitment 
by clinical teachers,85 interactions between senior clinicians and residents,8687 
bedside teaching with active involvement of the residents, 88 observation and 
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critical feedback.76 Methods for teaching junior doctors have been identified in 
a number of studies,60 65 89-93 including the value of senior clinicians as role 
models?9 83 Other beneficial ways to teach include the use of 'protected time' 
for formal weekly education sessions, feedback, dry rounds,"; critical incident 
analysis and case discussions with senior clinicians,";; and portfolios.94 Ward 
rounds, once thought to be crucial for bedside learning, were not seen by the 
interns as a useful mechanism for learning about clinical signs and symptoms. 
Videotaped vignettes and role plays78 have been successfully used in a 
teacher preparation course to prepare residents for teaching and leadership 
roles. Well structured and planned morning reports, 95-97 and interactions with 
teachers74 98 were both demonstrated to be successful methods for teaching 
junior doctors. 
Even though workforce requirements demand junior doctors to know and 
learn more 'on the job', opportunities for doing so are diminishing. Patients 
have shorter hospital stays so there are fewer hours to learn about the 
patients' conditions. The world-wide trend towards shorter working hours for 
interns and residents has implications for accessing educational programs 
and training opportunities.99 100 
The pressure on junior doctors to provide services is often in conflict with their 
educational requirements. This conflict is most evident when insufficient time 
is allocated or when junior doctors fail to access education programs because 
of their high work load. Few studies investigate this tension.85 93101 One US 
study 101 found that when a sub-set of patients was managed by nurses or 
physician assistants, this reduced the number of patients per resident and 
allowed more time for both residents and teachers for education. 
Many state, national and international organisationsv;;; are reviewing and 
implementing post graduate junior doctor education programmes designed 
specifically for the first two years after graduation. But these initiatives do not 
factor in the high service demands or the time required to acquire the 
competencies. 
' Clinical competence encapsulates both technical competence and interpersonal skills (interactional 
~kills ensure proficiency in communication, counseling and prevention skills.) 
• Dry round is discussion about a case away from the bedside. 
"'.Interns wanted constructive feedback and did not view an 'excessively critical approach' as useful. 
""The Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW, Australian Medical Council, General Medical Council UK, 
Association of American Colleges, 
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3.2 Knowledge and experience 
The lack of experience of interns and residents underpins the requirement that 
junior doctors be conditionally registered as medical practitioners in their first 
year of practice. The link between inadequate knowledge and inexperience 
and medical errors is accepted within medicine as one of the consequences of 
employing doctors still in training, but the acceptance is implied rather than 
explicit. Hospitals do not routinely advise patients being admitted that they will 
be treated by junior doctors starting their professional lives. Nor does the 
medical hierarchy explicitly acknowledge the vulnerability of junior doctors to 
mistakes. Training and accrediting bodies do not explicitly acknowledge the 
vulnerability of junior doctors to errors. The correlation between increasing 
levels of skill (and knowledge) and decreased errors, seemingly obvious, was 
established over a decade and a half ago 102 but this evidence has not 
prompted those responsible for junior doctor training to be more explicit about 
junior doctor preparedness and the potential for errors. 
One of the reasons interns lack confidence when they start work is 
inadequate training in core clinical skills. 103 104 How junior doctors perceive 
themselves in the medical and hospital hierarchy may relate to how confident 
and willing they are to ask for help. This in turn may affect their ability to 
recognise their limitations. Lack of confidence could be a significant factor in 
whether a junior doctor seeks help after a mistake. If they are unwilling or lack 
confidence to ask for help with simple tasks, will they have the confidence to 
ask for help when they are in trouble? No studies seek to establish from the 
junior doctors' perspectives the cultural, clinical or environmental factors that 
promote or inhibit them from seeking appropriate help. 
A number of studies 14 73 103105-111 examine preparedness of medical students 
for clinical practice but none of them study ill-preparedness for errors. Most 
reveal many interns have deficiencies in basic clinical skills when they start 
internship. Inadequate understanding of the crucial signs of acute illness, 
airway obstruction and basic life support were examples of specific areas 
where doctors had inadequate knowledge and skills. 112 The potential for 
junior doctors to learn incorrect techniques was observed to be high in one 
study .103 Another study concluded that experience in the first year after 
medical graduation did not necessarily correct the deficiencies.112 First-year 
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trainees often learn from doctors immediately ahead of them, again raising the 
question of the quality of the learning. 
Studies7383112-119 of junior doctors' preparedness for treating patients with 
particular medical problems indicate inadequate confidence and knowledge in 
assessing and treating common psychiatric conditions, depression, anxiety 
and alcohol misuse.116 120 
3.3 Supervision 
The impact of inadequate supervision on quality of care was first noted 
centuries ago.ix But the link between inadequate supervision and medical 
errors is only now being studied. There is some evidence that the failure to 
supervise interns and residents makes them more vulnerable to medical 
mistakes. 4 6 121 -124 Poor interpersonal relationships between interns, residents 
and supervisors have also been identified as factors in errors. 125 The 1987 UK 
Confidential Enquiry into Peri-operative Deaths 126 disclosed that many 
operations were undertaken by junior doctors who did not have enough 
experience to operate safely. They found that 10.4 per cent of deaths 
following surgery were related to inadequate supervision of junior staff. 
Supervision of trainees is a core component of the apprenticeship model 
underpinning medical education. 127 The supervision process generally 
involves a professionally qualified person helping the novice to gain insights 
into their professional practice, and gain wider knowledge and skills. Yet 
unlike other health related professions (nursing, social work, psychology) 
there is little written about clinical supervision in peer reviewed literature! 
Kilminster et al defined supervision as the provision of guidance and feedback 
on matters of personal professional and educational development in the 
context of the trainee's experience of providing safe and appropriate care.128 
This definition directly links supervision of interns and residents to the safety 
of patients. 
''Concern about supervision was noted at least 350 years ago in the regulations of St Bartholomew's 
Hospital of 1633 which stated ''That noe Chiurgian be suffered to p"forme the cures in this howse by his 
Boy or s'vant w'hout his owne ov'sight or care." (From Keynes GL The Life of William Harvey, Oxford 
University Press 1966 p. 70) 
' Psychiatry has a well developed literature on supervision, but it specifically relates to psychotherapy 
and supeiVision of the therapist providing therapy. 
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Since there is little information about the actual experience of junior doctors 
with supervision, the question, 'Who supervises interns and residents?' is 
difficult to answer. Few studies have explored it. Effective supervisors, 
irrespective of level of seniority, have these characteristics: demonstrated 
clinical and professional competence; capacity to teach in the clinical context; 
ability to set goals; capacity to summarise the clinical encounter; ability to 
provide on-going feedback; and capacity to assess clinical activity. 129 
The permanent working group of European Junior Hospital Doctors in their 
policy statement Postgraduate Medical Training: a European Future 130 
classify supervision into passive and active. Passive supervision "entails the 
constant availability - on request and with ease of access - of a senior more 
competent member of staff to deal with matters beyond the particular trainee's 
competence. "130 Active supervision involves "the regular and consistent 
attendance of a named specialist to review or examine the work of the trainee 
in all aspects of his or her job, i.e. admissions and emergency assessment; in-
patient care; including procedures and therapies, correspondence and note 
keeping; discharges; out-patient care; consultation, liaison, and community 
work; working relations with other staff; organisation of clinical activity. "130 The 
policy requires the named supervising specialist to be responsible for 
organising the process of supervision. 
In the UK, university medical faculties oversee the pre-registration year. A 
Pre-Registration House Officer (PRHO) is required to spend three months in 
surgery, three months in medicine and may include up to four months in 
general practice.77 The GMC requires all interns (PRHO) to be supervised by 
consultants who are formally designated as the educational supervisors. Their 
duties include the joint development of a personal plan, learning objectives, 
assessment of the objectives, evaluation, appraisal and certifying satisfactory 
service. 131 132 Interns must have available to them at all times a more senior 
member of staff in an appropriate specialty who can provide cover and help. 
The arrangements must be explicit and known to both the intern and the 
supervisor. The GMC expressly prohibits house officers having to rely on help 
from outside the hospital. The GMC rules also require PRHOs to be given 
clinical responsibility for some acute admissions as well as experience in the 
care of patients with chronic illness.77 
77 
The National Training and Assessment Guidelines for Junior Medical Officers 
published in 2003 by the Australian Confederation of Postgraduate Medical 
Education Councils 133 requires hospitals to provide adequate and appropriate 
supervision. But the document does not say what adequate and appropriate 
supervision involves. Junior doctors are advised to ensure they are 
'adequately supervised' particularly in the first year (internship) in which 
greater supervision is required. Less direct supervision and more clinical 
responsibility is recommended for second year doctors (residents). The 
guidelines provide instructions for hospitals, term supervisors and clinical 
teachers as to the level and type of supervision. 
A few studies have shown ways to improve the quality of supervision for 
junior doctors. One Canadian study of 20 years ago 134 reported strategies for 
improving the quality of supervision that remain appropriate today. They 
suggested screening supervisors' practice for consistency with educational 
goals, educating supervisors about program goals, setting realistic learning 
objectives, teaching supervisors to use constructive feedback techniques and 
developing their skills in assessment and evaluation of performance. Other 
ways for enhanced supervision include better use of the morning report, 135 
case by case supervision, 136 establishment of a 'service chief system that 
utilises external experts, 137 use of log books, 138 and using a systems approach 
program. 139 
A Danish program 93 improved supervision by attaching junior doctors to 
specialised teams and creating more supervised working situations such as 
morning rounds being attended by both junior and senior doctors. This saved 
time for supervision. 
In the US major legislative reforms concerning working hours and supervision 
of junior doctors were prompted by a major finding of inadequate supervision 
by the high-profile investigation into the death of Libby Zion in 1984.140141 
Libby Zion was an 18 year old woman with high fever admitted to a university 
teaching hospital who died shortly after admission to hospital. The Grand 
Jury's 1986 report of the death concluded: 
The most serious deficiencies can be traced to the practice of permitting inexperienced 
physicians to staff emergency rooms and allowing interns and junior residents to practice 
medicine without supervision. 140 
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The reforms in relation to supervision included closer attending supervision of 
residents, particularly in hospital emergency departments, 'night float' 
coverage to relieve busy house officers and fewer numbers of patients under 
the care of single resident. 
Studies 6 142-144 link diagnostic errors to poor supervision and show that junior 
staff benefit and errors are minimised when they receive specific training and 
testing on their abilities before working unsupervised. Supervision is more 
than case discussion and co-signing medical records. It often requires 
(depending on the site) direct patient interview and examination by the 
attending physician. 145 146 
Data on the ward activities of junior medical staff are minimal but one 1993 
survey 147 of interns and residents working in five emergency departments in 
Boston and Cambridge (Massachusetts) showed that they underestimated the 
time spent in supervision with the attending physicians. The mean estimated 
proportion of time junior staff thought they spent in supervision was eight per 
cent whereas the mean actual proportion was 17 per cent. The study also 
showed evidence suggesting that when residents are directly supervised, 
significantly higher rates of compliance with guidelines are shown than for 
residents acting alone.148 
A 1995 survey 149 of Norwegian pre-registration interns (1 04/133) found that 
50 per cent of the 'medical' and 65 per cent of the 'surgical' house officers 
reported they received no introductory information or supervision before 
starting their hospital duties. Two-thirds said they did not attend any 
educational programmes and 80 per cent did not receive systematic feedback 
on their work. Most house officers received no evaluation of their work at the 
end of the pre-vocational year. 149 In addition to inadequate feedback on 
performance, 150 pre-registration house officers also perceived a lack of 
support from senior staff. 10 98 151 
The literature also shows that problems with inadequate skills acquisition are 
related to poor supervision. Many interns learned procedures while 
unsupervised152-154 and were judged by supervisors to have poor technique 
and inadequate mastering of procedures. 155 
3.4 Fatigue 
Demands for improved patient safety and intern and resident well-being are 
driving a number of countries to reform the excessive hours worked by 
doctors. The connection between sleep deprivation of interns due to long 
hours and circadian interruption and well-being was made three decades 
ago 156 yet it is only recently that governments and regulators have been 
serious about limiting hours. 
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Attention to the hours of work originally began with campaigns on 'safe hours' 
for junior doctors, 157 but it is now recognised that trainees 158 and senior 
clinicians159 are also affected. Since August 2004 junior doctors in Europe 
and the UK have been legally required to work 58 hours a week. By 2009 they 
will be limited to a 48-hour week. 160 The European Court of Justice, 161 which 
determined the rules, relied heavily on the overwhelming evidence that sleep 
deprivation, sleep restrictions and unnatural circadian cycles xi contribute to 
cognitive deficits, motor impairments, injuries and errors. 162-167 
Some US and UK residents reported working in excess of 80 hours a week 
with 100-120 hour weeks reported. 157 168 169 There is strong scientific evidence 
linking fatigue and performance. 170-173 Increased fatigue, decreased alertness 
and impaired performance in a variety of psychomotor settings have been 
associated with poor quality sleep and inadequate recovery. 165172174-178 
Studies in the UK and Ireland also show that fatigue can impact on the 
wellbeing of residents affecting their mood (depression, anxiety, anger and 
confusion).156176179-183 
Despite the methodological problemsxii of pre 1990 studies, more recent 
controlled studies have confirmed the findings that sleep deprivation can 
negatively impact on clinical performance.158172 179184185 Fatigue has also 
been linked to increased risk of medical errors8107 176179186-193 and motor 
vehicle accidents. 194-198 A 2004 study by Landrigan et al 199 was one of the 
first to measure the effects of sleep deprivation on medical errors. They found 
that interns working in the medical intensive unit and coronary care unit of 
xi Circadian rhythms are the patterns of activity that occur on a 24-hour cycle and are important 
biological regulators in virtually every living creature. 
XII Potential confounders such as circadian time of the testing, practice effects, accumulated sleep debt, 
prior training experience were not examined in the earlier studies. 
80 
Brigham and Women's Hospital (Boston US) made substantially more serious 
mistakes when they worked frequent shifts of 24 hours or more than when 
they worked shorter shifts. Other studies show that sleep deprivation can have 
similar symptoms to alcohol intoxication.164 
The Australian Medical Association's Safe Hours Working campaign in 
Australia sought to cap working hours for doctors and has been a leader to 
reduce hours for junior doctors. Other organisations have echoed the need for 
safe hours for junior doctors."iii 
3.5 Stress 
Stress in junior medical staff has been linked to low morale, depression and 
burn-out. But these manifestations of stress have not yet been studied to find 
out if they are factors in mistakes involving junior doctors. 
Sources of doctors' stress xiv are varied. Psychologists200 suggest that stress 
can be categorised into one or more of the following five categories:- job 
related stress (work overload, under-utilisation, hours of work, shift work, time 
pressures, repetitive work, physical conditions and level of cooperation); role-
based stress (role ambiguity, role conflict, level of responsibility-too much and 
too little); conflicting demands between work and home (between professional 
and personal); conflicting relationships (with superiors, subordinates, 
colleagues); career development (opportunity and choice) and organisational 
structure and culture (office politics, communications, participation in decision-
making, organisational knowledge and trust). 
Doctors are prone to mental health problems 48 201 -208 particularly depression 
203 209
-
213 in their first post-graduate years as well as in later years.214-216 While 
rates of depression and mental health problems among doctors are higher 
than those experienced by the general population, 217 218 the literature shows 
that when interns and residents are supported by fellow house officers21 9-221 
and senior clinicians, 138 222 and are members of well functioning teams,223 they 
o;; The Australian Council on Safety and Quality and the NSW Health Department have established 
committees to examine safe hours. I co-chair the NSW Safe Hours Working Party which is responsible 
for reviewing the work practices and hours of work for all health professionals in the NSW health 
system. 
"' Stress results from an event which produces physical or psychological pain. (See Payne R. Firth-
Cozens J. Stress in health professionals. Chichester John Wiley and Sons. 1987. 
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are less likely to feel isolated and suffer stress. xv Performance is also affected 
by stress. 207 224-226 Stress as a cause of mistakes and mistakes as a source of 
stress have not been well researched. My study seeks to elicit from interns 
and residents the role of stress as a factor in mistakes as well as their 
personal response to mistakes. 
There is strong evidence indicating that inadequate sleep219 227-229 contributes 
to stress and depression rather than the number of hours worked. 218 Other 
stressors identified in the literature include financial status, educational debt214 
230 and term allocation. 231 Studies in the UK and the US 47 232 233 identify 
emotional pressure, demands from patients, interruptions, time pressure and 
interferences with social life as main factors associated with job stress. But 
these did not study the relationship with mistakes. One UK study found that 
while doctors acknowledged to researchers they were stressed they found it 
difficult to be open about it to their colleagues because they think they ought 
to be able to manage because they 'are doctors'.234 My study builds on this by 
seeking to find out who doctors talk to about their problems and whether they 
are adequately supported in the workplace. 
3.6 Work environment and organisation 
Hospitals are complex organisations235 236 comprising many autonomous units 
and departments, each having different work routines, structures, culture and 
modus operandi.237 Hospitals organise the work of junior doctors using a 
roster system which means they are rotated through different departments 
and hospitals. This makes familiarity with the environment difficult. A report 
published by the British Medical Association238 identified work environment 
along with long hours as major contributors to stress among doctors. 
Unfamiliar environments have been identified as a precursor to errors 158 239 
and when coupled with the inexperience of junior medical officers are thought 
to lead to medical errors. 121 216 229 239-242 The extent to which junior doctors 
think that unfamiliar environments cause them to make mistakes has not 
previously been studied. 
)(V Well functioning teams have also been associated with better patient outcomes and a reduction in 
errors. 
Experience in other industries tells us that standardising work processes 
reduces the opportunities for mistakes. 
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The influential report Crossing the Quality Chasm236 identified organisational 
factors for reform because it recognised that the way work is organised is a 
common feature in system failures. 125 243 244 Firth-Cozens218 observed that 
'whole organisations' can be stressed as well as the individuals who work in 
them. The level of care offered in hospitals, the availability of specialised 
services and the access to senior staff also impacts on the quality of care 
offered patients. In addition work satisfaction that derives from an organised 
and predictable work place is a known factor favourably impacting on 
performance. 218 245 246 
The tasks of junior doctors are many, varied and unpredictable. They are 
dependent on many interconnecting factors and relationships. These multiple 
factors have the potential to compromise delivery of safe care.247 For 
example, doctors who routinely practice beyond their level of knowledge and 
experience may have different attitudes to their work, their colleagues and 
their patients from those who are routinely supervised. As we saw above, 
stress also leads to lower morale, poorer work performance and 
dissatisfaction. 48 215 248 249 
The situation in which errors occur is relevant for understanding whether any 
extenuating or unusual circumstances are contributing. Change-overs of shift, 
shift work, nights, overtime or equipment or technology failure all increase 
opportunities for errors. 250.252 The extent to which these activities are 
associated with mistakes involving junior doctors has not previously been 
investigated. The role of equipment and technology failure in errors is well 
established and falls broadly into two categories - the malfunctioning of 
equipment or technology as a result of a design fault or a failure of a 
component and when the user causes a malfunction.253-255 User error has 
been also identified as a significant factor in most preventable medical device-
related incidents. 254 256 But while the above studies have been associated with 
mistakes generally, their relationship with mistakes involving junior doctors 
has not previously been studied. 
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4 Communication 
The role of good communication in the provision of quality health care and the 
role poor communication plays in sub-standard care are both well 
documented. xvi 
But communicating accurate information in a timely way between the multiple 
health workers (consultants, registrars, nurses, pharmacists, radiologists, 
medical records and laboratory personnel) is not easy, nor are there standard 
ways for communicating within hospitals. How successfully junior doctors treat 
patients often depends on informal communications among staff and their 
understanding of the work place.249 Medical mistakes caused by 
miscommunication, nil or inadequate communication are well known and 
occur daily in hospitals. 251 257 258 The quality of the communication between 
patients33 36 259-263 and other health professionals264-269 strongly correlates with 
treatment outcomes. Checklists, protocols and 'care-pathways' are effective 
for communicating patient care orders.270 
While teaching communication skills to facilitate better patient-doctor 
communication is now common in medical education, learning how to 
communicate in a complex environment such as a hospital has not been 
included in medical curricula until very recently.xvii Junior doctors in most 
Australian hospitals from their first day of employment are expected to be able 
to communicate with all professional groups and hospital staff and know the 
different methods used to communicate information irrespective of the term or 
the department to which they are allocated. How junior doctors actually 
experience their induction to the hospital and the wards is relevant to their 
understanding of the role the system plays in health care services. Their level 
of understanding will also be an indicator of their appreciation of the role of 
complexity in the execution of errors. 
"" Poor communication is a well known factor in complaints and was nearly always a factor in 
complaints to the NSW Health Care Complaints Commission. 
"'' I introduced a session called "Communications in hospitals" into the Sydney Medical Program Year 3 
in 2002 after a successful pilot in 2001. 
Many post graduate medical training programs here and in the US now 
include risk-communication skills training in their curricula because they 
recognised the connection between negligence suits and inadequate 
communication between physicians and patients or their families. 36 271 
5 Inquiries and reports 
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In this section I review the conclusions of some of the major reports in 
Australia, North America and the United Kingdom and Ireland about junior 
doctors. These reports are important because they help clarify the problems 
associated with the environment in which interns and residents work. 
Examining the work of interns and residents from a patient safety perspective 
is a very recent development in Australia and overseas. Early reports on junior 
doctors failed to examine the potential risks to patients when treated by 
inexperienced medical staff. The main focus of these reports was on 
workforce requirements and the quality, role and function of medical 
education. 
Since the late 1990s, two areas have emerged for attention: safe hours and 
core competencies for practice. The safe hours campaigns as we saw earlier 
are still in their infancy and have yet to demonstrate that shorter hours lead to 
improved morale for doctors and improved safety for patients. Core curricula 
that identify pre-vocational in-hospital training for interns and residents, as 
mentioned earlier, are now being developed and implemented in most 
developed countries. 
5.1 Australia 
Australia relied on English reports 272-274 for identifying and making 
improvements in medical education, including the education of junior doctors. 
It was not until the 1970s that medical education in Australia separated from 
the auspices of the General Medical Council in the United Kingdom. 275 Early 
Australian reports mainly about workforce issues, focussed on either the 
under or over-supply of doctors for the needs of the Australian population. 
Junior doctors being part of the hospital workforce were included in these 
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reviews in relation to workforce availability and predictions for future workforce 
requirements. Even though iatrogenic injuries in the hospitals had been known 
as early as the 1960s276 277 278 it was not then thought a significant problem, 
so the absence of a safety perspective was understandable. 
But by the end of the 1970s intern training was undergoing critical analysis 
with workforce, quality of education and training on the agenda of state health 
ministers. xviii A 1978 report by the Education Research and Development 
Committee on Medical Education in Australia275 identified major gaps in 
postgraduate medical education; namely the lack of continuity between 
universities and hospitals and the fragmentation between undergraduate, 
graduate and vocational training. How this affected patient care was never 
examined. The link between mistakes and inexperience, work environment or 
work schedules was never made. One explanation may be that detailed 
information about the role, work and mistakes of interns and residents was not 
available. 
A lack of understanding about the role of junior doctors prompted the 
Queensland Government in 1979 to commission a study into residency. 279 
Five Queensland hospitalsxix were selected for study using a multifactorial 
approach. The authors originally intended to examine the day-to-day routines 
and work loads of interns but they soon realised this could not be done in 
isolation from their training and development.xx The factors selected for 
examination included work routines, administration, training, professional 
development and social circumstances. The relationship of these selected 
factors to increased vulnerability of interns and residents to medical mistakes 
was not identified or examined. 
This study recommended changes in staffing and organisational 
arrangements, training and assessment, conditions of service and also 
identified further research areas. The multifactorial approach was innovative 
for its time. But the authors did not appreciate the importance of the role of 
medical culture and the organisation of medicine in the training of junior 
"'" Dissatisfaction with the status quo and perceived needs for internship review was the catalyst for a 
seminar on future directions for internship and mechanisms for its oversight held at Westmead Hospital 
on 19 April 1979. 
"'The hospitals were the Royal Brisbane, Princess Alexandra, Ipswich, Southport and Radcliffe. 
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doctors. For example, the authors recommended a 48 hour week as well as 
six hours of active learning for interns each week. Reduced hours and 
quarantined teaching periods are valid reforms but without the support of the 
medical profession were bound to fail. Twenty-five years on, reduced hours 
and quarantined teaching are again on the agenda mainly because of 
governments and professional concerns about doctors' welfare and the need 
to reduce adverse events. 
The Commission of Inquiry into the efficiency and administration of hospitalsxxi 
(the Jamison lnquiry)280 did not make explicit reference to the relationship 
between inexperienced junior doctors and patient safety but it did recommend 
an immediate review of intern training.280 
Following Queensland's lead, the New South Wales Department of Health 
established the Resident Medical Staff Advisory Committee in 1984.281 This 
committee was concerned about the structure of internship and examined the 
various training options for internship. The 12 months pre-registration 
requirement was endorsed but this report, too, was silent on the possible 
relationship between adverse events and the involvement of junior doctors. 
This is not surprising because mistakes in the 1980s were discussed mainly 
in relation to patient complaints, medical negligence actions or disciplinary 
investigations by medical boards or employing hospitals. 
The Victorian Government established the Joint Advisory Committee on Intern 
Training in 1986.282 xxii As well as strengthening the educational components 
of the JMO program it formally recognised for the first time the dual 
components of service provision and education. 
While junior doctors had varied experiences there were common themes in all 
the states' education programs. They all lacked defined goals for internship 
and had inadequate accreditation with poor participation. The NSW Medical 
Board said: " ... if medical education is a continuum, then the internship is its 
"The main focus of the study was internship with the work of residents and registrars included where 
appropriate. 
""' The terms of reference suggested by the Jamison Inquiry covered manpower implications of 
vocational training, actual and required numbers of training posts in each state, funding of postgraduate 
training programs, and the service commitments of trainees and length of training programs. 
~·Recommendation for mandatory pre registration or internship was first made by VMPF in 1969. It was 
introduced in Victoria in 1972. 
~ 
most neglected component because neither Colleges nor Universities are 
responsible for interns." 282 
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The main concerns of these various state committees were hours-of-work. 
Many clinicians expressed reservations about reduced hours which, while 
beneficial for reducing intern fatigue, were also thought to be detrimental to 
the intern gaining experience. It was felt that interns needed to be present 
when important management decisions were made. In their view learning 
involved the interns working a minimum 40 hour week, the average being 50 
hours per week. The Victorian report indicated that an average 70 hours per 
week was necessary to obtain appropriate clinical experience. 282 
Focus on the role and education of interns culminated in a national meeting 
on medical education and medical workforce in 1986.283 Eleven 
recommendations came from this workshop concerning supervision, continuity 
of learning, quality control, more teacher responsibility for content of 
education, role for universities, systems for detecting stressed interns, and 
need for broad experience. But interns and residents might be stressed for 
many reasons, not just hours of work. The role mistakes played in relation to 
stress, work-based problems, quality of learning, and inadequate educational 
content was not considered. 
The relationship between the training of doctors and the delivery and financing 
of medical care was acknowledged in the 1988 report Australian Medical 
Education and Workforce into the 21•t Century.(The Doherty Inquiry) 283 xxiii Its 
first term of reference concerned the adequacy of the internship year for 
producing medical graduates with the appropriate skills and competencies to 
meet national health care needs. Over 400 submissions were received from 
the community, including the employers of medical graduates who were 
critical of the clinical experience and practical skills of medical graduates.283 
The Sir Charles Gairdner Hospital (Western Australia) submitted: 
'Many interns are painfully aware of their inadequacies in this area. Internship is often a 
stressful experience for this reason, and the ineptitude of interns probably contributes to 
problems of infection control - interns aseptic technique often leaves a lot to be desired. 
Interns comment that their acquisition of practical skills is too random, and depends too much 
>OOii The first recommendation ofthe Doherty Report was:- 'The Commonwealth Government recognise 
the close relationship between, on the one hand, how medical care is delivered and financed, and, on 
the other, how medical practiffoners ara trained (medical education) and their numbers and distribution 
(medical workforce)' 
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on their own initiative as medical students. This is satisfactory for those with initiative, but 
unsatisfactory for the patients of those without. It is noted that both registrars and senior 
nursing staff who once used to assist interns in acquiring practical skills, are now often so 
busy that they are unable to assist when requested. This is not due to increasing numbers of 
patients, or to any change in the health care scheme, but to technology creep which means 
that the same number of inpatients in the 1980s generates considerably more work (eg serum 
theophylline assays, antibiotic assays, ultrasound examinations, etc.) than they would have in 
the 1960s (when the number of test and treatment options available was comparatively 
limited). Workloads have changed, so that interns are now tending to learn by experience and 
experimentation as well as by guidance. This is not a matter of choice; it is a matter of 
necessity' 283 
While many of the reports are silent on the relationship between safety of 
patients and junior doctor inexperience, the employing hospitals were vocal 
about the position of the junior medical workforce. Submissions to the inquiry 
confirmed the importance of the internship year for the acquisition of new 
knowledge, skills and attitudes but the effectiveness of these programs varied. 
Broad-ranging criticisms of the intern year covered: - lack of appropriate role 
models in community medicine; case mix of the teaching hospitals; increasing 
financial and bed constraints. The Australian Postgraduate Medical 
Foundation 283 also identified deficiencies in policies and administration 
(goals, preparation supervision, assessment and counselling); implementation 
(appointment and rotations, clinical experience); and educational 
programming and vocational guidance. 
One of the few submissions to mention the intern year in the context of patient 
safety was from the Australian College for Emergency Medicine: 
"At present interns are required to treat many conditions with which they are unfamiliar, often 
with inadequate supervision or support, and the A&E term can be very stressful. Errors of 
judgement are frequent with consequent delays in diagnosis >odv and management of acute 
conditions". 283 
The Australian Geriatrics Society in its submission to the Doherty Inquiry 
pointed out that major change had occurred in the latter part of the 20th 
century but the legacy of the historically based tradition of medical education 
within acute hospitals remained.283 Their list of problems included emphasis 
on curative medicine at the expense of preventative medicine; separation of 
physical from mental illness; continued focus on high technology medicine in 
the acute care setting; lack of community involvement and continued 
><><iv When I was the Director of the NSW Complaints Unit I investigated a number of cases concerning 
errors of diagnoses in the emergency department by interns. In 1988 one case concerning a 
misdiagnosis of a child who presented to the ED with a history of polycystic kidneys migraine and 
vomHing resulted in death of the child. The investigation highlighted the use of inexperienced staff in 
clinical settings. Hospital staffing arrangements in all NSW hospttals changed as a result of this tragic 
case. (see Department of Health ,Complaints Unit Annual Report 1989) 
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misapplication of high technology medicine to patients with chronic, disabling 
or irreversible disease. 
A dim picture was painted of the intern year by the Student Initiative in 
Community Health (SIGH): 
'Interns spend the majority of their time in a service role, most of it working alone, with little 
supervision. We are particularly concerned at the lack of guidance given in the appropriate 
use of diagnostic services which are frequently ordered by the intern. In addition interns are 
inadequately prepared for their role as "information providers" and patient advocate. Many 
interns have difficulty working as part of a team and often feel unable to seek help from other 
staff members due to the hierarchy still existent in hospitals ...... concern must be raised as to 
the long hours interns are expected to work. Regardless of the planned roster most interns 
work more than their set hours. All interns report working full days after nights without sleep. 
This must be to the detriment of the total care of patients and efficiency in the hospital'. 283 
Reduction of hours spearheaded the Australian Medical Association (AMA) 
campaign for improved working conditions for junior doctors. A 1995 report by 
the AMA laid the foundations for the Safe Hours national campaign,lCXV 
culminating in the AMA National Code of Practice- Hours of work, shiftwork 
and rostering for hospital doctors (1999). 284 285 
The main AMA industrial agenda was the safety and welfare of doctors. 
Indirectly patients benefit if their care providers are alert and not affected by 
fatigue. The AMA code, though, does not refer to the relationship between 
fatigue of doctors and patient safety. 
A subsequent AMA project, the Work Life Flexibility Project, 286 which 
canvassed stakeholder=' views on junior doctors and their work identified 
better education and training for improving working conditions for junior 
doctors. The report repeated the finding of many previous inquiries that 
interns are ill-prepared for their clinical years with many post graduate year 1 
and year 2 doctors suffering 'unnecessary stress'. JCXVii 286 The relationship 
between working conditions and adverse events was raised in the context of 
clinical handoverslCXViii when it noted that handover could be improved by 
introducing clinical guidelines. 
= The strategy for the safe hours campaign was approved by the AMA Federal Council in March 1996. 
"""' Focus groups were held with the following stakeholder groups:- health professionals, health 
professional associations, Colleges, governments, consumers, hospital administrators, health services 
a11:~ facilities. (For a full list see Attachment 8 of the report.workplace@ama.com.au) 
"""" Junior doctors were concerned that flexible training and work opportunities be seen as legitimate 
op_tions and not seen as a lack of commitment to medicine. 
"""'" The term handover refers to the transfer of information about a patient and their condition 
between health workers. 
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Handovers in medicine are ill defined and the literature287-290 is only now 
addressing the need for improved handovers in the context of continuity of 
patient care and patient safety. The identification of particular activities that 
may expose patients to more risk is a change from traditional methods used to 
manage junior doctor problems. Instead of focusing on individual junior 
doctors (work harder, be more attentive and better educated) the focus has 
moved to their work environment. This refocus from the personal to the 
system is a step in the right direction. Because my study investigates the 
underlying factors involved in junior doctors' mistakes, if handovers are a 
problem then this will become evident when junior doctors select it as a 
contributing factor. This will take awareness of 'handover as a problem' one 
step further. Finding out whether handovers, communication and timely 
availability of consultant and registrar advice are identified by interns and 
residents as factors in their mistakes will expand our knowledge of handovers 
as precursors for errors. 
The need for better training and education for interns and residents was 
nationally recognised when the Australian Medical Council (AMC) published 
national guidelines for interns training and assessment in 1996?91 These were 
updated in 2002 by the Confederation of Postgraduate Medical Education 
Councils. 133 The update covers broad and emerging topic areas""ix associated 
with the dual role of interns and residents as employees and trainees. The 
most recent AMC guidelines link the potential for mistakes with fatigue and 
long shifts but do not make the link between mistakes and poor supervision. 
At the time of writing the Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW was 
developing a core curriculum xxx for interns and residents (PGY1/PGY2). 
One of the first Australian reports to make a direct link between safety of 
patients and the employment of junior doctors in public hospitals was the 
Inquiry into Obstetric and Gynaecological Services at King Edward Memorial 
Hospital (Western Australia) 1990-2000.292 Inadequate supervision of junior 
medical staff by consultants was identified as a serious problem facing the 
.oox Topic areas include roles and responsibilities of parties involved in medical education, educational 
and professional development (aims, objectives of first lwo years, use of diagnostic and consultant 
services, personal and professional development), skills acquisition, program organisation, resources, 
supervision, and medical ethics. 
)(XX 1 am a member of this committee and identifying core competencies and developing a curriculum to 
match the competencies is a high priority. Work. began in February 2003. 
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hospital. While the Inquiry found that unsupervised junior doctors xxxi had 
major responsibility for assessment and providing care in many complex 
clinical situations,xxxii it also recognised that residents did not have the 
necessary knowledge and experience to manage complex cases. The 
analysis showed that errors occurred in 47 per cent of high-risk obstetric 
cases. More than half the errors were very serious, with failure to recognise a 
serious and unstable condition and inappropriate omission (failure to do 
something that should have been done) being the two most common mistakes 
made by junior medical staff.292 Junior doctors were also associated with the 
highest occurrence of clinical errors. Resident doctors made 76 per cent of the 
total errors associated with high-risk cases and registrars made 65 per cent of 
the total number of errors. The problem of poor supervision at the hospital had 
been earlier acknowledged by senior clinicians in 1999 who wrote: 
'Low morale at the hospital stems from years of lack of supervision/teaching. Junior staff feel 
unsupported and over criticised ... Residents have been left to their own devices and there is 
simply little or no supervision for junior registrars.' 292 
The Inquiry identified additional cultural problems such as the reliance on 
junior doctors to know when supervision was required and reluctance by junior 
doctors to seek assistance from senior clinicians. It also found systemic 
management, accountability and organisational problems. These findings 
support the need for further research. Working backwards from a mistake and 
analysing it from a number of perspectives will help to isolate with more 
accuracy those areas or activities that require further examination. 
The final Report of the King Edward Inquiry devoted a chapter to education 
and training of junior doctors and recommended improved clinical training of 
junior medical staff, skilled clinical teachers, quarantined learning, compulsory 
attendances of residents at educational meetings and regular performance 
review. The report also recommended the Western Australian Postgraduate 
Medical Council actively develop and evaluate a post graduate medical 
program for residents. 
XlOd Residents were the most junior doctors employed who were required to have completed their 
internship. 
""'" Secondary analysis of the clinical file review of 372 high-risk complex cases showed that junior 
medical officers (levels 1- 4 registrars) provided most of the care at the crucial times.( clinical 
assessment, decision-making or inteNention) 
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To date there have been no obvious demands by governments or professional 
organisations for state post graduate medical councils to either not allocate or 
remove junior doctors from working in hospitals failing to meet minimum 
standards of training and supervision. Even though a hospital is required to be 
accredited before junior doctors can be allocated to it, there is great 
reluctance to stop or withdraw doctors from working even when there is 
evidence of inadequate support, supervision and/or bad conditions. This 
tension between service provision and quality of the training remains 
unresolved despite years of comment from earlier inquiries. 
Because the relationship between junior medical staff and mistakes is under-
researched, there is little information available to help post graduate councils 
better understand the environment in which interns and residents work. 
Detailed information about Intern and Resident factors (personal and 
professional factors) Patient factors (complexity and severity of the patient's 
illness, age, gender and language) and System factors (type of training, level 
of responsibility, supervision, scheduling of work and unit cultures) will help 
identify new areas for curriculum development but also provide a patient 
centred approach for training and education. 
5.2 North America 
Many reports on training and education of medical students and doctors 
identify the Flexner report293 as a major influence on modern medical training 
in the United States and Canada. While Flexner was concerned mainly with 
undergraduate medical education, his reforms concerning the basic sciences 
have impacted on the education of junior doctors generally. His reform 
agenda culminated in the 1950s with the implementation of a nationwide 
system of undergraduate and graduate medical education (based on scientific 
principles, research and supervised clinical practice) which became standard 
in US hospitals.294 
But by mid 1960 specialisation had caused graduate medical education to 
become fragmented and diffused with little continuity between undergraduate 
education and vocational training. Consequently The Citizen's Commission on 
Graduate Medical Education295 (Millis Report) recommended that internship 
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be abandoned as a free standing entity and be integrated into residency 
(vocational training programmes).xxx;;; However the folly of this was not 
recognised unti11982 when the American Medical Association recommended 
the re-introduction of a general year of training. 
The management of adverse eventsxxxiv is a key challenge facing educators of 
junior doctors today. Linking design and delivery of residency programs to the 
core competencies expected of residents is pivotal. The development of core 
curriculum by the US Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education 
(ACGME)296 is similar to that being developed in Australia and includes topic 
areas of ethics, medico-legal issues, communication skills, evidence based 
medicine and procedural skills. The ACGME requires residents, by the time 
they have completed training, to be proficient in patient care, clinical science, 
practice based learning and improvement, interpersonal skills and 
communication, professionalism, and systems based practice?96 
The Canadians similarly identified generic core competencies irrespective of 
the area of specialisation intended by a trainee. 297 
5.3 The United Kingdom and Ireland 
Two reports272 298 published in the 1940s influenced the early development of 
supervised clinical training in the UK, but it was not until 1953 that compulsory 
postgraduate training was introduced in Britain. The Goodenough Report 
(1944) examined several options for a supervised year in clinical practice but 
finally decided that entry into independent medical practice should be 
preceded by a compulsory period of approved clinical practice under 
supervision.272 xxxv The General Medical Council agreed in 1946 and amended 
the Medical Act prohibiting registration until the satisfactory completion of 12 
months supervised practice in an approved hospital.298 
xxxm The Millis Report also said that the focus should not be on producing more specialties but on 
integrating medical education and practice. The availability of applied technology and the rapid growth in 
knowledge were cited in the report as factors in the development of specialisations but the report also 
identified that specialisation had the potential for increased fragmentation in the delivery of health care 
for the community. 
"""'See Table 1.1 in Chapter One setting out the adverse event rates for different countries. 
=The recommendation was "every medical student after he has passed his final examinations and 
before he is admitted to the Medical Register and allowed to take up independent practice shall be 
required to serve as junior house-officer for a period of 12 month in one or more approved hospitals." 
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The British Medical Association (BMA) reporf98 xxxvi on the supervised year 
emphasised that successful internship is highly dependent on the nature of 
the appointment and the duties assigned interns. Three internship models 
were canvassed in the BMA report but none were recommended. The first 
model called the "rotating" internship, involved an intern spending a portion of 
the year doing medicine, surgery and midwifery with additional periods spent 
in paediatrics, dermatology or ophthalmology. This model fell short because of 
the short time spent in each subject, leaving interns with only superficial 
knowledge.299 The second model, a "straight" service internship, involved 
interns remaining in the one area and its subdivisions. This model failed to 
expose the interns to a sufficient range of experiences. The third model, 
"mixed" internship, required interns to work in two or three clinical divisions 
with six months minimum in one of them. The Goodenough Report adopted 
this last model recommending that interns spend six months in general 
medicine and six months in general surgery. 
The BMA Committee objected to all three models on the grounds they were 
based on grouping of diseases or methods for treatment and that "they adhere 
to the compartmental system of medical practice". 298 They also "fail to 
constitute for the intern an introduction to the intensive and integrated study of 
a sick person."298 The Committee argued that if internship is a consolidation of 
training then it should mirror the medical curriculum and be a continuation of 
learning for training in a speciality or for general practice and not be regarded 
as preparation for immediate independent practice. 
The BMA proposed a new model based on interns treating 'sick' patients 
rather than a 'medical' or 'surgical' case. While the BMA 'patient-centred' 
approach was not accepted, it is worth recounting because it is based on a 
continuum of care model and has many favourable attributes for patients and 
interns. In this model the interns are assigned to both in-patients and out-
patients on their admission and remain intimately involved with the care of the 
patients until discharged. The interns take part in all consultations, record the 
results, order tests, observe and assist with procedures. They are expected to 
xxxvi The BMA were influential in instigating the intern year and first put the idea to the authorities in 
1934. 
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find out about both social background and domestic circumstances and learn 
about prevention. 
The Committee predicted that such a model would improve the quality of 
patient care because of the presence of interns and their educational 
requirements. The BMA warned hospitals against allowing internship to 
degenerate into "a device for securing cheap resident service for hospitals or 
for staff. "298 This model is one of the first to explicitly recognise the importance 
of patient safety by designing a training program around the patients' journeys 
through the hospital. Even though half a century has passed the BMA model 
for junior doctor training is a landmark for its attention to the work environment 
of junior doctors. 
The UK Royal Commission on Medical Education 273 (1965-8) confirmed the 
importance of general post graduate training irrespective of any intended 
streaming into the different specialties. The Royal Commission noted the 
great dissatisfaction with many of the training posts for junior doctors, 
including inadequate supervision and the limited time available for study and 
reflection. 273 
The 1990s saw a shift in focus from formal JMO training programs to 
examining the work environment and its impact on the health and welfare of 
junior doctors. A 1997 report 22 by the UK Department of Health (NHS 
Workforce), cognisant of the growing literature on the role the environment 
plays in errors, focused on working conditions and impact on the health and 
welfare of young doctors rather than on their training and educational needs. 
Work overloadxxxv11 , difficulties with combining personal life with a medical 
career, and angry patients were found to be the most frequent distressing 
aspects of junior doctors' work. 22 
Since 1997 The General Medical Councilxxxv111 (GMC) has been reforming 
training and education for medical practitioners in the United Kingdom. New 
training requirements were outlined in the New Doctor: Recommendations on 
General Clinical Training. 77 In 2002 the GMC followed up with the publication 
XJOOiil The respondents reported many psychosomatic symptoms associated with long hours of work but 
after implementation of the new working conditions for interns (the new deal) these disappeared but 
doctors were still stressed by the number of menial tasks they had to perform. 
JOOMII The GMC is the body responsible for defining standards for the pre-registration house 
officer (PRHO) year and also for ensuring standards are met. 
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of a report card outlining activity since the release of the clinical training 
guidelines.300 Eight key themes underpin junior doctor training. The dual roles 
of service provision and learning are recognised with the guidelines stipulating 
that the educational needs of junior doctors are to receive priority. Other key 
themes include appropriate clinical and educational supervision and attention 
to junior doctor welfare. 
A 2001 report on working hours of junior doctors (NCHD)'oocix in lreland301 
recognised the global trend towards reduced working hours and 
recommended that junior doctors reduce hours gradually with a limit of 48 
hours per week in place by 201 0 ! 1 The report recommended an increase in 
the number of consultants to provide a consultant-led service rather than 
increase the junior doctor ranks. The committee examining hours of work also 
found that junior doctors were spending about four per cent of their time 
receiving formal training or studying mainly because consultants had little time 
to teach and junior doctors were too busy to attend any teaching that was 
provided. The report concluded that consultants would provide better quality 
of service with greater continuity of care by being on duty and providing 24-
hours-a-day service backed up by NCHD staff working appropriate shift 
patterns. 149 301 The costs associated with a consultant led service and the 
world wide shortage of doctors may make this recommendation unworkable. 
6 Non fiction accounts of training and education by medical 
students and junior doctors 
Three books have been written by medical students302-304 and three by junior 
doctors305-307 about their early hospital experience. All were published in the 
1980s or before with most being still in print with updated prefaces. Themes 
include hospital hierarchies, the medical culture, professional socialisation, 
personal responses to suffering and dying and narratives of patient care and 
treatment. The classic sociological text Boys in White304 in its 61h printing (one 
of the few with an index) devotes a chapter to student perspectives on 
internship (in 1955). The authors interviewed 336 students about criteria for 
""";'In Ireland junior doctors are known as non-consultant hospital doctors (NCHD) 
" This is to comply with the European Directive which when adopted into Irish law will require the 
maximum average working hours for NCHD to be 48 hours per week by 2010. 
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choosing internships. Eight categories were identified .Xu Level of responsibility 
was selected as the most important criterion for 27 per cent of the students 
followed by teaching (28 per cent) clinical experience (19 per cent) and pay 
(13 per cent). Students had contact with interns and residents but the most 
important contact was with residents who were responsible for much of the 
teaching. Teaching medical students was identified as a significant role for 
residents along with administration and education.304 
Discussions about medical mistakes, errors, mishaps or adverse events were 
not directly canvassed in these books. When they were raised it was mainly in 
relation to the behaviour or conduct of clinicians and students and not as the 
main focus, for example; a case where a student who made a diagnosis that 
his supervisors and other staff missed and the favourable impact on his 
reputation. 304 In contrast, books written by interns tend to talk directly about 
medical mistakes. In Doctor X306 the author explains that the high number of 
deaths and catastrophes recorded at his hospital are not indicative of any 
poor standard of care because the cases he selected are the ones he 
remembered. But he does make generalisations about the hospital 
organisation and hierarchy and their links with medical mistakes. For example 
he refers to 'disasters that occur on nights and weekends, as anyone in 
medicine well knows.'306 Marion in his book Intern Blues published over 20 
years later summarised his internship, "I somehow survived that year in spite 
of the fact that I and other interns in my group received negligible guidance 
from the senior people in the program. I was overworked, overtired, lonely and 
insecure, often depressed, and conflicted in my own responsibilities, whether 
admitting an infant with a dangerously high fever or coping with the 
psychological and physical stresses of dealing with AIDS patients." 305 
Fear of mistakes from overtired ness was a constant theme in Manion's book 
particularly during internship. '/was chronically overtired ... and so nervous 
and scared I was going to accidentally screw up and kill someone, I had 
trouble sleeping even during the nights I wasn't on call.'305 
xli The criteria were responsibility, clinical experience, teaching, pay, travel, facilities and working 
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7 Conclusion 
Research about the role and functions of interns and residents in maintaining 
a safe environment for patients, the impact of the hospital environment on 
both patients and junior doctors and the organisation of work will increasingly 
become the foci for policy makers and health service managers. But the 
experience of junior medical staff and mistakes is still not receiving the 
attention it deserves. The themes in this literature review (inadequate 
preparedness for internship, inadequate training and education of interns and 
residents, poor work routines, sleep deprivation, excessive hours, stress, 
complex organisational issues, outdated hierarchical structures and unsafe 
practices) provide overwhelming support for the proposition that junior doctors 
are vulnerable to errors. 
The literature shows that we know very little about how, when and where 
junior staff experience mistakes. Greater scrutiny of their experience is 
required so that we might more accurately identify those areas that present 
the greatest risks to patients. 
conditions, professional contacts miscellaneous. 
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Chapter Four: Method 
Introduction 
1 Background to the study 
This research project began as a collaborative study with Marilynn Rosenthal, 
Professor of Sociology, and Director of the Program in Health Policy Studies at 
the University of Michigan-Dearborn and Kathleen Sutcliffe, Assistant Professor 
from the University of Michigan Business School. I was invited to collaborate in 
the study 'Supporting medical residents: A multifactorial study of medical 
mishaps' because of my work with the New South Wales Ministerial Council on 
Quality in Health Care; and my interest in the role and position of junior doctors in 
hospitals. 
The design of my study is similar to that developed by Rosenthal and Sutcliffe. I 
use the in-depth interview method and a semi-structured questionnaire (the 
questionnaire they used, with slight modifications). My study uses different 
sampling to the Michigan study and includes all departments in the hospital in 
which interns and residents work instead of just three departments used in the 
Michigan study;;. 
2 In-depth Interview study method 
As explained below, I selected qualitative techniques because I wanted to 
investigate the interns' and residents' experiences of medical mistakes and 
explore their perceptions of the associated factors. This required that I question 
the doctors about mistakes; the causes, the environment in which they occur, 
their preparedness for managing mistakes and their responses. Taylor and 
Bogdan define in-depth interviewing as "repeated face-to-face encounters 
between the researcher and informants directed toward understanding 
informants' perspectives on their lives, experiences, or situations as expressed in 
their own words. 1 (at p. 77) 
; I was the Deputy Chair of the New South Wales Ministerial Council on Quality in Health Care 
~2000-2003) 
1 Departments of Surgery, Medicine and Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
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I selected this method because doctors work in complex environments, 
participate in a professional culture, and apply a body of knowledge and skills that 
has meaning to them. Knowing and understanding what mistakes mean to them, 
what they think cause them, how they apply their knowledge and skills in avoiding 
them and how they relate to patients and others in the workplace after 
experiencing mistakes is essential for better understanding of medical mistakes. 
In-depth interviewing has been a key method for data collection in qualitative 
research since the 1980s.2 Three types of in-depth interviews are used; 
structured, semi-structured and unstructured.1 3 Semi-structured interviews 
enable the researcher to focus on the issues central to the research question 1- in 
my case how junior doctors experienced and perceived medical mistakes. This 
method, unlike structured surveys or structured interviews, is best for reducing 
the power imbalance and helping to develop rapport with the informants. It also 
enabled me to follow a particular line of questioning, elicit information and let the 
informants tell their stories and give their opinions in their own words. For me to 
understand how the informants' behaved when they made mistakes I first needed 
to know what they thought about them and what they thought caused the 
mistakes. Schultz4 argues that for us to understand why people behave the way 
they do we need to understand how they define a particular situation. This 
method depends on the informants' verbal accounts of their experiences, of their 
'social realities.' 5 (at p. 95) 
For my in-depth interviews I used a semi-structured questionnaire to guide the 
interviews because I wanted to see if the informants' shared any experiences or 
perceptions of mistakes. Flexibility was maintained because I was able to focus 
on particular aspects of the narratives told by junior doctors and obtain extensive 
detail about their experiences and views, while also collecting their responses to 
a standard set of questions about their perceptions of the causes of mistakes. 
The doctors I interviewed were able to give their accounts of events, expressing 
their feelings and attitudes towards mistakes, which sometimes led to issues and 
concerns I had not anticipated in the questions addressed in the semi-structured 
questionnaire. Traditional survey methods would have limited the opportunity 
for deep exploration of the complex phenomena being investigated. 
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In-depth interviews are useful for sensitive topics 5 6 or when personal information 
is being sought. Because of the sensitivity surrounding medical mistakes I wanted 
to ensure that the doctors felt as comfortable as I could hope to make them about 
disclosing details to me. I also wanted them to feel free to discuss the aftermath 
and their feelings associated with the incidents. 
The main disadvantage associated with in-depth interviews relates to the 
dependence of the researcher on the informant's interpretation and presentation 
of the facts involved in the accounts as being true. I was not present when the 
mistakes occurred. I have only the evidence of the doctors' accounts that the 
situations they described actually happened. To minimise this disadvantage I 
arranged for a sample of the interviews to be independently corroborated by two 
reviewers who were able to access the medical records to check if the mistake 
narratives described by informants had been recorded as having occurred. (I 
describe this process below.) 
2.1 Semi-structured questionnaire 
The same set of questions for each topic were asked of each doctor interviewed 
but the time spent on each area and the depth of examination depended on the 
informant's experiences and perspective. Because the experience of each doctor 
was different and because I was interested in exploring the causes of mistakes I 
needed to have a systematic and comprehensive way to limit and manage the 
information exchanged during the interviews. Using a standard set of questions 
about each mistake also permitted me to analyse the mistakes with a view to 
establishing patterns of responses. 
Because interviewing permits exploration of complex human perceptions I was 
also able to probe beneath the doctors' sometimes superficial responses to my 
questions. When I first asked the doctors if they had ever observed or been 
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involved in a medical mistake, some initially replied 'no'. After explanation of 
the literature on mistakes nearly everyone remembered one or more medical 
mistakes which were then explored in discussion. This capacity to engage with 
doctors at a personal level triggered memories of mistakes or broke the 'ice' of 
the initial reticence to bring up relevant material. Their disclosure was essential 
for harvesting their stories, experiences and observations. 
3 Previous methods used for studying doctors' experiences of mistakes 
A qualitative approach to data collection was also indicated for this study because 
the study of medical mistakes involving junior doctors is a relatively new and 
under-researched area. The status of knowledge in this emerging area of 
research interest has not yet reached a point where there are accepted, validated 
standard research questions that are widely acknowledged as suitable for use in 
research on safety. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods have been previously used to study 
doctors' experiences of medical mistakes. Previous studies of medical mistakes 
included hypothetical case vignettes, 7 anonymous surveys for self-completion,8-11 
focus groups 12 and interviews.13-15 The use of hypothetical case vignettes is a 
common method for engaging doctors in discussions about patient harm and 
identifying attitudes and ethical reasoning by doctors about mistakes. The 
sensitive nature of the topic and an understandable reluctance to talk about one's 
mistakes make it more palatable for doctors if the discussion is about a fictitious 
case. Discussions of hypothetical cases permit identification and examination of 
factors contributing to mistakes but they cannot examine the medical mistake in 
the context of a 'real environment' lived through by each doctor. The lack of 
environmental 'context' in hypothetical case studies limits the authenticity of 
responses. Discussion and analysis are also limited to and by the facts presented 
in the hypothetical case study. Since I wanted to talk with doctors about their 
actual perceptions and experiences of mistakes this method was not suitable for 
my study. 
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Anonymous questionnaires or surveys about medical mistakes are useful for 
ascertaining clinicians' views about the causes of mistakes, how to prevent them, 
their frequency and how they perceive them but such methods only permit limited 
exploration of the factors contributing to mistakes compared to face-to-face depth 
interviews. Some of the informants said that the discussion with me was the first 
time they had talked about mistakes except for conversations with family and 
friends. My study overcomes the limitation identified by Wu9 in an earlier 1989 
study in which he was unable to confirm the data provided by the respondents in 
the anonymous surveys. One way to overcome this deficiency is to question the 
respondents directly about their mistakes. 
The medical profession has only recently begun to develop a language for 
discussing mistakes Hi Adverse event, error, mishap and disclosure while not new 
terms, are seldom used by many clinicians. Discussions about mistakes usually 
take place in a blame context (negligence and litigation) leaving many clinicians 
unpractised in analysing and discussing mistakes from a safety improvement 
perspective. This meant that I often had to clarify informants' responses and 
provide context for my questions. Without this opportunity some of the answers 
would have been superficial and potentially misleading. This was one of the main 
reasons for my not using anonymous surveys. I wanted to explore interns' and 
residents' experiences and perceptions about errors and this would not have 
been possible except face-to-face. 16 Frequently I had to clarify a particular 
response which would have not been possible had I used anonymous reporting. 
The potential for misunderstanding was minimised because I was able to seek 
more information, to check details and clarify answers. I was also concerned that 
anonymous questionnaires would yield a low response rate because of 
confidentiality fears and time pressures. 
111 This has been helped by the increasing use of improvement methods such as Root Cause 
Analysis, Clinical Practice Improvement enable the detailed examination of mistakes; why and 
how they happened. 
Junior doctors are often swamped with protocols, guidelines, and requests for 
information.iv Attending an interview, while more time-costly, was organised 
within working hours and with a scheduled time. (Attending the interview also 
gave them a break from their regular hospital duties.) 
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Focus groups are useful for facilitating doctors' discussions about medical 
mistakes. But the presence of others may constrain participants from delving into 
areas such as quality of supervision, the 'hidden culture' or organisational 
matters, for fear of offending their employers or other clinicians who may or may 
not be their supervisors. Confidentiality is not assured in group situations. Doctors 
may feel inhibited about disclosing their mistakes, talking about feelings of 
inadequacy or acknowledging their inexperience in front of peers. For these 
reasons focus groups were not used. 
4 Hospital Approval 
I have not named the hospital used in the research because of the sensitivities 
surrounding medical mistakes and adverse eventsv. The current medico-legal 
environment is a barrier to open discussion about medical mistakes not only for 
individual clinicians but also for organisations that fear public criticism or legal 
threat. 
When I first discussed this research in March 2000 with the hospital's clinical 
director and the hospital executive, they were concerned about confidentiality, the 
reactions of the junior doctors to the questions and possible exposure to litigation. 
They obtained legal advice from their insurers (the NSW Government Insurance 
Office) and discussed the research proposal with the hospital executive and 
clinical training sub-committee. I attended a number of these meetings to explain 
the research and methodology. 
;, The Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW surveys all PGY1 and PGY2 years about their 
hospital experience and training. The return rates are very poor. 
'An injury that was caused by medical management (rather than the underlying disease) and that 
prolonged the hospitalisation produced a disability at or before the time of injury or both. 
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I reassured the hospital that names would not be recorded and that the 
research would be of no forensic value to any potential litigant. I explained that I 
did not intend to keep identifying data. 
After four months of discussion the research was approved in July 2000 with the 
following conditions. 
• No case studies or vignettes were to be published in medical journals or 
the press that could identify any junior doctor. 
• A status report of the process was to be provided to the Human Research 
Ethics Committee (HREC) after five junior medical officer interviews 
• A status report of the first five investigations into adverse events was to be 
provided to the HREC. 
I have complied with these conditions. I have also agreed to provide the hospital 
executive with a copy of research articles prior to publication in journals or 
coverage by the news media. 
The concern with which the hospital assessed the research topic reflects the 
climate of apprehension that operates today in many hospitals. Once the medico-
legal concerns were resolved the hospital approved the research. Since the 
commencement of the project the hospital has invited me to participate in many 
hospital activities involving junior doctors. 
4.1 Ethics Approval 
The hospital HREC approved the research on 3 July 2000. In addition to my 
undertakings about confidentiality, the HREC required that I establish a 
counselling mechanism for doctors should they become anxious during or after 
the interview because of the potential stress they experienced in recounting a 
mistake. I was also to report to HREC if any doctor became distressed as a result 
of discussing medical mistakes. No doctor did. 
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4.2 The Advisory Committee 
After approval for the research I formed a research advisory committee. Given the 
nature and sensitivity of the study I wanted to have senior clinicians overseeing 
the project. Committee members helped spread information about the research. 
This held a potential two-fold benefit. First, it acted as a prompt for prominent 
hospital staff to start thinking and talking about medical mistakes. Second, if 
senior clinicians were seen to support the project, junior doctors may be more 
willing to be interviewed. 
Apart from myself, the committee comprised : -
Director of Medical Services 
Director of Clinical Training 
Head of the General Clinical Training Committee 
President of the Resident Medical Offices Association 
Manager of the Quality Assurance Unit 
Director of the Quality Assurance Unit 
Head of the hospital's Department of Medicine 
Head of the hospital's Department of Psychological Medicine 
5 Allocation of junior medical officers to hospitals 
In 2000 the Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW allocated a total of 32 interns•; 
to the hospital. In addition there were 27 Resident Medical Officer One (RM01) 
positions allocated to the hospital. vii Hospital internship commenced on Monday 
10 January 2000. The clinical year runs for 52 weeks and comprises five terms. 
~The total available pool of Interns for New South Wales in 2000 was 476. 
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6 The Study Population 
The study population of junior medical officers (JMOs) comprised interns, RM01s 
and unstreamed RM02s viii allocated to and working at a tertiary hospital in 
Sydney in 2000. The study hospital is the major teaching hospital for an Area 
Health Service that includes six metropolitan and rural district hospitals. Junior 
medical officers are rostered to all sites. A total of 114 (interns, RM01 and 
unstreamed RM02) positions were allocated to the Area Health Service in 2000 
when the interviews were conducted. The following table describes the type and 
numbers of JMOs allocated to the Area Health Service. 
Table 4.1 Position and number of Junior Medical Officers allocated to the Area Health Service 
2000. Provided by the NSW Postgraduate Medical Council 
Category Type From Number 
Intern Australian Medical Council. Overseas graduates. 6 
Intern NSW universities. NSW. 28 
Resident Medical Officer 1 Postgraduate Medical Local/overseas. 29 
Council quota. 
Resident Medical Officer 1 Outside quota. Australia/New 13.5 
Zealand/Australian Medical 
Council graduate. 
Resident Medical Officer 1 Outside quota. United Kingdom GP 18 
exchange. 
Resident Medical Officer 2 Not in training program. 19.5 
Total 114 
The Department of Resident Training and Management of the teaching hospital 
provided the names and contact details of 114 junior doctors who had been 
allocated to the Area Health Service (including unstreamed RM02s). But my 
study population were confined to those doctors working at the tertiary hospital. 
,;;.The total available pool of RM01 s for New South Wales in 2000 was 375. 
""An intern is a junior medical officer in the first post graduate year (PGY1) of hospital clinical 
practice. 
A resident medical officer 1 (RMO 1) is a junior medical officer in their second post graduate year 
(PGY 2) of hospital clinical practice. 
A resident medical officer 2 (RMO 2) is a doctor in their third year of practice in a public hospital. 
An unstreamed RMO is a doctor with two years post graduate experience who is not on a College 
training program. 
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The Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW ix advised that there were 59 junior 
medical officers allocated to the tertiary hospital at the time I began the interviews 
(Monday 21 August 2000, one week into term four). 
I worked from a list of names provided by the hospital (Interns, RM01 s and 
unstreamed RM02s) at the beginning of the term. I also sent 13 additional letters 
to doctors who were allocated to the peripheral metropolitan hospitals but who 
were rostered to the tertiary hospital in the following term when the interviews 
would commence. 
A total of 89 junior medical officers were sent introductory letters setting out the 
research objectives (appendix 1) and inviting them to participate in a semi-
structured interview lasting 60-90 minutes. Twenty-four (32%) letters were 
returned unopened from the departments. The person was either not known, had 
left the hospital or had returned overseas. The high rate of returned letters 
indicates that the records of the hospital may not be accurate and that the 
allocation number recorded by the Postgraduate Council of NSW may have been 
more accurate. 
Table 4.2 Number of doctors contacted and number in final sample population 
Letters sent to JMOs rostered at Letters returned Final sample JMOs absent Available 
the tertiary hospital/peripheral (Left or not known in population. sickness/recre JMO pool for 
hospitals. the department). ational interview. 
leave/off site. 
89 24 65 17 48 
100% 31.6% 68.4% 19.1% 54.9.% 
;, Postgraduate Medical Council - Final allocation to the tertiary hospital for 2000. Supplied by the 
Council in 2002 and published in the Sydney Morning Herald in 2000. See 
http://www.medeserv.com.au/pmc 
121 
Figure 4.1 Approaches to junior medical officers (JMOs) and final number of JMOs interviewed-
figures provided by the Department of Resident Training and Management of the tertiary hospital 
100 
•letters sent •letters returned D final sample population Cl JMOs absent • available pool of JMOs 
Table 4.3 Approaches to JMOs and final number of JMOs interviewed 
Department of Resident Training and Management of the tertiary hospital 
Available JMO pool JMOs JMOs JMOs 
for interview. approached for refused interviewed. 
interview. interview. 
48 33 1 32 
100% 69% 3% 67% 
--
Of the pool of doctors available for interview there remained 15 doctors whom I 
did not approach for interview. I did not seek to interview them because all the 
departments in the hospital had been covered. It was crucial that I cover each of 
the departments that junior doctors were allocated because some departments 
may have been more prone to mistakes because of the type of patient population 
and the availability of experienced staff on the wards. x One doctor refused an 
interview. 
Table 4.4 provides a breakdown of the JMO level of experience and the 
departments worked in during the study period. Departments not offering places 
x The sample size for interview studies is usually between 30 and 50 respondents and is smaller 
than that used for quantitative studies. (Pope C. van Royen P Baker R. Qualitative methods in 
research on healthcare quality. Quality & Safety in Health Care 2002;11 : 148) 
for junior doctors were excluded. Time spent in their department at the time of 
the interview was relevant to their familiarity with the ward and level of 
experience. 
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Table 4.4 Interns and residents interviewed: position. sex. current rotation. previous experience 
Record Year of Age Sex Current rotation Previous rotation experience 
training 
1 intern 36 female neurology aged care, 
2 intern 32 male haematology emergency, orthopaedics 
3 intern 29 female aged care & emergency/orthopaedics 
rehabilitation 
4 intern 23 male renal emergency/relief/geriatrics 
5 intern 24 female upper Gl surgery general medicine/ 
orthopaedics 
6 RM01 28 male urology opthopaedics/endocrinology/ 
nights/general surgery 
7 RM01 25 female vascular surgery nights/emergency 
dept./peripheral hospital 
8 intern 24 female orthopaedic aged care/relief/general 
medicine 
9 intern 24 female relief paediatrics general medicine/general 
surQerv/emergencv dept. 
10 intern 25 female emergency relief-orthopaedics/general 
medicine/neurology 
11 RM01 27 male colorectal surgery nights/relief/emergency 
12 intern 35 female relief orthopaedics/medicine/geriatri 
cs 
13 RMO 1 26 female respiratory peripheral hospital 
C2)respiratory/HIV 
14 intern 24 male respiratory orthopaedics/general surgery 
(peripheral hospital) 
emergency dept 
15 RM01 26 female neurosurgery oncology/relief 
16 intern 24 male orthopaedics rehabilitation/renal/ 
colorectal surgery 
17 intern 24 male neurosurgery geriatrics/relief(haematology) 
general medicine (peripheral 
hospital) 
18 RM01 26 male hand surgery Emergency dept.(peripheral 
hospital) 
19 RM02 40 female haem otology relief/upper Gl surgery 
20 RM01 25 male gynaecology Emergency (peripheral 
hospital)/intensive care 
uniUsurgery (peripheral 
hospital 
21 RM01 27 male neurology endocrinology/ophthalmology/ 
ear nose & throaV neck and 
head surgery/emergency 
cJ2 RM01 25 
---
male oncology emergency/rehabilitation/night 
Time in 
rotation 
week3 
week3 
week 3 
week3 
week4 
week 5 
week3 
week4 
week 1 
week 1 
week 5 
week 5 
week5 
week 8 
week 10 
week 9 
week 10 
week 10 
week 9 
week2 
week2 
week2 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
0 
RM02 41 female urology 
RM01 27 female head &neck 
surgery/ear nose 
& throat 
intern 28 female relief-
orthopaedics 
RM01 25 male relief 
RM01 25 female rheumatology 
&dermatology 
RM01 26 female respiratory 
RM01 24 male spinal 
RM02 26 female plastic surgery 
RM02 32 female renal medicine 
intern 35 female geriatrics 
Figure 4.2 Position of doctors interviewed 
Figure 4.3 Age groups of doctors interviewed. 
(19 females and 13 males were interviewed.) 
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s/ 
relief 
emergency/respiratory/cardiolo 
gy 
obstetrics & gynaecology 
/emergency (peripheral 
hospital)/urology/relief/nights 
Upper gastroenterology 
/emergency (peripheral 
hospital) 
/neurology/orthopaedic 
(peripheral hospital ) 
medicine (peripheral hospital) 
cardiothoracic 
surgery/Intensive care 
uniUnights/surgery 
surgery (peripheral hospital) 
/emergency/relief/Intensive 
care unit (peripheral hospital) 
gastroenterology/nights/ 
emergency/medicine 
(peripheral hospital) 
dermatology-
rheumatology/study leave 
peripheral hospital 
/gastroenterology 
surgery/relief/emergency 
N=32 
•lnt•rru 
.RMOt 
C un.stnam•d RMOl 
--------------·--- N=32 
week2 
week 3 
week 3 
week3 
week 5 
week 5 
week4 
week 5 
week4 
I 
weekS I 
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6.1 Location 
The study hospital is one of the largest general hospitals in Australia with a bed 
capacity of about 736. The Emergency Department is a major trauma centre for 
the region. The hospital provides a range of sub-specialty services in medicine, 
surgery, critical care, anaesthetics, aged care, mental health, drug and alcohol, 
obstetrics and gynaecology, neonatology and paediatrics. 
In 2000, doctors were allocated to hospitals using criteria based on preference 
and merit. xi I targeted junior medical officers allocated to the teaching hospital but 
since most interns and residents are rotated across the Area Health Service most 
of them had experience working in smaller hospitals. 
Thirteen of the 32 doctors interviewed described medical mistakes occurring in a 
peripheral hospital. Mistakes in peripheral hospitals were included in the general 
analysis of medical mistakes. 
Interviews were conducted in the Department of Psychological Medicine, which is 
part of the main hospital complex. The time of interviews varied according to each 
doctor's work schedule. Apart from a letter of support for the research project 
from the president of the Resident Medical Officers Association, there was no 
incentive or payment made to the junior doctors to encourage them to participate 
in the interviews. 
7 Models for examining adverse events 
An in-depth examination of the steps or processes involved in health care and the 
environment in which the care is provided underpins most models being used or 
developed to examine adverse events. 17-22 For example, the US Joint 
Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO) requires 
each member organisation to have a system for identifying sentinel events 
(serious adverse outcomes) which includes in-depth analysis of errors to 
• In 2001 the Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW changed its allocation criteria to exclude 
merit as selection criteria and allocate solely on preferences using a ballot. 
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determine all the possible underlying causes and factors. 23 JCAHO requires 
that all factors (patient care processes, organisational management systems and 
external environment) are considered; not just one or two. Within each of these 
categories are sub-categories of factors that must be tested to determine whether 
they are contributing factors. 
The US Veteran Affairs National Center for Patient Safeti4 identifies similar 
factors in their triage process for analysing significant adverse events and near 
misses: - human factors (communication, training, fatigue, and scheduling), 
environment and equipment. 
English psychologist Charles Vincent's25 framework for investigating and 
analysing clinical incidents is not based on analysing the process of the 
significant adverse event. Instead he builds on the work of Reason focusing on 
the institutional context, organisational and management factors, work 
environment, team factors, individual factors, task factors, and patient factors in 
his analysis of medical mistakes. 
My interviewing strategy prompts junior doctors to analyse their mistakes by 
considering a range of factors known to be associated with mistakes and 
selecting those factors that are most relevant. 
8 The Questionnaire 
Rosenthal and Sutcliffexii piloted the questionnaire in Michigan, which formed the 
basis for the semi-structured interviews. Because the questionnaire was designed 
for interviewing doctors in US hospitals, I reviewed the questionnaire for context 
and language. I also asked two Australian experts•;;; in quality and safety to 
review the questionnaire to ensure that the terminology was appropriate for the 
Australian context. I also piloted the questionnaire with two junior doctors who 
were not from the study hospital. Given the concern about the poor level of 
disclosure to patients suffering adverse events, I added an additional question 
~; Marilynn Rosenthal! and Kathleen Sutcliffe from the University of Michigan designed the 
questionnaire for a study on medical residents and medical mishaps in 1997. 
about whether there was any communication with the patient or family after 
the mistake was identified and/or acknowledged. 
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The questionnaire was semi-structured using open-ended questions. I 
opportunistically asked additional questions when informants had significant 
things to say about particular areas, such as the medical culture and the position 
of junior doctors in the medical hierarchy. The questionnaire (appendix 2) covers 
medical mistakes made and observed, the factors perceived to contribute to the 
mistakes, understanding of and training in addressing medical errors, and 
suggestions for improvement in the way hospitals manage medical mistakes. The 
bulk of the questions focused on interns and residents recounting medical 
mistakes, either experienced or observed. After each mistake was outlined there 
was a detailed discussion about their views as to the possible factors that caused, 
or were associated with, the mistakes. 
To encourage doctors to freely discuss medical mistakes, I told them that they 
could talk about the mistake in the third person if they felt uncomfortable in 
discussing their own mistakes. All except two interns disclosed their own role in 
the mistake(s) during the interview. 
8.1 Mishap, mistake or error: which word to use? 
The terminology used in the medical literature to describe adverse events mainly 
falls into two categories: errors and adverse events.26 Errors are distinguished 
from adverse events because an error may or may not cause harm to patients 
and adverse events may occur even though there has been no error in care and 
treatment. However, the terms errors, mishaps and mistakes are often used 
interchangeably in the health literature•iv 
,m The Manager of the Quality Assurance Unit at a major teaching hospital and the Chair of the 
NSW Ministerial Council on Quality and Health Care who is also an lntensivist reviewed the 
questionnaire. 
'"See Chapter One: for definition of terms. 
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Rosenthal and Sutcliffe used the word 'mishap' to describe a medical error 
rather than 'mistake' on the basis that doctors would feel less threatened and be 
more willing to talk about them. While Rosenthal et al use the word 'mishap' to 
describe errors 27 it is not commonly used in the quality and safety literature. The 
Macquarie Dictionary defines mishap as an unfortunate accident. 
I did a Medline key word search of the words 'medical mishaps' 'medical 
mistakes' and 'medical errors'. The following citations reflect their usage. 
Table 4.5 Medline Search using medical mishaps, medical mistakes. medical errors (singular and 
plural) as key words 1966 to December week 3 2002 
Search history results 
Medical mishap(s) 17 
Medical mistake(s) 77 
Medical error (s) 2611 
Between January 1997 and December 2002 there were 8 citations found using 
the word 'medical mishap(s)' as key words. The decreasing use of the word 
'mishap' may reflect the willingness of those working in the health system to 
confront mistakes and errors. Rosenthal et al while using the term 'mishap' 
acknowledge there is currently no standard terminology for this field of study and 
that many words are used to describe and refer to mishaps. They prefer mishap 
because it is less specific than other terms which they think bring broader issues 
forward for debate.27 
The doctors I interviewed mostly did not know the precise definitions of terms 
used to describe errors. I did not challenge the terminology used by the doctors to 
describe their incidents. In my research the doctors interviewed did not draw any 
distinction between the words mishap, error and mistake. Even if I used the word 
'mishap' in a question the doctors did not tend to mirror my usage. If I used both 
'mishap' and 'mistake' in the question the doctors tended to use 'mistake' in their 
reply. For example 
Q Have you heard of mistakes or mishaps happening? 
A I haven't heard of specific mistakes but I did in other area health 
services. (Informant 9) 
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All three words were used interchangeably by the doctors when describing an 
adverse event but the word 'mistake' was used more often than either mishap or 
error. Nineteen doctors used the word mistake and 15 doctors talked about 
errors. Many doctors switched between words. 
The following statements are examples: 
"I guess major mishaps are mistakes which you wouldn't want to happen and maybe because of 
morbidity or fatality to the patient" (Informant 2) 
"Most mistakes are simple errors that happen (and) can easily be ironed out." (Informant 4) 
"Mistakes are errors to do with patient care." (Informant 9) 
"Mistakes and mishaps happen and someone else must be taking care of them." (Informant 14) 
"Mishap means a mistake that has gone wrong or not to plan." (Informant 30) 
Because a major component of this study is an examination of the factors 
underpinning medical mistakes involving interns and residents, it was necessary 
to identify all possible activities and processes that might be associated with 
errors. Reason argues that understanding of error requires examination of the 
nature of the task and its environmental circumstances, the mechanisms 
governing performance and the nature of the individual.22 The questionnaire 
needed to be sufficiently broad to ensure that all possible explanations and 
circumstances were discussed, not just those at the 'sharp' end of the mistake.xv 
8.2 The questionnaire design 
The questionnaire (appendix 2) was developed using categories of known factors 
associated with workplace mistakes which have previously been identified in 
other industries. The broad areas covered in the questionnaire are set out below. 
xv The sharp end of the system refers to the humans present at the time of the error. 
(I provide further reasons for the inclusion of these topics in Chapters One 
and Three.) 
8.2.1 Demographics such as age, year of training, current and previous 
rotations 
129 
Knowing the doctors' ages and their level of experiencexvi is relevant for the 
analysis of the informants' perceptions of medical mistakes because these are 
known contributing factors in errors.928-30 Harrison31 identified inexperience as the 
single most important factor leading to knowledge-based errors resulting in 
adverse events. Time spent in a department is also relevant in terms of 
familiarisation with the ward routine, staff and organisation of work. Because 
junior doctors are often new to the organisation they may not have sufficient 
knowledge about the hospital organisational structures, mechanisms for 
reviewing adverse events or for identifying support structures in the event of a 
mistake.8 
8.2.2 Understanding of medical mistakes 
As I discussed in the introduction, the study of medical mistakes using knowledge 
from other areas is relatively new. Therefore it is important to gauge the level of 
knowledge and understanding interns and residents may have about errors and 
the extent of their knowledge about causation. 
8.2.3 The current working environment, the nature of the work, communication 
and supervisory arrangements. 
The complexity of the environment32 is often a precursor in human errors. 
Whether informants understand the relationship between complexity and the 
potential for errors is important for identifying gaps in knowledge. Inadequate 
supervision33 34 has also been identified as a factor in medical errors. (Chapter 
Three contains more detailed discussion about the role inadequate supervision 
plays in mistakes by interns and residents.) 
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8.2.4 Medical mistakes 
Each informant was asked to describe up to three medical mistakes. In addition to 
the narrative of each mistake they were asked to identify the main factors 
associated with the mistakes. 
This section of the questionnaire listed all known factors found in the literature 
such as an individual's lack of knowledge or skill, communication, patient's 
condition, the situation, equipment/technology failure, the work environment, work 
organisation and existing external factors. Informants were asked to select one or 
more of these factors and discuss them in relation to the mistake being described. 
(I further discuss these factors in Chapters One and Three.) 
8.2.5 Patient's condition 
The questionnaire included questions about the conditions of patients (severity of 
illness, co-morbid disease), demographics and personal circumstances of 
patients because sicker patients have more treatments and interventions. More 
treatments also mean greater complications and possibility of errors. 
8.2.6 Near misses 
A near miss is a mistake with no adverse event. Informants were asked about 
their understanding and knowledge of 'near misses'. Because no patients are hurt 
by near misses it is thought that clinicians may be more willing to acknowledge 
them and use the event as a learning opportunity. These questions were included 
because informants may have been willing to discuss them more freely than 
mistakes. 
8.2.7 Avoiding mistakes 
This group of questions was designed to elicit the state of junior doctors' general 
knowledge of strategies for minimising medical errors. Informants' personal 
strategies for minimising harm to patients were also canvassed. This information 
""; Post graduate year 1 and 2 ( PGY 1 and PGY 2) 
helps locate the individual doctor's knowledge of the methods used by the 
organisation to help prevent errors.35 
8.2.8 Reporting mistakes 
The informants were asked if they reported the mistakes. Most hospitals at the 
time of the research had policies on adverse event reporting but the extent to 
which doctors knew about them or reported adverse events was unknown. 
8.2.9 Discussion of the mistakes with others 
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If informants discussed mistakes I wanted to know with whom these were 
discussed, and the circumstances of these discussions. This information will help 
better understanding of the emotional and professional impact of mistakes. 
8.2.1 0 Training in e"or management 
Questions about informants' training and education in mistake management may 
relate to how well informants handle mistakes. It may also help identify gaps and 
possible areas for improvement. 
After these topics were canvassed I asked the JMOs if they could think of any 
areas not covered. The junior doctors were then questioned about the perceived 
seriousness of the mistakes and their views about the main contributing factors. 
8.2.11 Communicating with the patient and/or family 
A JMO's experience of sharing information with patients is an important element 
of clinical practice. Senior clinicians can be persuasive role models, both positive 
and negative. The literature shows that some clinicians, although being good 
doctors in other respects, are not honest with their patients about the causes of 
errors.36 Their actions can influence interns' and residents' approaches to patients 
who suffer adverse events. Ascertaining the JMOs' perceptions about disclosure 
to patients is relevant to their understanding of the impact of error on patients and 
their own professional development. 
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8.3 Short Questionnaire for medical officers who decline an interview 
A short questionnaire was designed to elicit reasons for declining an interview. 
9 Organising the interview 
Prior to my contacting each intern and resident by telephone I sent each of the 
JMOs a letter plus an information sheet explaining the research. They also 
received a separate letter signed by the president of the Resident Medical 
Officers Association encouraging the junior medical officers to participate. 
Because the hospital executive and the Resident Medical Officers Association 
supported the research there was publicity throughout the hospital. During the 
initial telephone conversations many doctors referred to the president of the 
Resident Medical Association's letter and their own support for the aims of the 
research. I also addressed two educational forums about the proposed research 
and the nature of mistakes generally. I arranged interview times to suit the 
convenience of the doctors. I conducted all the interviews. 
I commenced telephoning the doctors whose names were recorded on a hospital 
list""ii which identified the rostering arrangements for doctors for the term 
beginning 14 August 2000 and 30 October 2000. Doctors are rostered for the 
term to one of 28 departments including night duty and relief. A term lasts 10 
weeks. 
During the initial telephone calli explained the nature of the research to the 
doctors and sought their permission for an interview. I continued contacting 
doctors and arranging interviews until I had secured interviews with junior doctors 
who had worked in every department in the hospital in the past six months. The 
interviews took place over four months. Thirty-two interviews were held during 
work hours in most instances. 
,;; The hospital provided me with a list of all the interns and residents working in the Area Health 
Service and the departments they were allocated for all the terms. 
:;\ 
'~ 
! 
~~ 
During the first 15 minutes of the interview I explained the study aims and 
obtained informed consent from the doctors. (See appendix 3 for a copy of the 
consent form). An independent person witnessed our signatures. I obtained 
permission to tape all interviews. No doctor asked to terminate the interview. 
Interview times ranged from 50 to 90 minutes. Some had to be rescheduled 
because of work demands. 
9.1 Confidentiality 
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The hospital executive and the Human Research Ethics Committee were 
concerned to protect the identities of doctors who disclosed adverse events. 
They feared their identities could be discovered from the department associated 
with the adverse event and the characteristics of the adverse events disclosed. I 
addressed these concerns by giving all informants a number with no names 
recorded. The hospital's quality assurance program was used to access and 
retrieve the medical records. I also agreed that no vignettes would be published 
capable of identifying an individual. (See appendix 4 for a copy of the Statement 
of Confidentiality.) 
9.2 Transcription of interviews 
A stenographer with experience in the health sector transcribed the interviews. I 
checked all the transcriptions against the taped interviews. Corrections were 
made. Interviews were saved as Word documents. 
10 Organising the data 
QSR NUD*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data* Indexing Searching and 
Theorizing )xv;;; software was used for storing the data which I collated into 
categories and sub-categories. QSR NUD*IST is a computer package for 
handling non-numerical and unstructured data in qualitative analysis. While it 
permits the searching of text and patterns of coding and facilitates theorising 
about the data I only used the program for coding the data into an index system.37 
xviil QSR stands for Qualitative Solutions and Research, which is a software development company 
located in Melbourne 
This was because I used a semi-structured questionnaire which had already 
set the topic areas I was examining. In each category I identified a range of 
activities described by interns and residents. (See appendix 5 for a copy of the 
headings and sub-categories I developed.) 
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I then examined each interview and selected passages of text for storing into the 
appropriate activity. The program trainer acted as an 'auditor' in that she reviewed 
my coding strategy and framework for coding the data. 
I analysed the data by examining the categories and sub-categories I developed. 
I looked for themes, clusters of responses and patterns relating to responses and 
perceptions of mistakes. I systematically examined the responses to each 
mistake using the standardised format set out in the questionnaire. 
11 Independent verification of selected cases 
One of the main disadvantages of in-depth interviews is the assumption that 
one's informants provide accurate accounts and are not prone to problems of 
fabrication or recall bias. To address this concern I sought to independently verify 
as much as possible the informants' narratives and descriptions of the mistakes 
described. I advised the interns and residents selected for interview both in 
correspondence and at the beginning of the interview that the study would involve 
an independent verification of a selection of medical errors recounted by them. 
When the intern or resident described a mistake, I asked him or her to provide me 
with any identifying data (such as a patient name or bed number) that would 
enable the quality assurance unit to access the medical record. The majority of 
informants could not remember patients' names, dates of admission or bed 
numbers or chose not to volunteer the information. If they had identifying 
information I switched the tape recorder off and recorded the details on paper. A 
few contacted me after the interviews with identifying information such as a bed 
number or name. This information was then used to identify a sample of the 
mistakes reported by the informants. 
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11.1 Accessing and retrieving the medical records 
A protocol was developed for accessing the medical records to cover both the 
confidentiality of patients and the informants and to ensure compliance with the 
hospital requirements for accessing information about adverse events. The 
hospital has a chart and medical record review process for flagging problems in 
patient care. This process has qualified privilege and as such is not subject to 
legal disclosure. A condition of my study was that the independent validation of 
selected cases would not be discoverable through a legal process. To comply 
with this requirement I elected to use the existing privileged processes. 
11.2 Using identifying data to access the medical records 
Eighteen of the 57 mistakesxix described were selected for independent validation 
because there appeared to be sufficient information to enable the patient to be 
identified. But the data in seven cases did not match any records or there was 
insufficient identifying information to permit retrieval despite much searching. This 
may have been due to doctors' concerns about confidentiality causing some 
doctors to change some of the patient characteristics when describing an adverse 
event. For example, they may have changed the sex or age of the patient in 
telling the narrative of the mistake. A final 11 mistakes could be linked with 
medical records. In each of these 11 cases, the medical records corroborated that 
the patient as described by the informant existed. The reviewers said that in one 
case the medical records did not document the adverse event but they confirmed 
the existence of the patient and all aspects of their hospitalisation.xx 
A specialist physician (gastroenterologist) with expertise in quality and safety and 
the manager of the quality assurance program who has postgraduate 
qualifications separately reviewed the medical records to corroborate the 
informants' narratives of the adverse events. The junior doctors' narratives of the 
adverse events were provided to the reviewers. They completed a questionnaire 
•x The informants described a total of 81 mistakes. I examined 57 of these mistakes in-depth. 
(See Chapter Five) 
"" Intern 14 
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for each of the adverse events described by the informants and checked the 
medical records to confirm or dispute the narratives described by the informants. 
This was the sole use of the information provided by the reviewers. 
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Chapter Five: Results 
Mistakes and Factors 
1 Overview of the mistakes described 
When I first asked the informants to describe a mistake they had experienced 
or observed, 11 doctors said they could not recall any mistakes, but the 32 
informants went on to describe a total of 81 mistakes. This suggests the 
language used to discuss mistakes is under-developed and poorly understood 
by junior doctors. They tended to use words such as 'stuff-ups' to describe 
their mistakes. The following quote captures one resident's view of errors 
'I can't think of many significant mistakes that I have been involved in because there may be many that you 
wouldn't even know about. There are a lot of things that happen that you might not realise have taken place. I 
would not expect to be told about a mistake unless it was very serious; the mistakes I know about are the 
ones that have led to significantly bad outcomes to patients. The fact is you move on from mistakes very 
readily. I remember when someone dies or has had a stroke which is quite devastating, ones that will become 
good stories in years to come. The other ones like the one that just happened today, there are always little 
errors, you might write the wrong dose on their med chart or forget to chart something or little things like that. 
They often happen.' RMO (21 ); 
A number of doctors did not know how to define a 'mistake'; whether a bad 
outcome or a bad experience fitted the definition for a mistake. One intern;; 
said while she was unsure about whether her example was a mistake it 
scared her so it was worth mentioning. Her case concerned a delayed 
response to a patient with high serum potassium. The patient died while the 
intern was administering treatment. The intern further said in describing a 
second case of missed diagnosis of pulmonary oedema that she was unsure 
whether the omission was a mistake or something else but that 'it is not really 
vety good'. 
Most informants said a mistake implied that something had 'gone wrong' or 
that something happened that should not have happened. While three 
informants referred to possible factors underpinning errors, most of the 
answers were couched in terms of the individual responsibility of the doctors 
(and nurses). A consistent theme involved the identification of individuals 
; The number and position of the informant has been inserted after all quotations to track the 
data but also allow the reader to follow particular informants' responses. I did not do this when 
I used quotations to emphasise a particular point. For example on page 140. 
;; Intern (3) 
(nurses and doctors) as having primary responsibility for mistakes. These 
following quotations reflect the focus on personal responsibility. 
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'I guess the important thing is to differentiate it (mistake) from bad outcomes and in some cases 
they are always going to have bad outcomes but there are some things that, things go wrong due 
to our doing.' 
'Someone making a mistake, writing down something, to something being omitted.' 
'A doctor being involved as opposed to any other health professional.' 
'Someone did wrong that could probably have been avoided.' 
'A bad outcome that could have been avoided by appropriate intervention.' 
'A compromise of patient care, standard of care expected from either medical staff or nursing staff.' 
No one denied that errors occurred in hospitals. Twenty-nine of the 32 (91 %) 
doctors interviewed said that mistakes are common or very common. Sixteen 
said the mistakes are common, 13 said they are very common with two saying 
they are uncommon. One resident stated 'I think (mistakes) are a lot more 
common than people like to admit.'iii Other doctors made similar statements 
about frequency of mistakes. One interniv who said he did not think mistakes 
were common clarified his answer 'I am sure there are mistakes, I just 
personally haven't been involved in them or seen them generally.' One 
resident in reply to the question about the frequency of mistakes said: 
'Pretty common, I would only be speculating at numbers. They happen all the time, let's be honest. Whether 
or not there are any outcomes is obviously much less common, because it usually takes more than one 
mishap necessarily to create a problem. It is the disasters we hear about but not the day-to-day lots of little 
holes.' RM01 (29) 
There was no response to the question from one interviewee. While no one 
used blame language about the causes of mistakes and adverse events most 
feared being blamed for their own mistakes. An exploration of informants' 
understanding of medical mistakes showed they mostly referred to their 
limited medical knowledge, the place where the mistake occurred, interactions 
with other health workers, bad patient outcomes, and ranking of the mistake 
into minor and serious. 
''' RM01 (26) 
" Intern (9) 
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2 Total mistakes described by interns and residents 
All 32 informants• reported at least one medical mistake they had experienced 
or observed. Interns and residents described a total of 81 mistakes. Of these 
69 (85%) directly involved the informants and 12 (15%) were mistakes 
described by informants who said they were not directly involved. Before the 
interviews started I told informants they could discuss their mistakes in the 
third person. The higher-than-expected self-disclosure suggests willingness to 
disclose mistakes in a safe environment. 
Eight of the 32 informants, when asked if they had experienced or observed a 
mistake in the last six months, at first said they could not remember. As the 
interview progressed they all recalled mistakes. (Doctors are not required to 
remember or analyse mistakes within an improvement framework, which may 
explain the delayed mistake narratives.) Some may have been cautious 
because of the sensitivity of talking about mistakes. Once reassured of the 
context for the interview they may have felt more comfortable discussing 
mistakes. Another trend in the interviews was for informants to describe 
toward the end of the interview the mistake that concerned them most. This 
may be because they felt more comfortable. 
The 81 mistakes occurred in the metropolitan hospital and district hospitals. 
Table 5.1 lists the categories of mistakes described by informants. The 
mistakes comprised four categories: (1) medication errors (2) diagnosis (3) 
treatment and (4) patient management. Mistakes involving incorrect or 
delayed treatment were the largest category followed by diagnostic mistakes, 
medication and patient management errors. 
'The informants comprised Interns, RM01 and RM02 medial officers. An Intern is a doctor in their 
first year since graduation. RM01 is a Resident Medical Officer in their second year. An RM02 is 
a Resident Medical Officer Year 2. ( 3 years since graduation) 
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Table 5.1: Number and category of mistakes described 
Category Sub-category Number Total Number Percentage 
Medication errors Incorrect drug 10 16 20% 
Incorrect dose 6 
(including 2 
wrona catients). 
Diagnosis lncorrecUmissed 22 27% 
diagnosis. 14 
Delayed 
diagnosis. 8 
Treatment Delay in 16 31 38% 
treatment. 
Incorrect 15 
treatment 
(including 3 
wrong patients). 
Patient management Assortment of 12 12 15% 
monitoring, 
reporting, 
discharge, 
wrona tests. 
TOTAL 81 81 100% 
Seven informants identified one mistake each, ten identified two, nine 
identified three, three identified four and three identified five making a total of 
81 mistakes. Fifty-seven (70%) of the 81 mistakes were analysed because the 
informants remembered sufficient detail to enable examination of the 
underlying factors involved. (Of these, ten informants identified one each, 13 
identified two mistakes, and seven identified three mistakes.) The remaining 
24 mistakes not analysed are mistakes described by informants in answer to 
general questions or had insufficient detail to permit further examination. 
These mistakes are in italic in Table 5.2. The cases selected for analysis of 
underlying factors are in standard type face. 
Table 5.2: Total Mistakes: position tvpe of mistake, experience 
1 Cases described but not analysed in italics (24 mistakes) 
2 Cases for analysis of factors in standard type face (57 mistakes) 
Identifier Respondent Number of Typss of mistake 
mistakes 
described 
1 Intern 3 Incorrect drug provided (beta blocker). 
Incorrect diagnosis (missed bowel 
obstruction). 
Delay in treatment (delay in fluid 
restrichon). 
2 Intern 1 Incorrect treatment (removal of femoral 
line). 
3 intern 2 Misdiagnosis (pulmonary oedema). 
Delay in treatment (high potassium 
reading). 
4 intern 5 Incorrect medication given. 
Observer or 
experienced 
Own experience. 
Own experience. 
Own experience. 
Own experience. 
Own experience. 
Own experience. 
Observed. 
143 
Incorrect medication (penicillin when Observed. 
patient allergic). 
Unnecessary hospitalisation. Observed. 
Inappropriate invasive procedures at end Observed. 
of life (nasogastric tube). 
Incorrect fluid measures. Observed. 
5 intern 5 Incorrect dose. Own experience. 
Surgical mishap-ileoscopy. Own experience. 
Incorrect flushing wMe cell filter. Observed. 
Incorrect treatment (wrong site chest Observed. 
drein}. 
No post-operative management plans. Own experience. 
6 RM01 1 Delayed diaanosis of suraical problem. Own experience. 
7 RM01 4 Medication not given. Own experience. 
Medication given to wrong patient. Own experience. 
Incorrect dose of medication. Own experience. 
Misdiagnosis (myocardial infarct). Own experience. 
8 intern 2 Delayed treatment. Own experience. 
Lack of monitoring pre-operatively. Own experience. 
9 intern 1 Delayed treatment (high potassium level}. Observed. 
10 intern 3 Medication given to wrong patient Own experience. 
Delayed diagnosis (endocarditis and Own experience. 
sepsis). 
Delayed treatment. Own experience. 
11 RM01 3 Incorrect dose of beta blocker- read 500 Own experience. 
for 50 mg. 
Misdiagnosis of obstructive airways Own experience. 
disease. 
Incorrect treatment (no anticoagulants Own experience. 
aiven-pulmonary embolism). 
12 intern 3 Delay in treatment and test results. Own experience. 
Wrong tests and consultation. Own experience. 
Nil information and delays in management. Own experience. 
13 RM01 2 Delay in attending cardiac arrest. Own experience. 
Incorrect dose (gentamycin-kidney failure). Observed. 
14 intern 1 Delay in treatment (dehydration, renal Own experience. 
failure). 
15 RM01 2 Delayed diagnosis (broken hip). Own experience. 
Delayed treatment in ED (renal and Own experience. 
cardiac failure). 
16 intern 2 Incorrect medication. Own experience. 
InadeQuate discharae. Own experience. 
17 intern 2 Wrong diagnosis (no blood gas done). Own experience. 
Delay in cannula insertion. Own experience. 
18 RM01 1 Incorrect treatment (premature removal of Own experience. 
drain). 
19 RM02 4 Misdiagnosis (fracture). Own experience. 
Misdiagnosis (too much oxygen). Own experience. 
Delay in diagnosis (test delay after hours}. Own experience. 
Incorrect treatment.(no medication). Own experience. 
20 RM01 3 Misdiagnosis (pneumothorax). Own experience. 
Delay in diagnosing (infarct). Own experience. 
Delay in treatment (stroke}. Own experience. 
21 RM01 4 Delay in treatment (low potassium). Observed. 
Incorrect treatment (stroke patient}. Observed. 
Incorrect treatment (wrong patient on Own experience. 
heparin management). 
Incorrect treatment (anticoagulation 
medication to wrong patient}. 
Own experience. 
Incorrect medication (aspirin). Own experience. 
22 RM01 3 Delayed diagnosis (renal failure). Own experience. 
Incorrect treatment (defibrillator not Own experience. 
available). 
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23 RM02 2 Misdiagnosis (lortion of the testes). Own experience. 
Failure to document history in notes in ED. Own experience. 
24 RM01 2 Misdiagnosis (of malnutrition). Own experience. 
Delayed treatment (nil nasogastric feed Own experience. 
tube). 
25 Intern 2 Incorrect prescribing (penicillin). Own experience. 
Misdiagnosis (ed delay in tests). Own experience. 
26 RM01 1 Incorrect treatment (patient in atrial Own experience. 
fibrillation). 
27 RM01 3 Delayed diagnosis (hypertension and Own experience. 
septic shock). 
Delayed treatment (very sick patient- Own experience. 
inexperienced dr). 
Incorrect treatment (central line insertion). Observed. 
28 RM01 5 Incorrect dose (ACE inhibitor 100 mg Own experience. 
instead of 28 mg). 
Incorrect fluids. Own experience. 
Misdiagnosis (fistula). Own experience. 
Incorrect diagnosis (respiratory ":t~e of 40). Own experience. 
Incorrect treatment (wrong patient . Own experience. 
29 RM01 3 Delay in diagnosis (spinal patient). Own experience. 
Delay in treatment (surgery). Own experience. 
Delay in treatment ihigh potassium). Own experience. 
30 RM02 1 Delay in treatment (infected central line). Own experience. 
31 RM02 3 Incorrect dose (sate/mol). Own experience. 
Misdiagnosis (post operative internal Own experience. 
bleed). 
Delay in surge'}', Own experience. 
32 Intern 2 Incorrect treatment (diabetic patient in ED). Own experience. 
Delav in treatment (lest result delav). Own exPerience. 
2.1 Examining the underlying factors in the mistakes for in-depth analysis 
I discussed 57 mistakes in detail with the interns and residents. The mistakes 
and the underlying factors that are examined in detail are listed in Table 5.3 
below. The underlying factors associated with their mistakes were identified 
by the informants from a list provided to them. Each was asked to nominate 
the factors they thought were present at the time of the mistake. (See 
appendix 2, pages 7 and 8 for a list of the factors). 
Table 5.3: 57 Cases for analysis: cateqorv of mistake, location, patient condition and patient 
outcome 
Identifier Position Type of mistake Location Condition of patient- {pre 
mistake) 
1 Intern Incorrect drug given from day Ward-about to be Stable. 
of admission to discharge. discharged. 
(Beta blocker given Instead of 
anti depressant.) 
Incorrect diagnosfs (missed Surgical ward in Patient had dementia and 
bowel obstruction). peripheral fracture of neck of femur. Very 
hospital. sick. 
3 intern Misdiagnosis (pulmonary Ward-intern on Surgery two hours previously-
oedema). overtime. Patient for discharge with 
wheezes in chest. 
Outcome for 
patient {post 
mlstak~ 
No adverse outcome. 
Died. 
Extra few days in 
hospital-discharged. 
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Delay in treatment (high End of overtime Very sick patient-high Died in !CU. 
potassium reading). shift on ward. potassium level. Very slow 
breathing. 
4 intern Incorrect medication given- Emergency Worsening creatinine level: Returned to previous 
given anti hypertension Department. generally very sick patient with level of functioning. 
medication instead of calcium lot of medical problems (cardiac 
tablets. failure, diabetes, coronary and 
renal impairment). 
Incorrect treatment Geriatlic Ward. Terminally ill with end-stage Pulled PEG out and 
(Inappropriate invasive Parkinson's disease. Patient did bled to death. 
procedures at end of life) not want a PEG (percutaneous 
endoscopic gastrostomy) -
pulled out. 
Incorrect fluid measures. Ward-overtime on Patient hyponatremic (122)- on Extended length of 
night duty. wrong fluids. stay. 
5 intern Wrong treatment {surgical Base hospital. Pain and no urine output. Return to theatre and 
mishap-Ileostomy). Showed signs of peritonitis and additional length of 
infection around the ileostomy stay. 
site. 
Incorrect flushing white cells Surgical ward on Patient had splenectomy and Stable extended length 
filter with saline. night shift. required blood transfusion. of stay. 
Unwell nauseous and fever. 
No post operative Spinal ward. Patient with ankylosing No permanent 
management plans. spondylitis- slipped fixation. neurological defect. 
Extended length of 
stay. 
6 RM01 Delayed diagnosis of surgical Medical ward and Patient with infiltrative lung Died. 
problem. ICU. disease. Unwell post -
operatively. 
7 RM01 Medication not given. Surgical ward. Very unwell patient with No ill effects. 
numerous complications post 
surgery. Infected graft and on 
long term antibiotics. 
Medication given to wrong Surgical ward- Both patients stable and not too No adverse outcome. 
patient. Intravenous night shift. unwell. 
antibiotics 
{right patient, missed out on 
antibioti~ 
Misdiagnosis {myocardial Emergency Sick patient with chest pains. Not completely bad but 
Infarct). Department. not desirable. Survived 
the infarct. Extended 
length of stay. 
8 intern lack of monitoring pre- Surgical ward and Diabetic patient on nil by mouth. No adverse outcome-
operatively. theatres. Having pin and plate for hip. surgery completed on 
day. 
9 intern Delayed treatment {high Surgical ward. Patient for elective surgery. Died. 
potassium level). 
10 intern Medication given to wrong Medical ward. Unwell patient. No adverse outcome. 
patient. 
Delayed diagnosis Peripheral Very sick patient. Heart surgery. 
{endocarditis and sepsis). hospital. Survived. Extended 
length of stay. 
Delayed treatment. Ward, ICU. Elderly patient very unwell. Unknown to intern. 
11 RM01 Misdiagnosis of obstructive Emergency Unconscious came fn by Unknown to RM01. 
airways disease. department in ambulance. 
peripheral 
hospital. 
12 intern Delay in treatment and test Orthopaedic Motor vehicle accident victim- Clinically stable. 
results. ward. Patient with fractured tibia and Discharged. 
external fixations, fractured 
hand- infection. 
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Wrong tests and consultation. Ward at Patient had chest pain and DisCharged. 
peripheral recent endoscopywhad gastritis. 
hospital. 
Nil information and delays in Ward peripheral Patient on warfarin. Discharged. 
management. hospital. 
13 RM01 Delay in attending cardiac Peripheral Very sick patient with chronic Died. 
arrest call (also delay in test hospital- medical airways disease with infected 
ordering) ward exacerbation. 
Weekend shift. 
Incorrect dose (gentamycin). Medical ward. Patient admitted with normal Acute renal failure. 
kidney function. Extended length of 
stav. 
14 intern Delay in treatment. Medical ward. Patient with pneumonia Died. 
dehydration, renal failure). . 
15 RM01 Delayed diagnosis {broken Peripheral Complaining of pain, conscious, Extended length of stay 
hlp). hospital bit confused and demented. in ICU. Transferred to 
Emergency ward. 
Department-
medical ward over 
Christmas. 
Delay in treatment. Emergency Sick patient and hypotensive, Extended length of stay 
Department. no urine output Transferred Month in ICU on 
patient with renal failure and ventilator 
cardiac failure. Returned to ward. 
16 intern Inadequate discharge. Orthopaedic Interstate Patient- had surgery Discharged without x-
ward. for fracture. rays and reports. 
17 intern Wrong diagnosis (no blood General ward in Very sick elderly patient with Died in ICU. 
gas done). peripheral pneumonia. 
hospital. 
Delay in cannula insertion. Gastro ward. Patient with metastases and Died. 
limited life expectancy - months. 
Vomiting blood. 
18 RM01 Incorrect treatment Ward. Child patient. No adverse outcome. 
(premature removal of drain). 
19 RM02 Misdiagnosis (fracture). Peripheral Patient had a fall, nauseous No adverse outcome. 
hospital and no neurological symptoms. 
Emergency 
Department 
Misdiagnosis (too much Respiratory Ward. Patient with chest infection and Extended length of stay 
oxygen). chronic retention of C02. in lCU and ward. 
Incorrect treatment (no Emergency Patient with infected Extended length of 
medication). Department. exacerbation of Chronic stay. No adverse 
Airways Disease. outcome. 
20 RM01 Misdiagnosis Orthopaedic Patient had numerous Arrested. Extended 
(tension pneumothorax). Ward. orthopaedic problems. Hip length of stay. 
replacement turned septic. 
Short of breath. 
Delay in diagnosing Spinal ward. Patient had stents and Extended length of 
(acute myocardial infarct). percutaneous nephrostomy stay. Recovered. 
tubes put in. Obstructed 
urethra. 
21 RM01 Delay in admission and Upper Gl Ward. Elective patient scheduled for Died. 
treatment surgery. 
(low potassium). 
Incorrect treatment (wrong Emergency Patient had vertebral artery No hann done. 
patient on heparin Department and dissection. Had been anti 
management). ward. coagulated started on warfarin 
and heparin infusion. 
Incorrect medication Peripheral Patient due for surgery -urinary Surgery proceeded 
22 RM01 (aspirin). hospital- tract infection. with no adverse 
Emergency outcome. 
Department -
Ward. 
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Delayed diagnosis. Emergency Patient had pneumonia. Renal Extended length of stay 
Department. failure. in gastric ward. No 
adverse outcome. 
Treatment (defibrillator not Rehabilitation Elderty Patient rehab after Died. 
available). Ward. fractures. 
23 RM02 Misdiagnosis (torsion of the Emergency Young boy in pain. Delayed surgery. 
testis). Department. Recovered. 
Failure to document history in 
notes In ED. 
24 RM01 Misdiagnosis Orthopaedic Post operative due to fractured Transferred to ICU. 
(of malnutrition). Ward-weekend. femur in very unwell patient • RMO does not know 
vomiting, weight loss, dumping outcome. 
syndrome from previous 
stomach cancer. 
Delayed treatment Head and Neck Difficult and confused patient No food for 4 days. 
(nil nasogastric feed tube). Ward. with oral cancer had trachea Tube reinserted. 
tube. 
26 RM01 Incorrect treatment. Emergency Patient with recent onset stroke Extended length of 
Department Base having atrial fibrillation. stay. 
hospital. 
27 RM01 Delayed diagnosis Surgical ward. Very unwell patient vomiting. Unknown to RMO. 
(Hypertension and septic 
shock). 
Delayed treatment. Peripheral Patient unwell in pre respiratory Died. 
Hospital Intensive arrest situation. 
Care Unit. 
Incorrect treatment Peripheral Unwell patient in Intensive Care No adverse outcome. 
(Central line Insertion into Hospital Intensive Unit. 
artery). Care Unit. 
26 RM01 Misdiagnosis Surgical Ward Patient with adhesions to Extended length of 
(fistula). Peripheral bowel- Post operative surgical stay. After 3 months 
Hospital. complications-in hospital for transferred to teaching 
months. hospital and surgery 
corrected- discharged 
home. 
Incorrect treatment. Peripheral Sick patient post cardiac arrest Died. 
(Wrong patient). Hospital Intensive with uncontrollable seizures 
Care Unit. 2nd patient with pelforated 
duodenal ulcer and fitting. 
29 RM01 Delay in diagnosis. Emergency Spinal patient admitted with Extended length of 
Department- hypothennia, low platelet count. stay. No adverse 
Spinal Ward. outcome. 
Delay in treatment. Spinal Ward. Patient had thoracic spine Extended length of 
(surgery). fracture. stay. 
30 RM02 Delay in treatment. Surgical Ward. Patient had complicated bums Extended length of 
I 
(infected central line). and two central lines inserted. stay. 
' 31 RM02 Misdiagnosis Gastro ward. Patient post operative with Died. 
(post operative internal abdominal pain. 
bleed). 
Delay in surgery. Pre - arranged Patient had problem with fistula. Discharged without 
admission to surgery. 
Renal ward. 
32 Intern Delay in treatment Surgical ward. Patient in accident. Fractures. No adverse outcome. 
(test result delay). 
- --
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3 Overview of factors underlying the mistakes 
3.1 Location 
The following Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show the places where mistakes occurred. 
Table 5.4: Location within hospital of mistakes reported by interns. RM01s and RM02s 
Metropolitan teachin nospltal 
Area Intern RM01 RM02 TOTAL 
General Ward 5 1 6 
Emergency 1 5 2 8 
Department 
Geriatric ward 1 1 2 
Surgical ward 4 3 1 8 
Orthopaedic 2 2 4 
ward 
Sj)inal ward 1 2 3 
Medical ward 2 2 4 
Gastro ward 1 1 1 3 
Renal ward 1 1 
Respiratory ward 1 1 
Head and neck 1 1 
ward 
Total 17 18 6 41 
Table 5.5: Location within hospital of mistakes reported by interns. RM01s and RM02s 
• ""'''r-'-'""'''""' ••v.,.,..n,..,.., 
Area Intern RM01 RM02 TOTAL 
General ward 4 4 
Emergency 3 3 1 7 
department 
Medical ward 1 1 
Intensive care 3 3 
unit 
Suroical ward 1 1 
Total 7 8 1 16 
3.1.1 Mistakes in the teaching hospital 
Forty-one (71 %) mistakes of the 57 occurred in the teaching hospital: 
Emergency Department (eight), surgical ward (six) spinal ward (five) medical 
ward (four) orthopaedic ward (four) gastro ward (three) respiratory ward (one) 
rehab and geriatric ward (two) renal ward (one) head and neck ward (one) 
unspecified ward (six). Informants identified the ED and the surgical wards as 
very busy terms. The cluster of mistakes in these two areas is therefore not 
unexpected. 
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3.1.2 Mistakes in the peripheral hospitals 
The remaining 16 (29%) mistakes occurred in the peripheral hospitals. Within 
this group six occurred in a general medical ward, five in the Emergency 
Department, three in an Intensive Care Unit and two in a surgical ward (one 
orthopaedic). The informants said the lack of availability of senior clinicians 
after hours had an impact on their clinical experience and contrasted to their 
experience in the teaching hospital where they had more ready access to 
senior staff. 
Three themes emerged from the analysis of location. The first related to the 
problems associated with inadequate supervision in the peripheral hospitals. 
The second related to the Emergency Department's role as entry point for 
many patients and third related to the obtaining out-of-department 
consultations for patients who require review and consultation from clinicians 
in other areas of the hospital. 
3.1.3 Supervision in the peripheral hospitals 
Informants in the peripheral hospitals reported being left alone in responsible 
positions with insufficient experience and support. Planned teaching 
commitments of supervisors and scheduled leave for clinical staff were two 
explanations for this. The five quotations below reflect the general attitude to 
supervision in district hospitals. 
'You are in the country- obviously there is not much staff around.' Intern (5) 
'It took place in a peripheral hospital; I was the only person on duty in the Emergency Department 
and there were no relatives with the patient. She was unconscious. After admission she got 
intubated and then she went up to the ward.' RM01 (11) 
'I was newly graduated and at a smaller hospital. On overtime there tends to be one intern and one 
registrar, which makes the workload for an intern high. There is only one junior staff on a weekend 
and one registrar.' RM01 (13) 
'It was a district hospital. During the holiday period, the nursing homes have a fairly low threshold 
to send someone to the hospital if they feel that something's wrong. The patient was in the ED for 
probably half a day. The x-ray was finally done on his hip after 4 days'. RM01 (15) 
'It's intimidating being left in charge at nights. Apart from ringing the consultant there's not a lot of 
other support. The nurses look to you even though they're experienced.' Intern (8) 
Interns and residents also had positive experiences in the peripheral 
hospitals: increased opportunities for hands-on-learning and being more 
engaged members of the team. These following quotations express the 
thoughts of many informants. 
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'The ICU unit (at the peripheral hospital) encourages residents to do practical stuff, and get 
experience which we don't get to do very much at (the teaching Hospital) because there are ten 
registrars before you who are very keen.' RM01 (27) 
'You get more support at a peripheral hospital than at the teaching hospital where you're a lot on 
your own. At the smaller hospital you help each other out, even with other medical teams. They will 
always give you a hand if you are out of your depth or whatever.' Intern (25) 
3.1.4 The Emergency Department 
A number of mistakes occurred in Emergency Departments, which is 
surprising given the policy of 24-hour cover by experienced clinicians. The 
need for adequate supervision in the ED is widely recognised. Informants 
recognised the need for supervision and when they were left unsupervised in 
the ED referred to the policy not to leave inexperienced doctors unsupervised. 
One intern and six residents (four RM01s and two RM02s) described 
mistakes in the ED. The ED was identified by informants as very busy, chaotic 
and where mistakes are likely to happen. They also sourced it as the start of 
many problems which later manifested on the ward. The following edited 
quotations give the flavour of some of the attitudes expressed about the ED. 
'When I was an intern working in the emergency department a lady came in with chest pains and 
she received immediate treatment. I initially diagnosed it as unstable angina but it turned out to be 
a myocardial infarct. It was a misdiagnosis, but we did get the diagnosis in the end but it was 
delayed which is important in myocardial infarctions.' RM01 (7) 
'As an intern in emergency you get to form your own opinions first and then run things by the 
registrars and seek their direction. On the wards you are mainly clerking. I'm a lot more like a 
doctor here. I think this is a better learning environment that the other wards. You have to start 
thinking for yourself. You don't really have to be concerned that people are going to pick your 
mistakes before you misdiagnose or not enough experience or whatever but it's up to yourself and 
you can think as much as you want. There is more opportunity to learn from experience as well as 
from the other doctors.' Intern (10) 
'I think medication errors are common for patients (who) come in through ED.' RM01 (13). 
'A patient was transferred to neurosurgery via our ED from (a town) in western NSW and 
unfortunately this gentleman arrived in the early hours of the morning where he sat for about 8-9 
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hours. By the time he got to our ward he was very sick with renal failure and cardiac failure. I felt 
he had been dumped on our ward by the ED without them sorting anything out in the hours that 
they had him down there.' RMO 1 (15) 
'The emergency department is more prone to transcription errors and failure to follow up on tests. 
They could also start treatment a lot earlier. They are also very busy.' RM02 (19) 
3.1.5 Out-of-Department Consultations 
Problems for JMOs obtaining consultations from other departments and 
specialty areas in the hospital (referred to as out-of-department consultations) 
included unavailability of clinicians because they were in theatre, difficulty in 
convincing other specialists of the urgency, poor responses to junior medical 
officers' request for consultations, difficulties with coordination of such 
requests, difficulties recognising the primary responsible cliniciansv;, problems 
with continuity of care and delays in specialist consults causing problems in 
patient management and pressure on beds. The following quotations from 
residents highlight that the problem is not only associated with interns 
unfamiliar with ward routines, hospital structure and hierarchies. 
'We had three registrars at that point and we consulted the surgical registrar and it was difficult to 
get that surgical registrar to come to review the patient.' RM01 (6) 
'The work environment includes the problem of the teams having to come outside their own area 
for a consult. This is a difficulty to encounter, because nobody likes to work harder when you don't 
have to. The hospital requires patients to be looked after in the speciality of the area, so we are 
getting many specialists (for each patient) and who coordinates it all is a real problem' RM01 (20) 
'With conjoint admissions somebody still needs to take ultimate responsibility for the overall 
management, somebody needs to call the shots.' RMO 1 (20) 
'If somebody performs an operation on a patient they should be following that patient up during the 
peri and post operative perlod. I think in practice that doesn't happen. This causes communication 
difficulties or delays in actually getting some consultations.' RM01 (29} 
'People don't like moving out of their own comfort zone. It gets continually talked about. It is an 
issue for the NUM of the ward and the nursing staff, because they don't know who to call and they 
are going through whatever avenues they can. It is on a case-by-case basis rather than looking at 
prevention.' RM01 (29) 
'Consultants from different specialities have a reputation for not coming to see the patient for a 
week. Medically it's difficult for us. But we can't do much about that.' RM01 (29) 
''This occurred when many specialists were involved in treating the patient. 
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3.2 Situation at the time of mistakes 
Before I asked each doctor about the possible factors surrounding each of the 
mistakes I questioned them about the general situation on the ward/area at 
the time of the mistake. Time of the event (weekends, nights and overtime}, 
the workload and inadequate staff were constant themes. Table 5.6 lists the 
most significant general features identified by the doctors. All but one doctor 
talked about the impact of workload on their capacity to attend to all their work 
demands. 
'In a peripheral hospital I was left without proper cover. The registrar was away on study leave and 
other registrars are meant to cover. The consultant is meant to provide more cover. This didn't 
happen and essentially we had a very, very sick guy in his fifties. We didn't know what was going 
on.' Intern (10) 
'Mishaps happen when things are busy. And when you are rushing and when you are tired or 
someone is away. When the registrar is away it makes the chain a bit more broken. There is not 
adequate back up for when someone is away which creates a busy or an abnormal situation.' 
RM01 (29) 
Table 5.6: General situation and position of doctors 
Situation Intern factors RM01 factors RM02 Total 
factors factors 
Inadequate staffing. 4 (registrar absenUnot available) 3 (registrar absenU 16 
4 not available) 
1 (consultant unavailable/not 3 
helpful) 1 (consultant 
(total 9) unavailable) 
(total IL 
New staffl<>!!.ency staff. 1 1 
Out of normal hours. 6weekends 4weekends 1 weekend 22 
3 night duty 5 night duty 1 night duty 
2 overtime (total 9) (total 2) 
(total 11) 
Holidays/theatres closed. 1 1 
Patient Factors (very sick 6 6 1 13 
patient) (Language). 
Discharge process. 2 2 
Ward allocation. 1 (patient in different wards) 1 
Workload. 6 10 1 17 
Inadequate communication 5 5 10 
about tests, instructions, 
patient condition. 
Emergency Dept. Delay in 1 3 4 
admission to ward. 
Intimidation by consultant. 1 1 
Out of ordinary 1 2 3 
pathway/admission. 
42 43 6 91 
3.3 Outcomes of care for the patients 
Table 5.3 above sets out the outcome of the care provided to patients. Twenty 
patients (36%) had an extended stay in hospital, 19 (34%) suffered no 
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adverse outcome and 13 (23%) died. The outcomes were not known for four 
(7%). Of the 13 patients who died, a number were very sick with significant 
co-morbidity. There was no attempt to directly link the death with the mistake, 
even though in many instances the mistake was seen as a significant factor in 
the patient's demise. Table 5.7 below describes the number of deaths and the 
category of mistakes associated with the deaths. 
Table 5.7: Position, number of mistakes involving patient deaths, category of mistake reported by 
interns, RM01 sand RM02s 
Position Number of mistakes Involving Category of mistake 
deaths 
Interns 6 2- Incorrect diagnosis. 
3 - Delay in treatment. 
1-lncorrect treatment. 
RM01 6 1- Incorrect treatment. 
4 -Delay in treatment. 
1- Delayed diaanosis. 
RM02 1 1-Misdiagnosis. 
Total 13 13 
Nine (69%) of the 13 deaths vii involved treatment mistakes (treatment delay 
(seven) and incorrect treatment (two)). Four involved a problem with diagnosis 
(two incorrect diagnoses, one misdiagnosis and one delayed diagnosis). 
Table 5.8: Position, number of mistakes involved in extended length of stay reported by interns, 
RM01s and RM02s 
Position Number of mistakes Involving Category of mistake 
Extended length of stay 
Intern 6 1- Misdiagnosis. 
4- Incorrect treatment. 
1- Delayed diagnosis. 
RM01 11 3- Misdiagnosis. 
4- Delayed diagnosis. 
2- Incorrect treatment. 
2 -delayed treatment. 
RM02 3 1- Misdiagnosis. 
1- Incorrect treatment. 
1- Delayed treatment. 
Total 20 20 
Ten of the 20 mistakes involving an extended length of stay in hospital related 
to treatment mistakes and the remaining ten related to diagnostic problems. 
'''Two doctors reported the same mistakes involving a death. It has been counted only once. 
' 
' 
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4 Factors perceived as contributing to mistakes 
4.1 Overview 
The factors described by interns and residents are categorised into four 
domains: Junior medical officer factors (medical knowledge and skill, 
interpersonal relationships, ability to work in teams, communication skills and 
power relationships); Patient factors (complexity and severity of illness, age, 
gender, language spoken at home); System factors (degree of supervision, 
organisation of work, work environment, location/situation, hospital) and 
External factors (state laws, regulations, cost containment , professional 
standards, industrial activity).vlii 
After each doctor finished telling the narrative of the mistake I asked whether 
any factors listed in Table 5.9 were present. This table sets out the number of 
times a factor was identified as contributing to the mistake being described. 
I then grouped the factors into one of the four domains listed above and set 
out in Table 5.1 0. At the end of the discussion about all the factors involved in 
the mistake I asked the doctor to nominate what they saw as the main factor 
contributing to the mistake. Table 5.11 sets out the informants' choices of the 
main factors in the mistakes. 
Table 5.9: Summary of individual factors, position and the main factor selected by informants. 
Factors Intern RM01 RM02 Total Main 
Factor 
Junior medical officer 
factors 
Knowledge and skill 7 13 2 22 18 
Communication 12 16 4 32 16 
Interpersonal 3 8 1 12 2 
Patient Factors 
Patient factors 6 13 2 21 4 
System Factors 
Supervision 6 8 2 16 6 
Location/situation 16 15 5 36 7 
Equipment/technology 0 2 1 3 0 
Work environment 4 5 1 10 1 
Organisation of work 7 5 0 12 3 
Hospital 1 1 0 2 0 
External Factors 
Other factors 1 2 0 3 0 
Total factors 63 88 18 169 57 
VIII The domains are set out in Chapter Four. 
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Table 5.10: Factors Domain and position of the informants 
Domain Intern RM01 RM02 Total 
Junior medical 22 37 7 66 
officer factors 
Patient factors 6 13 2 21 
System factors 34 36 9 79 
External factors 1 2 0 3 
63 88 18 169 
Table 5.11: Factors Domain and the main factor contributing to mistakes 
Domain Number of Total Percentage of total Main factor Percentage of 
factors factors main factors 
Junior medical officer 66 39% 36 63% 
factors 
Patient factors 21 12% 4 7% 
System factors 79 47% 17 30% 
External factors 3 2% 0 0% 
Total 169 100% 57 100% 
Taking all the factors into account the top five factors responsible for mistakes 
were Location/Situation (36) Communication (32) Knowledge and skill (22) 
Patient factors (21) and Supervision (16). But when interns and residents 
were asked to nominate the main factor involved in the mistake a different 
picture emerges. Knowledge and skill was mentioned most (18) followed by 
Communication (16) Location/Situation (seven) and Supervision (six) and 
Patient factors (four). 
The 57 mistakes fitted evenly into errors of omission (29) (a failure to do 
something) and errors of commission (28) (doing the wrong thing or the right 
thing at the wrong time). 
When all the factors were allocated to one of the four domains System factors 
(79) comprised the largest group followed by junior medical officer factors (66) 
then patient factors (21) and finally external factors (three). Table 5.12 shows 
the four domains. When the main factors are grouped into the four domains a 
different picture emerges. Sixty-three percent of the main factors related to 
junior medical officer factors ahead of either system factors (30%) or patient 
factors (7%). 
Even though interns and residents identified system factors (47%) most in 
their general discussion about mistakes when it came to nominating the main 
factor they overwhelming identified personal (junior doctor) factors as the 
main cause. They saw individual responsibility, either through lack of 
knowledge or skill caused by inexperience, inadequate communication and 
interpersonal issues as the main causes of mistakes. 
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Table 5.10 shows that interns, unlike RM01 sand RM02s, rated system 
factors (34 of 63 (54%)) most for all factors but as Table 5.12 shows when it 
came to the main factor they also identified junior medical officer factors most 
(16 of 23 (70%)). System factors accounted for five of 23 main factors. See 
Table 5.12 for a breakdown of the domain, position of the informants and their 
choices of main factors. Table 5.9 shows that RM01 s rated 'junior medical 
officer' factors most out of all factors (37 of 88(42%)) and also as the main 
factor but the percentage increased to 57 per cent. Table 5.9 similarly shows 
that RM02s rated junior medical officer factors (nine of 18 (50%)) most out of 
all factors as well as rating it as the main factor in mistakes (four out of the six 
(67%)). See Table 5.12 below. 
Table 5.12: Domain, position of informants and their choice of main factor 
Domain Intern RM01 RM02 Total Percentage 
Junior medical 16 16 4 36 63% 
officer factors. 
Patient factors. 2 2 0 4 7% 
System factors. 5 10 2 17 30% 
External factors. 0 0 0 0 0% 
Total 23 28 6 57 100% 
5 Examination of the factors 
5.1 Knowledge and Skill 
The informants nominated inadequate knowledge and skill as the main cause 
in 18 of the 57 mistakes (32%). But inadequate knowledge and skill, as 
causes, comprised only a small percentage of the total factors (22 out of a 
total 169 factors). Refer to Table 5.9. This table also shows that knowledge 
and skill comprised 11 per cent of the total factors selected by interns (seven 
out of 63), 15 per cent of the total factors selected by RM01 s (13 out of 88) 
and 11 per cent of the total factors selected by RM02s (two out of 18). 
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5.2 Supervision 
Inexperience was an issue when junior doctors were left in charge of units 
particularly on overtime or weekends or were requested to perform a 
procedure for which they had no training. In addition, interns and residents 
raised inexperience when they were left responsible for very sick patients with 
insufficient cover from seniors. But even when cover was readily available 
inexperience by itself remained a factor. One RM02 ix noted that although 
medical students are not taught how to take blood through a central line, they 
are required to insert central lines without training and in some cases without 
supervision. Inexperience was a factor for this intern• who described that 
while she was administering a treatment to a sick patient she was told by the 
patient's wife that he had stopped breathing. The intern, unsure what to do•;, 
left the ward to get the registrar who immediately called an alert and staff 
rushed to revive him. A pulse was re-established but he died shortly after in 
the Intensive Care Unit. JMOs saw inexperience as a factor in misdiagnoses 
particularly when they concentrated on initial diagnoses and failed to look for 
other presenting symptoms. 
'When you find one diagnosis, you tend to concentrate on that and not really look for other things. 
The ward was busy, so they were happy that I was looking after that patient at that time. I said it is 
unstable angina because there are changes in the ECG. You can also get changes with a 
myocardial infarct similar to changes of unstable angina.' RM01 (7) 
'I basically got left dealing with it. We had a very very sick guy in his fifties; we didn't know what 
was going on' (Intern 1 0) 
Recognising the need for help and asking for it surfaced as distinct issues. 
Many informants referred to the inevitable situation in which junior doctors do 
not know what to do. Understandably, interns referred to this more often than 
RMOs. But both Interns and RMOs referred to the difficulties experienced in 
accessing senior clinicians or getting timely help. 
A central preoccupation of interns was the importance of their ability to 
recognise very sick patients. The need 'to know' or 'have confirmed' that 
something was wrong was identified as a significant issue for JMOs 
;, RM02 (30) 
'Intern (3) 
• The intern did not have the experience or knowledge to know whether to commence 
resuscitation or not. 
requesting help from seniors. Confidence and good communication skills 
relevant to this task are discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
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Competing demands delayed junior doctors requesting assistance. Quick 
assessments and rushed decisions were associated with mistakes caused by 
lack of knowledge and skill. 
'I had to do a quick assessment of this woman and my verdict was she is not much worse than she 
was yesterday. She had a chest drain pulled out about 24 hours before. The post chest drain 
removal x-ray had been done with no recurrence of the tension pneumothorax, but that was about 
6 hours post. I requested a mobile x-ray. I listened to her chest and wasn't clinically convinced that 
she was any better or worse. I wasn't able to say that this lady had a recurrent tension 
pneumothorax, which again I probably would be able to do now if I saw her, just on clinical 
grounds.' RM01 (20) 
Inexperience also affected the ability to carry out orders from senior clinicians. 
Failure to clarify telephone orders for medications and dosages was reported 
along with failure to clarify other clinical treatments. 
'He wrote down the orders clearly and said that if the patient had abdominal pain she would need 
to be reviewed overnight. The patient did have pain and was reviewed overnight by a person who 
was junior. They kept giving the patient morphine but the patient was really bleeding from the 
ERCP site. If the person had bothered to feel the abdomen she would have felt it to be very sore, 
had rebound.' RM02 (32) 
Some doctors said they felt intimidated when asking registrars and 
consultants questions about orders or treatments. One intern,';; when told to 
put a patient on triple therapy antibiotics, began to question the registrar about 
the therapy but was cut short by the registrar terminating the call. The doctor 
said she was too embarrassed to ask the nurses and became very flustered 
when she was attempting to look up the medication in MIMS. She found the 
correct medication but failed to notice that the patient was allergic to penicillin. 
Another intern recounted the following experience when requested to give a 
very sick patient calcium chloride because of his high potassium levels. 
The informants recognised the limitations of their knowledge and skill as 
issues when they were not adequately supervised by more senior staff. For 
that reason it was surprising that there was not more explicit mention of 
•• Intern (25) 
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inadequate supervision given that improving the quality of supervision was a 
common strategy identified by interns and residents in their suggestions for 
improvement. xiii 
Junior doctors clearly distinguished the quality and availability of supervision 
at the metropolitan teaching hospital from that available at the peripheral 
hospitals. Unavailability of senior staff was an issue in both places but more 
so in the peripheral hospitals. Generally doctors were more favourable in their 
comments about supervision at the teaching hospital. Favourable comments 
included the hospital's policy for not relying on interns in the Emergency 
Department and night rosters and the availability of doctors on the wards. 
This contrasted starkly with their experience in the peripheral hospitals where 
three of the seven (43%) mistakes occurring in the Emergency Department 
involved an intern. The remaining four involved three RM01s and one RM02. 
Unfavourable comments were also made about the unavailability of doctors in 
the peripheral hospitals, for example when residents were left to cover all the 
hospital by themselves. The absence of ward rounds by consultants and 
unavailability of registrars also received unfavourable mention. One intern 
said interns and residents are often left unsupervised in the peripheral 
hospitals due to registrar unavailability because of teaching and other 
demands.'iv 
The Emergency Department of the metropolitan hospital was consistently 
identified as providing good supervision, even though a number of mistakes 
were identified as occurring in the ED. One intern identified a mistake in the 
ED with the remaining seven mistakes being identified by five RM01s and two 
RM02s. 
An adjunct to supervision was the willingness or capacity of the interns or 
residents to ask for advice or help. There was a reluctance to call those 
"" See Chapter Three: What do we know? A review of the literature. Better supervision is a 
constant theme in feedback forums from junior medical officers to the Postgraduate Medical 
Council of NSW. 
"'Intern (17) 
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registrars and consultants who did not respond well to questions. Fear of 
being seen as incompetent either by the nurses or senior clinicians was 
frequently mentioned. One resident xv said that 'approaching' senior staff was 
a major issue depending on the unit or department. Junior doctors talked 
about the stress associated with uncertainty of the significance or seriousness 
of patients' conditions and whether they needed to make telephone calls to 
consultants. It appears that a lot of time is spent worrying about the reactions 
of consultants or registrars. The common wish not to appear 'stupid' was 
significant. They also worried about the impact on future working relationships 
and career prospects. 
One internxvi noted that experienced clinicians were more willing to help 
interns while junior registrars were reluctant. This was particularly the case 
when trying to obtain out-of-department consultations.xv;; Interns and residents 
had high praise for a small number of consultants who went out of their way to 
reassure them of their availability and advise them they should ring at any 
time. 
There was a strong correlation between having regular and predictable ward 
rounds and junior staff feeling supported and supervised. One RM01xviii said 
that a department that gave him an instruction to call for assistance or advice 
at any time was a unique experience. This resident was provided with 
orientation to the unit, a list of people to call, information about when to call 
and an outline of the expectations of the RM01 as part of the health care 
team. The importance of regular weekly meetings and approachable 
colleagues underpinned what another resident"ix called 'supervised 
autonomy'. He defined this as the capacity to call for help when one is 'out of 
one's depth' and it is perceived as learning in a safe environment. 
~ RM01(11) 
,... Intern (16) 
,..., Intern (16) 
,...;; RM01(13) 
., RM01(31) 
Negative comments were made about supervision when interns' and 
residents' calls for assistance were either ignored or delayed because of 
competing demands. 
5.3 Interpersonal factors 
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All the informants spoke about, and recognised the importance of, good 
interpersonal relationships, particularly with their registrars. A problem with 
interpersonal relationships only rated as a factor in 12 (8%) out of a total169 
factors and as a main factor in only two mistakes. (Table 5.9) Two main 
issues were identified with interpersonal factors. The first related to 
supervision and included the ability of interns or residents to convince 
clinicians that their assistance was required. This failure to engage other 
clinicians in 'your' patient's problem was perceived as a personal failing on the 
part of the person requesting: they lacked skills to convince, or the capacity to 
present an interesting story. 
The ability to get a consultant from another area to attend a patient in a timely 
manner was also raised in the discussions with difficulties associated in 
obtaining out-of-department consultations. 
The second related to the requirement that interns and residents in addition to 
doing their own jobs should also look out for their peers. One resident"" 
referred to this as the 'resident code of conduct.' The unwritten code requires 
that a person completes their tasks before finishing work, not leaving others to 
complete unfinished tasks. People who are known for not finishing their work 
will eventually find themselves unsupported. 
In conjunction with work demands, two additional matters surfaced. One 
concerned the demands on 'older' junior doctors who in their forties have 
young families. Three doctors were overseas trained doctors who, having 
passed their examinations enabling them to practice, are required to complete 
a supervised year in a hospital. While they are not interns the hospitals treats 
~ RM01 (21) 
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them the same as interns. Hospitals do not make adjustments for doctors with 
competing family responsibilities. Another matter related to the demands on 
the workforce generally. One resident observed that having an assertive 
personality helped in obtaining additional assistance. He said it is very 
common to work with frustrated or uncooperative people. 
'It's a sad reality but we are not just doctors but also workers. If you call somebody up to consult 
them at 4:30 on a Friday afternoon, they are pissed off because they want to go home at 5pm. 
There is a pressure on you not to seek assistance from others because potentially they are not 
going to want to do it.' RM01 (20) 
5.4 Communication 
All informants commented on the value of good communication and identified 
personal relationships as a significant factor in successful communication. Of 
all the factors, communication was nominated the most and comprised 32 out 
of a total of169 factors (21 %). Table 5.9 sets out the factors and the number 
of times nominated by the informants. But when it came to the main cause of 
mistakes, communication dropped to second ranking behind knowledge and 
skill (16 of 57 (28%)). Both interns and residents identified communication 
breakdown as a significant factor in mistakes. The communication problems 
they identified were broad and fitted into the following six categories: 
communication with other doctors, nurses and patients, methods of 
communication, documentation, and quality of the communication. 
5.4.1 Communication with other doctors 
A constant theme in communication was that good communication among 
doctors not only entailed skills on the part of doctors communicating but also 
good listening skills in the people receiving the communication. A number of 
doctors referred to their efforts at communicating problems to particular teams 
or clinicians but despite their efforts the communications failed to achieve the 
desired results. 
One resident xxi working on a medical ward reported how a patient received 
an open biopsy instead of a bronchoscopic biopsy and another chest biopsy 
""RM01(6) 
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instead of a muscle biopsy. In addition, the medical registrar failed to convince 
the surgical team of the need for review of the patient after the procedures. 
The resident acknowledged there could have been valid surgical reasons for 
the alternative procedures but this was not communicated to the treating 
medical team. Although the patient continued to deteriorate the medical team 
could not convince the surgical registrar and consultant to review the patient 
nor could they convince them that the problem was associated with post -
operative bleeding. It was not until after admission to the Intensive Care Unit 
and associated scans and tests that the surgical problems were revealed. The 
resident involved in this case said there may have been lots of 'high level' 
discussions between the surgical and medical consultants, but they did not 
'filter down' to him. 
Most interns and residents reported difficulty in asking for help from senior 
clinicians because requests for assistance were not always well received. 
One resident xxii said it was not uncommon to meet resistance for urgent 
consults which required the junior doctor to have the strength and tenacity to 
say to a senior clinician that the situation could not wait. It was acknowledged 
that such assertiveness might cause offence. Various techniques nominated 
by the doctors to address this problem included: advising senior clinicians 
they would document the request in the medical notes and that the clinician 
refused to attend. Putting requests in medico-legal terms usually worked, in 
the experience of this resident.xx;;; 
'As an intern or resident it's very scary to speak to a consultant who says you don't really need this 
now. The only way you can do it is to put it into medico-legal terms. They understand when I say 
that I am going to document in the notes that I am requesting an urgent CT and you have refused 
to come in. Those words usually mean they come in and all of a sudden you haven't made yourself 
a friend and therefore it's a difficult circumstance." RM01 (20) 
Responding to requests for assistance was mainly viewed by the interns and 
residents as a personal professional responsibility of patient care. Residents 
saw it as their responsibility when they failed to order tests for patients 
because of the difficulties in arranging them either because of the time of day 
""'RM01(20) 
""'" RM01(20) 
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or the location of patients. One resident xxiv recounted her failure to obtain an 
urgent ECG for a patient who was in the Radiology Department. She said the 
only way she could have obtained an ECG was to wheel the very sick patient 
around to the Emergency Department. She saw this logistical issue as solely 
her responsibility rather than being a system problem. The following day the 
patient did receive an ECG which indicated an infarct. 
Unequal power relationships in the medical hierarchy also play a role when 
junior members think diagnoses or treatments are wrong but fail to raise their 
concerns with consultants or registrars. In a case involving the placement of a 
drain,xxv even though the registrar agreed with the intern's assessment of a 
misdiagnosis, the registrar would not contradict the consultant. This was 
despite the patient's long hospitalisation and complaints about patient 
management from the patient and his family. This hesitancy to communicate a 
contrary position with a more senior clinician was not uncommon among 
junior doctors. Contradicting clinicians becomes more complicated if the 
specialist concerned practises in the area in which a resident is interested. 
Obtaining a training position is dependent on reports from senior clinicians. 
One resident interested in orthopaedics said he was reluctant to raise issues 
that might affect his future: 
'Some consultant orthopaedic surgeons are not that approachable for criticism. You can talk to 
them about things that go well but you wouldn't want to be saying to the boss that the way you 
managed that was really bad because he might be the one employing me in 10 years time. so you 
do have to bear these things in mind.' RM01 (5) 
The hierarchy described by interns and residents had the consultant (the 
boss) at the top. Seniority directly related to the capacity to give orders. The 
intern was at the bottom. But lines of authority within the hierarchy were less 
clear with the appropriate senior person to call or refer to being less obvious 
to the doctors interviewed. 
'The hierarchy can be unclear as to whom to call. It is a matter of trial and error and making phone calls and 
being totally led through to the appropriate person to call. You have orientation on the first day, but in practice 
it is not as clear as what they say in orientation.' Intern (8) 
~" RM01 (20) 
= RM01(28) 
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The hierarchy was seen by informants as useful for distinguishing the relative 
inexperience of interns and residents from more senior clinicians. But there 
was little reference to the importance of 'mentoring' and learning from 
supervisors that is traditionally associated with the medical hierarchy. Rather 
it (the hierarchy) was accepted as a 'fact of life' for junior staff. The 
importance of having consultants who demonstrated leadership, and who 
were available and approachable were noted to be important factors for a 
successful term but they were absent in most of the informants' training. 
The experience of the hierarchy as a positive factor was variable and highly 
dependent on the department one worked in. Intimidation and fear were 
characteristics better describing the consultant - JMO relationship. Examples 
of poor relationships between JMOs and senior clinicians covered all 
situations and included weekends and nights as well normal day shifts. 
The doctors interviewed were philosophical about their roles in the hospital 
hierarchy; they saw it as an inevitable part of training to be a doctor. 
'You feel like you have been dropped in it somewhat and you are in the deep end and you either sink or swim 
and you have to make decisions." RMO 1 (18) 
The hierarchy also significantly impacts on how interns and residents respond 
to mistakes. Negative responses from consultants or supervisors to a clinical 
concern or query will often shorten communications about those concerns. 
'Eventually the consultant rang and I told him that I was bolstering fluids. It is hard to know if someone's sick 
because you haven't seen much of (his condition). I didn't know what was going on with the patient and I 
started explaining what was happening to the consultant and he got upset at me and unfortunately he took it 
out on me. I think he may have said to add another antibiotic or something like that which I did." RM01 (10) 
Diagram 5.1 sets out the hierarchical relationship between the junior doctor 
registrars and consultants as described by the informants. Junior doctors 
report up the hierarchy any changes in the patient's status, changes in 
medication, test results and mistakes while they act upon information (orders) 
from those further up the hierarchy in relation to test results, investigations to 
undertake, medications to change or chart, and discharge instructions. 
Change in status 
Change in medication 
Test results 
Problems with management plan 
Mistakes 
Realstrars 
Interns and Residents 
Diagram 5.1: Hierarchical relationships 
Diagnosis 
Management plan 
Tests 
Investigations 
Medication orders 
Discharge Information 
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Registrars were identified by interns and residents as the most significant 
people in the hospital and medical hierarchy. They were the undisputed first 
contacts for interns and residents generally and also in the event of problems. 
Nurses were also mentioned by seven doctors in relation to people they have 
most contact with during the day. Having a supportive registrar was an 
important issue for the doctors. One intern summarised the situation in 
relation to available and approachable registrars. 
' In the surgical terms the registrars are operating most of the time but I knew I could always contact them. I 
have their page number and they would answer and were receptive to my questions. I think it's a matter of 
luck who you get. Having a supportive registrar makes a huge difference and having an approachable 
consultant makes a big difference. I've heard about registrars being too busy to be available, or bringing 
pressure on the interns not to call a certain registrar, and it's difficult if you are told not to call unless it is 
absolutely necessary. That gives you the message I don't want to be called.' Intern (32) 
Interns and residents said that direct contact with consultants occurred during 
ward rounds and in relation to individual patients. 
'My registrar is senior and he gives me flexibility which I like, but he is always there if I need anything and I 
have no problems in contacting him or my consultants. With this term I usually start with my registrar as my 
usual port of call because the others tend to be busy, but they all said to me to ring if there are any problems 
or if my registrar's away. On other terms I have preferred to call the registrar, not that I have had a problem 
with a consultant in their approach to me, but I know they are busy. If the patient is really sick of course I will 
call the consultant.' RM01 (13) 
Routine communications about patients usually occurs between registrars and 
junior staff and the registrars and consultants. 
'The consultant's relationship is more linked in with the registrar than with me. When they do a ward round 
during hours, they will try and identify problems that have arisen and anything they would like organised. If the 
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consultants aren't there and there is an issue then I speak to the registrar and the registrar then telephones 
the consultants.' RM01 (15) 
Miscommunications between junior and senior doctors particularly via the 
telephone were also factors in mistakes. Miscommunications involved 
medications, wrong dosages, and the wrong patients. In one case involving 
the wrong patient, the patient died directly as a result of the management plan 
ordered over the telephone. The consultant thought the resident xxvi was 
talking about a different patient. Both patients were unconscious and having 
seizures, but were of different nationalities and cultural backgrounds. The 
telephone call was in the middle of the night. The resident thought she may 
not have spoken clearly enough. She said: 
'I could have been a bit clearer. When you're ringing people up in the middle of the night and 
waking them up you try to be brief. I think you talk more quickly, and abbreviate things and make 
everything really succinct about what you want to talk about rather than have a long-winded 
conversation. That's probably why, if someone gets the wrong patient in his or her head from the 
beginning, it might not be clarified.' RM01 (28) 
Misunderstanding of the seriousness of a patient's condition was also 
reported by interns and residents, who with hindsight, realised that they did 
not fully appreciate the urgency of the instructions when they were made. One 
internxxvii was asked to get a particular drug and give it to the patient because 
the patient's potassium was very high. The intern asked the nurses for the 
drug which was stored off the ward. Neither the intern nor the nurses knew 
how to prepare the medication nor did the intern know how sick the patient 
was or how serious a high potassium reading was. 
Misunderstanding of instructions occurred particularly on weekends and in 
circumstances where there was no face-to-face meeting of the treating team. 
Late evening ward rounds, inadequate documentation, consultant-only ward 
rounds and lack of clear responsibility were all associated with 
miscommunications resulting in patient adverse events. Lack of specificity in 
instructions was also identified, particularly in relation to junior doctors. Many 
reported the practice of senior clinicians passing on important instructions and 
~' RM01(28) 
~" Intern (3) 
information in the corridor or clinics. Relying on memory alone was thought 
inappropriate. 
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A few doctors referred to the communication problems they experienced with 
some consultants. Most experiences were in the context of out-of-hours calls 
to a consultant, either during the night or on the weekend. One intemxxv;;; 
working in a peripheral hospital recounted how she, on overtime with 
insufficient cover (because a registrar was away on study leave), had a sick 
patient as well as being in charge of an eight bed coronary care unit. The 
intern was notified about a patient who was 'tachycardic', and unresponsive to 
treatment. The intern was first on call and unsure about what to do, so she 
called the emergency doctor. He also was not sure about what to do. The 
consultant rang in the interim and the intern explained the situation and the 
treatment she had instigated. The intern was unsure of her actions and 
wanted someone else to provide an opinion. After she started to explain the 
patient's condition to the consultant, the consultant informed the intern of the 
patient's age and implied that she was not looking after the patient 
appropriately. The intern interpreted his outburst as indicative of the 
consultant's own guilt for leaving her without cover or supervision. The 
consultant attended the patient about 20 minutes later. This following 
quotation from an intern illustrates the awareness of the medical hierarchy 
among some doctors. 
'On a Sunday night (I called) a consultant on call. I explained who I was and before I'd even told 
the patient's age he said - I don't mean to stop you right there, but are you talking to the 
appropriate person? He explained he was the consultant. I said I thought I was contacting the 
person who was on call and he said, 'Have you run this by the registrar?' To me, that was the 
biggest insult because there was no way I wouldn't run a very sick guy by a registrar. I said 'I 
have'. He didn't want to hear from an intern.' Intern (1 0) 
The message to interns and residents here is that junior doctors do not talk to 
consultants. Registrars were unanimously identified as the main contact for 
clinical problem-solving and education. Consultants were seen as mainly 
relating to registrars who passed information down the hierarchy. 
~"' Intern (1 0) 
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5.4.2 Communications with nurses 
While general comments about communications with nursing staff were 
positive two themes emerged in mistakes associated with miscommunication 
involving nurses. The first theme concerned nurses who did not appreciate 
the urgency of some cases and the second related to the lack of 
assertiveness of nurses to ask questions of doctors about treatments or 
proposed treatments. This was an issue for some doctors in the context that 
nurses were experienced and probably knew more than junior doctors about 
patients' conditions. 
The lack of information from nurses about the urgency of a matter related to 
both pager activity and poor communication. Paging doctors without indicating 
the urgency to attend patients was a frustration for many. One resident 
remembered receiving a normal page but it turned out to be urgent. 'I 
wandered up the ward but when I got there I saw full CPR going on a blue 
patient ... The cardiac arrest call was bypassed' .xxix In this case the consultant 
deviated from his usual practice and asked the nurses to tell the resident; his 
normal practice was to page the doctor himself and directly provide 
instructions. The nurses did not pass on this order to the doctor because 
'even though he looked a bit off but we didn't want to say anything' .xxx 
Doctors reported feeling frustrated by continual paging during overtime and 
weekends. Nurses who paged for insertion of cannulas and to fulfil fluid 
orders without any attempt to prioritise matters caused most comment. This 
was especially a problem in the peripheral hospitals where the 'workload can 
explode' for the junior doctors rostered on nights. xxxi 
One resident=;; when working as an intern in the ED recalled how an 
experienced nurse failed to query her diagnosis of unstable angina even 
though the ECG indicated an infarct. She said the nurses were probably 
aware of her error but also added that everyone was busy and they were 
""' RM01(13) 
~ RM01 (13) 
"""RM01(13) 
~u RM01(7) 
happy to have someone take charge of the patient who came in as a semi-
urgent case. 
5.4.3 Communication with patients 
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The role patients played in mistakes where poor communication was a factor 
was minimal. There were only a few instances where communication with the 
patient was identified as a factor in the mistakes. One related to the history 
provided by the patient and the two other mistakes involved patients with 
cognitive impairment. 
'The better the patient's cognition the better the outcome. We are dealing with in geriatrics and 
renal medicine and even in emergency downstairs a very aged population, in their eighties and 
nineties and the more severely cognitively impaired, the more we rely on second hand histories 
and second hand medication charts. It's hard to make a decision.' Intern (4) 
5.4.4 Documentation 
Failure to read instructions in the medical notes, failure to document in the 
medical records, misinterpretation of dosages, unclear written instructions and 
failure to check medications were all mentioned as factors associated with 
poor communication. One patient with a collapsed lung, chest infection and 
chronic C02 retention was given 40 per cent oxygen despite a written 
instruction from the consultant to put him on 29 to 31 per cent of oxygen. The 
resident"""iii who described this case said that the instructions were clearly 
stated in the medical records which the nurses failed to read. Many doctors 
referred to the importance of face-to-face communications to prevent 
miscommunication. Many did not trust that orders would be followed if they 
were only written in the notes. One resident said 'If you're lucky sometimes, it 
will happen.' xxxiv 
Another residenF adopted a policy of always speaking to the registrar 
involved even if they had written an order in the record, rather than assuming 
the notes would be read. Remembering to make notes was an issue 
particularly when the work environment changed either because of work load, 
"""'" RM02 (19) 
"""'' RM01(6) 
= RM01 (15) 
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staff shortages or time pressures. One resident""""; left in charge forgot to 
write down an order for anti-coagulation medication resulting in the death of a 
person. The patient had a pulmonary embolism and died. In this case 
absenteeism left the resident single-handedly to manage patients. 
In another 'time pressured' case, an internxxxvii looking after a post-surgical 
patient with a wheeze organised a chest x-ray and made a provisional 
diagnosis of an infection. He appropriately consulted the registrar and 
consultant who agreed with the plan. The resident ordered the tests but failed 
to record the plan or the tests in the medical notes because he was busy with 
other demands. He went onto overtime duty without writing up the case. The 
next day a colleague advised him that the patient had pulmonary oedema and 
that he should have written up the notes. 
In addition to time pressures another reason for failing to document is 
inadequate knowledge and skill. Failing to record in the Emergency 
Department medical records a diagnosis or history of the patient may indicate 
a lack of knowledge.xxxv;;; Another resident who wrote an unclear instruction in 
the notes said he realised in retrospect that his order to cease aspirin would 
have been difficult to see (and read) because he had scribbled all over the 
medical chart. 
Another problem concerned the reluctance to check or change a medication 
order once written in the notes. One resident said, 'If you write up the wrong 
medication then people who do not know much about medication will give it. 
You run into trouble once it is written up - it's Holy Grail and it will keep being 
given unless there is someone to say 'stop doing it.' )()()(ix 
""""RM0!(11) 
""""; Intern (3) 
-m RM02(23) 
=• Intern (4) 
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5.5 Patient factors 
Interns identified the patient's condition as a factor in mistakes more than did 
residents. But overall, patients' conditions did not rate highly as factors in 
mistakes. Patient factors counted for 21 out of 169 (12%) factors and they 
only rated four times as the main factor (four out of 57 (7%)). There were no 
distinguishing features relating to patient conditions except that the patients 
were very sick and that they had been in hospital for a long time. One patient"1 
on many drugs had his or her drugs recorded on two medication charts. The 
design of the charts made it difficult for the staff to easily locate all the drugs 
(intravenous as well as by mouth) to be administered. While the resident 
identified the patient's condition as a factor they did not identify it as the main 
factor in that mistake. The failure of the nurse to check the medication chart 
was the main factor identified. 
In all four cases where the patient's condition was nominated as a main factor 
other factors were also present. These factors were nominated by the doctors 
but not selected as the main factor, but arguably they are more relevant to the 
main cause of the mistakes. For example, a moderately cognitively impaired 
patient with multiple co-morbidity (cardiac failure, diabetes, coronary and renal 
impairment) was prescribed an anti-hypertension medication instead of 
calcium. The resident and registrar in the Emergency Department wrote up 
the wrong medication. The facts as told by the doctor suggest that the 
communication between the Emergency Department and the patient's general 
practitioner was the main factor rather than the patient's condition. An intern•li 
inferred that if the patient was in better condition she would have been able to 
tell the doctors about her medications, not withstanding the complexity of her 
condition and the large number of drugs she would have been taking. 
Another case involved a patient who died from an undiagnosed high 
potassium level. The lntern•m identified patient condition as the main factor in 
• RM01 (7) 
"'Intern (4) 
"" Intern (9) 
173 
this case because the resident involved in the matter was working on 'a ward 
with sick patients'. 
5.6 Location/situation 
Taking all factors into account, 'location and the situation at the time of the 
mistake' was mentioned most (36 out of a total169 factors (21 %)).Within the 
domain of system problems it again rated the highest accounting for 36 out of 
79 factors (46%). But informants only mentioned it seven times (12%) as the 
main factor in a total 57 mistakes. This suggests that doctors are aware of the 
impact of working overtime, weekends and their particular vulnerability to error 
in a busy Emergency Department but do not think that improving or changing 
the situation will make a significant difference to patient outcomes. Table 5.13 
on the next page sets out the position of the doctor and the location and 
situation at the time of the mistake. 
Table 5.13: Position of informant location of mistake, situation at time of mistake and shift 
(busy, nights, over time, weekend, and holiday). 
Area Busv Ni!1ht/overtime Weekend Holidays 
RM0115 Emergency Department 1 1 1 
RM0115 Emergency Department 1 1 
RM02 23 Emeraencv Deoartment 1 1 
RM0129 Emergency De artment 1 1 
RM0219 Emergency Department 1 
RM0219 Emeraencv Deoartment 1 
Intern 5 Peripheral Emergence Dept. 1 1 
RM017 Emergency Department 1 
Intern 4 Emeraencv deoartment 1 
RM0111 Peripheral Emergency Dept. 1 
RM01 22 Emergency Department 1 
Intern 25 Emeraencv department 1 1 
RM01 26 Peripheral Emergency Dept. 1 1 
Intern 1 Patient In wron~:~ ward(gastro) 1 
Intern 32 40 ~atients 1 
Intern 1 Orthopaedic ward 1 1 
RM01 27 Suraical ward 1 
RM0121 Upper Gl surgical ward 1 1 
Intern 6 Ward to theatre 1 
Intern 5 Medical ward 1 1 
RM017 Surgical ward 1 1 
Intern 10 Ward 1 
Intern 10 Ward 1 1 
RM01 22 Rehabilitation ward 1 
RM01 13 Peripheral hospital 1 1 
RM0120 Spinal ward 1 
Intern 14 Medical Ward 1 1 
Intern 3 Ward unsoecified) 1 1 
Intern 3 ward 1 
Intern 16 Ward ( discharoe) 1 
Intern 17 ward 1 1 
Intern 17 Peripheral hospital 1 1 
RM01 24 Orthopaedic ward 1 1 
RM0124 Head and Neck ward 1 1 
RM02 30 Surgical ward 1 1 
RM02 31 Renal ward ((wrono ward) 1 
liB g __._ • 
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5.6.1 The Emergency Department 
The Emergency Department was named in 13 of the 36 sites associated with 
this category (situation and location). Interns and residents used words such 
as chaotic, busy and stressful to describe the ED. They attributed two 
underlying causes for the ED situation. The first related to the ED as the point-
of-entry for patients and the second related to problems caused by access 
block. Problems in the ED included lack of documentation (medications, 
histories and diagnoses), utilisation as a holding bay, lack of consultation, 
inadequate treatment of nursing home patients, high workload, insufficient 
staff, incorrect diagnosis, communication problems, failure to attend 
(peripheral hospital) and delay in transfer to the ward. While all these were 
mentioned as problems, workload and multiple demands on staff appeared to 
underpin many of the mistakes in the ED. One resident"m; looking after a man 
transferred from a private hospital (with suspected pneumonia), did not think 
the situation was critical and ordered blood tests, investigations and 
administered fluids. The ED got very busy and it was not until many hours 
later (around 3 am) that the resident looked at the test results and realised the 
patient was in renal failure. Delay in treatment in the ED, whether caused by 
workload in the ED or bed shortages in the ward, had implications and flow on 
effects particularly when the delay was associated with night time and 
weekends. 
'People in the ED knew that he had low blood pressure and that he wasn1 passing any urine and I 
think they should have got the relevant people involved to try and manage that rather than sending 
him up to the ward on Friday afternoon to be sorted out.' RM01 (15) 
The potential for misdiagnosis, especially by interns and residents, is 
acknowledged in the ED where their mistakes are often indicative of poor 
supervision. For example, an intern in her first emergency term who 
misdiagnosed a myocardial infarct as unstable angina recognised the role of 
inadequate supervision in her incorrect diagnosis. She said if she had 
received some help with reading the first ECG than she may not have been so 
set in her first diagnosis of unstable angina and may have considered other 
•m RM01 (22) 
diagnoses. But she recognised that in busy situations such as the ED other 
factors also operate. 
5.6.2 'Busyness' 
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Of the 36 mistakes in which location and situation were factors 'busyness' 
was identified in all but two of these. 'busyness' is both a cause and effect in 
events involved in mistakes but the significant majority of discussions about 
'busyness' identified 'busyness' as a cause of mistakes. Only a few saw 
"busyness" as an effect, identifying the following areas: sicker patients in 
hospital for shorter periods, inadequate staff and working in unfamiliar wards 
and departments. Most interns and residents assumed that all doctors are 
busy all the time, thought this the reason when doctors and nurses did not 
respond in a timely way to requests for help. 
See Diagram 5.2 for the five areas that contribute to 'busy' and some of the 
main consequences of 'busyness' as perceived by the interns and residents 
interviewed. Thinking time and little time at the bedside with patients were the 
casualties of being 'too busy'. But not all interns saw 'busyness' as an 
excuse. Even where 'busyness' was identified as a significant factor, when it 
came to the main factor, knowledge and skills were rated as more important 
'because I don't believe that as a medical practitioner that just being busy is 
an adequate excuse·xliv. 
•;, RM01 (15) 
Other factors 
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Diagram 5.2: Cause and effect of 'busyness' 
5.6.3 Overtime, Nights, and Weekend shifts 
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•Delay in tests 
Patients 1- •Delay in treatment 
•Inadequate explanations 
•Inadequate discussion 
•Poor documentation 
•Consultants unavailable 
Doctors •Delay in calling for help 
I •Tiredness I 
Culture J[_ •Stressed 
•Over worked 
•Emergency department 
Place 
•Surgical ward 
Twenty-three mistakes were associated with nights, overtime and weekends. 
Twelve concerned seven residents and five interns on night shift, 10 
concerned six residents and four interns on weekend shifts and one resident 
during a holiday period. 
Overtime and Relief 
All interns and residents had experienced working overtime. Overtime usually 
requires the doctor to work extended hours and not necessarily in the same 
ward or area. The following observations and problems about overtime were 
identified by the interns and residents: unfamiliar environment, role of the 
overtime doctor, back-up, and site (peripheral hospital). 
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Lack of hospital induction for overtime, no information and inadequate 
handovers were reported. One internxlv said she had no information about 
overtime even though she had never previously worked at the hospital and 
her first-ever shift on commencing work was rostered overtime. In addition to 
the quality of handovers, inadequate handovers were also associated with the 
person coming onto overtime duty arriving late due to work demands of the 
previous day shift. This is related to the strong desire for doctors to complete 
their work before handing over to the next person. 
The role of doctors on overtime determined to some extent the attitudes of the 
interns and residents to overtime work. One person reported the low 
expectation of junior doctors on overtime but others referred to a number of 
problems. First, overtime doctors did not necessarily feel responsible for the 
patients they saw. Second, there was a reluctance to change treatment during 
an overnight shift unless critical. Third, 'well' patients tended to be neglected 
in terms of follow-up because of paging and other work demands. One 
internxlvi explained that many interns are not good at monitoring fluids or at 
writing up fluids. 
Overtime was viewed as stressful, having multiple demands and things 
happening at the same time. Work demands included fixing medications and 
charting problems. One residenf1vii said'/ think things are mis-charted a lot 
and on overtime you are often asked to fix them up.' Another problem 
concerned paging and the lack of prioritising for requests in the context of the 
high volume of repetitive menial tasks. One internxlviii on overtime who was 
called to see an elderly woman who was admitted to a ward unfamiliar to the 
intern said she dismissed symptoms as 'nothing' only to find out the next day 
that she had suffered a 'minor 'stroke. 
Supervision during overtime surfaced in reference to available 'back-up'. The 
medical registrar on duty for the night (M1) was positively mentioned with 
"'' Intern (3) 
•• Intern (4) 
""' RMO 1 (28) 
"'''" Intern (5) 
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doctors stressing the importance of the M1 being available and approachable 
because of the inexperience of junior doctors. One intern said: 
'On overtime I don't know a lot of things. I think most interns are the same. If we don't know 
something, we ring up the registrar and say this is what I think is wrong and this is what I would 
like to do and is this ok. And if you have forgotten something they tell you but if there is no one to 
ask I can easily see how a mistake is not picked up'. Intern (17) 
The reasons for the failure of 'back- up' related to both personality of the 
registrars and site in which the overtime is being done. One intern noted that 
'Some registrars are fantastic on your overtime and they come around to the wards and they are 
very approachable. They don' bite your head off if you ask them things. Other people give you the 
impression that they don't want to be called, even though they're being paid, but they sit there in 
the 1V room all day. I don't know how you can stop that. It's not fair to the people who are nice to 
make them do overnight if they're nice.' Intern (17) 
Nurses and pharmacists were seen as good back-ups; they helped doctors on 
overtime who were unfamiliar with particular wards. Doctors found it very 
stressful to work in cardiology out of regular hours; this was particularly true 
when they did not know the relevant medication protocols. Experienced 
cardiology nursing staff assisted these doctors by informing them of the 
protocols dealing with appropriate drugs to be administered after the insertion 
of a stent. Many cardiology patients return to the wards after hours when the 
normal treating teams are unavailable. An overtime doctor does not 
necessarily know what is happening. 
There was stark contrast between working overtime at the acute teaching 
hospital and the peripheral hospitals. Interns reported that working alone in 
the peripheral hospitals was very stressful particularly when they were 
responsible for large numbers of patients without (in their view) sufficient 
back-up. One internxlix on overtime had responsibility for an eight bed 
coronary care unit. Another intern' said that while she was on overtime in a 
peripheral hospital she had three patient emergencies simultaneously in three 
different wards. Support systems exist in peripheral hospitals but are thought 
less accessible or effective than those in the acute teaching hospital. 
,,;, Intern (8) 
'Intern (14) 
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The biggest issue for doctors rostered on a relief term was the constantly 
changing environment and the wide variety of tasks. Coming to terms with the 
different areas and wards was stressful in all areas but more so in the busier 
wards where there were 20 to 30 patients. Similar to overtime, a lack of 
preparation was a factor. 
Nights 
Working nights for the informants involved covering an average of four to five 
wards with 75 to 100 patients and was associated with increased 
opportunities for medical mistakes in the context of a skeleton staff working in 
essentially a 9am to 5pm business despite the needs for 24 hour medical 
care. One resident said: 
With the medical han dover at a change of shift it is very difficult because medicine is basically a 
24 hour business for patients who get 9-5 hospital care. When you're off on weekends and 
evenings, there is only skeletal staff at those times.' (RMO 21) 
The quality of hand-overs from the day shift to the night shift was seen as a 
significant indicator as to how well night interns or residents would manage 
their shifts. With reduced staff it was noted that the main task of night doctors 
was to look after sick patients and not spend time 'sorting' out patients that 
could be looked after during the day. Other significant features of doing 
'nights' is the extent to which tasks ordered during the day are completed by 
the doctor before they commence on night duty. 
'I did 5 lots of nights week on week off and you only want to hear about patients who are unstable 
and need to be reviewed or who need an investigation done. The hand over really stops within 
your team at the end of the day and if something needs to be chasing up or needs to be done later 
on, or you have someone who is very sick and you want the resident to come back later on and 
check them out for what ever reason ... l believe very strongly in the resident code of conduct in as 
much as you have to do your own job and do you own work and make sure that you look after your 
fellow residents. Act in an ethical and responsible manner. It is very much a job that what goes 
around comes around. I think on the end of doing nights you know who is competent and who is 
slack. It has a very big follow through effect so I think that certainly is one of the major issues 
here.' (RMO 21) 
A range of problems were identified with night time work including inadequate 
nursing observations, feeling intimidated by the responsibility and paging 
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difficulties. One resident1; reported sleeping through a page to attend a patient 
who had a stroke, low platelet count and possible bleed. The resident slept 
through the 3.30 am page and text message but responded to the 5 am page. 
The difference in knowledge and experience between junior doctors and 
nurses, particularly in specialised units such as the Intensive Care Unit has 
the potential to create role confusion. One resident said she wrongly relied on 
the experience of the nurses when she was working in an Intensive Care Unit 
because she thought they have more experience in ventilation, intubation, and 
central lines. Such reliance can be misplaced, especially when agency nurses 
or nurses unfamiliar with the environment or area are employed. 
Being asked to work nights in peripheral hospitals wards in circumstances 
where residents did not have the skills or knowledge to do so was another 
concern.lii 
Weekends 
The main problem associated with weekends was the failure to treat, monitor 
and review patients on Saturday and Sunday, including ordering tests. Tests 
ordered on Friday afternoon and not done until Monday, and lack of 
monitoring of fluids, were common examples. One stable patient seen on 
Friday was noted to be dehydrated on the basis of her blood results. A note 
was made in the medical record for the resident to review over the weekend. 
This was not done and by Monday the patient was in acute renal failure. The 
patient died on Tuesday.liii 
The availability of back-up in the hospital did not diminish feelings of anxiety 
when residents or interns were rostered on weekends. One intern explaining 
her reluctance to call for help during a weekend shift said:-
'There was a Sunday, I was doing a fourteen-hour shift from 8 until 10 at night and you cover the 
wards. I had been left the day before; the registrar had been sick the day before and told someone 
they wouldn't come in on the Sunday. Admin is meant to provide locum cover during that time. 
"RM01 (20) 
'"RM02 
liii Intern 14 
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They couldn't find anyone. I tum up on the Sunday and unfortunately had a fourteen hour shift on 
my own covering the entire hospital. I knew there were people in emergency I could call if 
something bad happened, but you don't feel you can. I would have no hesitation if something bad 
happened. If an arrest happened or something in the ward it would take a little longer for someone 
to come up from emergency if there wasn't a registrar around. It was just the extra stress involved, 
knowing I would have to bother other people. I spent that day very stressed.' (Intern 1 0) 
Another resident treating a patient with a fracture and serious medical 
problems identified the work situation over the weekend as an issue. She said 
'The patient was very malnourished and this had been going on for a long time. She had a fracture 
because she was in the orthopaedic ward. Things hadn't been sorted out. She was admitted to the 
ward on Friday evening, so over the weekend I don't think people were supporting her very well.' 
RM01 (24) 
5.7 Equipment/technology 
Equipment failures or technology were not identified as factors associated 
with mistakes. Only one respondent identified an external factor to the 
hospital as a possible contributing factor. This related to an ambulance strike 
which impacted on the ability of the hospital to transport patients to another 
hospital for a CT scan but this factor was not identified by the informant as a 
main factor in the mistake. This low account for equipment failures may 
suggest that either there were few equipment failures in these mistakes or 
that the informants were unaware of them as factors in the mistakes or that 
they accepted that the design failures of equipment (poorly designed for the 
intended use) did not rate as a factor in the mistakes. 
5.8 The local work environment 
The local work environment was not identified as a significant factor 
underpinning mistakes. Only ten out of the 169 factors related to the work 
environment and it was only mentioned once as a main factor. In that caseuv 
the resident was describing poor management over the weekend in a 
peripheral hospital raising additional issues of supervision and continuity of 
care. 
Descriptions of the local work environment included difficulty in obtaining out-
of-department consultations and the lack of a specialty to coordinate patient 
"' RM01 (24) 
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care. A lack of beds and available theatres were also identified as problems. 
Lack of beds was acutely problematic when patients were put in beds 
'available' rather than in wards specifically organised around a particular 
medical problem. One resident1v disagreed with the hospital policy of placing 
all spinal patients in the spinal ward irrespective of their medical problems. 
Another internlvi said that aging patients who were not admitted to wards 
specialising in their particular condition were particularly vulnerable to being 
'forgotten about'. 
'The work environment includes the problem of the teams having to come across outside their own 
area for a consult. This is a difficulty because nobody likes to work harder when you don1 have to. 
Even the most altruistic of doctors will want to help but still will get to the end of their tether at the 
end of the day. The problem is that the hospital requires patients to be looked after by the 
speciality of the area, so we are getting patient the specialists (from other areas) and who 
coordinates it all is a real problem.' RM01 (20) 
5.9 The organisation of work 
Work organisation comprised 12 out of 169 factors. As a main factor work 
organisation only concerned three mistakes. Issues associated with work 
organisation cross over with other factors such as work environment, location 
and situation. Work organisation was identified as an issue when tests were 
required out of hours or at the end of the day or when the ward was short 
staffed. One resident who had difficulty in arranging an urgent ECG for a 
patient related this to a work organisation and the work practices of the 
hospital. 
6 Near misses 
All interns and residents identified a near-miss with most commenting on their 
frequency saying they were daily occurrences. Medication errors were 
common examples. One intern noted that it was unrealistic to expect junior 
doctors to check all drugs. 
'You can't expect everyone to know everything. I don't know if it is carelessness. It was not one 
thing that caused the problem. If you were more careful, you probably would have looked it up, but 
then you would have to look up every drug you wrote up'. Intern (4) 
'' RM01 (29) 
,.; Intern (1) 
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The near misses described included communication errors in transmitting the 
drug information, recharting errors, wrong dosage, and wrong drug. In most 
cases the intervention of pharmacists prevented the near misses becoming 
mistakes. 
Nurses also played a role in preventing near misses becoming errors. The 
following steps were taken by interns and residents to prevent near misses 
turning into adverse events: obtaining second opinions, clarifying information 
from consultants, other treating clinicians and family members, and requesting 
checks by nurses and pharmacists. One resident1vii said the pharmacist picked 
up his error when he ordered a patient to be given beta blocker with the dose 
of 500 mg a day instead of 50 mg. Another resident1v;;; said that while working 
on a weekend he had two occasions where incorrect doses were recorded in 
the medical records. The first, an order for an ACE inhibitor for a patient was 
written as 1 OOmg instead of 1 mg and the second, a patient with diarrhoea 
and hyponatraemia who had been given an incorrect fluid instead of normal 
saline. A second year resident reported that she nearly administered 25,000 
units of heparin as a bolus dose rather than an infusion. She realised her 
mistake when she checked the dosage. 11x 
'''' RM01(11) 
'"" RM01 (28) 
"' RM02 (30) 
Chapter Six: Results 
Acknowledging and Reporting Mistakes 
Responding and Discussing Mistakes 
Avoiding Mistakes 
Awareness of Mistakes 
1 Acknowledging and reporting of mistakes in the hospital 
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Mistakes can only lead to improvement if doctors acknowledge they occur. I 
asked each doctor whether or not the mistake they described was discussed 
within the health care team or with others in the hospital. I refer to this process 
as acknowledgement. Reporting is different. There can be acknowledgement 
of a mistake without reporting. Reporting a mistake in my study refers to the 
formal process in the hospital either by completing an incident form or 
advising a senior person who has the authority to do something about the 
mistake. 
Eighteen of the 32 informants (seven interns and eleven residents) said they 
told one or more members of the health care team; about the mistake. This 
involved 23 out of 57 mistakes (40%).The acknowledgement mainly 
comprised discussions between the junior doctors and either his or her 
registrar or the nurse unit manager about what steps should be taken to fix 
the patient's problem caused by the mistake. No informant reported they had 
subsequent discussions with their supervisors or a member of the health care 
team about the causes of the mistakes and what they could do to avoid 
making a similar mistake. The majority of mistakes described by the 
informants involved no acknowledgment of the mistake to the rest of the 
treating team. Without acknowledgement it is difficult to discuss the possible 
causes of the mistakes and what they might do to prevent the same mistakes 
from happening again. 
Ten mistakes (18%) were formally reported to a more senior person. Three of 
the ten mistakes reported involved a written notification either using a hospital 
1 The health care team usually comprised the consultant, registrar, residents and interns. 
Nurses and other health professionals may be involved depending on the ward. 
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incident form (two) or through another established mechanism used by the 
hospital for reporting incidents (one). One of the mistakes reported through 
the hospital's established reporting mechanisms concerned the death of a 
man admitted for an elective procedure. The Department head reported the 
patient's death to the quality assurance committee which conducted an 
investigation. Another two mistakes were reported to the Coroner. The 
Coroner's Act requires deaths under certain circumstances to be referred to 
the State Coroner. The remaining five mistakes that were formally reported 
involved face-to-face meetings with either a health administrator or a 
supervisor. 
Table 6.1 below sets out the position of the informant, the type of mistake and 
whether the informant acknowledged or reported the mistake. Most of the 
mistakes that were acknowledged belonged in the 'informal' category 
meaning that the case was not formally documented and reported through 
formal management channels. Informal reporting involves a number of levels: 
acknowledging the mistake to one's self, acknowledging the mistake to 
someone else (colleague, nurse or pharmacist) acknowledging to someone in 
authority (nurse unit manager or registrar), acknowledging someone else's 
mistakes to someone either informally or formally. 
Table 6.1: Summary of position, tvpe of mistake, acknowledgement, reporting and method of 
reporting mistakes 
Identifier Position Type of mistake Acknowledged Reported Fonn of 
reporting 
1 Intern Incorrect drug. Beta Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
blocker given from day 
of admission until day 
of discharge instead of 
anti depressant. 
Incorrect diagnosis Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(missed bowel 
obstruction). 
3 intern Misdiagnosis Yes. Telephone to Not reported. 
(pulmonary oedema). another intern. 
Delay in treatment Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(high potassium 
reading). 
4 intern Incorrect medication. Yes. Not reported. 
Given anti- During the ward 
hvoertension rounds. 
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medication instead of 
calcium tablets. 
Incorrect treatment. Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
Inappropriate invasive 
procedures at end-of-
life (nasogastric tube). 
Incorrect fluid Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
measures. 
5 intern Wrong treatment. Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(Surgical mishap -
Ileostomy). 
Incorrect flushing white Yes. Not reported. 
cells filter with saline. NUM talked to the 
nurse 
No post-operative Not acknowledged. 
management plans. 
6 RM01 Delayed diagnosis of Unsure. Not reported. 
surgical problem. 
7 RM01 Medication not given. Yes. Not reported. 
Informally raised 
with the nurse. 
Medication given to Yes. Yes. Incident 
wrong patient. By resident. report. 
Intravenous antibiotics 
(right patient missed 
out on antibiotics). 
Misdiagnosis Unknown. Unknown. 
(myocardial infarct). 
8 intern Lack of monitoring pre- Not acknowledged. Yes. Theatre staff 
operatively. report. 
9 intern Delayed treatment Not acknowledged. Unknown. 
(high potassium level). 
10 intern Medication given to Not acknowledged. 
wrong patient. 
Delayed diagnosis Not acknowledged. Yes. Administration. 
1 (endocarditis and I 
' 
sepsis). 
Delayed treatment. Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
11 RM01 Misdiagnosis of Yes. Yes. Coroner. 
obstructive airways Senior person 
disease. informally to 
resident. 
12 intern Delay in treatment and Yes. Yes. Administrative 
test results. officer 
responsible for 
JMO 
education. 
Wrong tests and Unknown. 
consultation. 
Nil information and Unknown. 
delavs in 
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management. 
13 RM01 Delay in attending Yes. Not reported. Medical notes. 
cardiac arrest call (also Resident raised 
delay in test ordering). issue with the 
director of nursing 
and the consultant. 
Incorrect dose of Yes. Not reported. 
gentamycin. Wrote in the 
medical records. 
14 intern Delay in treatment. Yes. Yes. Unknown. 
Raised in a team 
meeting. 
15 RM01 Delayed diagnosis Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(broken hip). 
Delay in treatment. Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
16 intern Inadequate discharge. Yes Not reported. 
17 intern Wrong diagnosis (no Yes. Not reported. 
blood gas done). 
Delay in cannula Yes. Not reported. 
insertion. With the reaistrar. 
18 RM01 Incorrect treatment Yes. Not reported. 
(premature removal of Informally with 
drain). registrar. 
19 RM02 Misdiagnosis (fracture) Yes. Not reported. 
With the ENT 
reaistrar. 
Misdiagnosis (too Not reported. 
much oxygen). 
Incorrect treatment Not reported. 
(no medication). 
20 RM01 Misdiagnosis Not reported. 
(tension 
pneumothorax). 
Delay in diagnosing Not reported. 
(acute myocardial 
infarct). 
21 RM01 Delay in admission Yes Yes. Quality 
and treatment assurance 
I (low potassium). committee. 
! 
Incorrect treatment Yes Yes Medical . 
(wrong patient on Informally with records. 
heparin management). registrar. 
Incorrect medication Yes Yes Incident form. 
22 RM01 (aspirin). Informally with 
registrar. 
Delayed diagnosis. Yes. Not reported. 
To the team. 
Treatment (defibrillator No. Yes. Coroner. 
not available). 
23 RM02 Misdiagnosis (torsion Yes. Not reported. 
of the testis) Failure to Letter to the 
document history in specialist to say 
188 
notes in ED. what happened. 
24 RM01 Misdiagnosis Not reported. 
(of malnutrition). 
Delayed treatment Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(no nasogastric feed 
tube). J 
26 RM01 Incorrect treatment. Not acknowledged. Not reported. ! 
I 
27 RM01 Delayed diagnosis Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(hypertension and 
septic shock). 
Delayed treatment. Not reported. 
Incorrect treatment Not reported. 
(Central line insertion). 
28 RM01 Misdiagnosis Yes. Not reported. 
(Fistula). Telephone from 
registrar to surgeon. 
Incorrect treatment Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(wrong patient). 
29 RM01 Delay in diagnosis. Yes. Not reported. 
But not with the 
consultants. 
Delay in treatment Yes. Not reported. 
(surgery). With the team. 
30 RM02 Delay in treatment Not acknowledged. Not reported. 
(Infected central line). 
31 RM02 Misdiagnosis Yes. Not reported. 
(Post-operative With the team. 
internal bleed). 
Delay in surgery. Not reported. 
32 Intern delay in treatment Not reported. 
(test result delay). 
One intern said even if there was interest in discussing mistakes it would be 
difficult because mistakes Just get lost in the system.' 11 He said that the high 
volume of cases and patient turnover and busy units cause this. 
1. 1 Why mistakes were not reported 
The reasons for not reporting mistakes fell into three categories: ignorance of 
where to report, type of incident and fear of reprisal. The role of nurses in 
reporting was raised by a number of doctors to highlight the difference in 
reporting cultures between the medical and nursing professions. The doctors 
" Intern (5) 
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recognised nurses had a formal system in place for reporting incidents. One 
Intern,;;; in comparing the different ways nurses and doctors report incidents, 
said nurses followed a strict documentation process for recording incidents, 
whereas doctors have no system to report mistakes. He said mistakes are 
often 'brushed under the rug' because one does not want to admit fallibility or 
be seen to be making mistakes. 
There appeared to be confusion between writing in the medical records what 
happened to a patient and formally reporting a mistake to the organisation. A 
number of doctors reported they did not know how to report and thought that a 
note in the record constituted 'reporting'. Even though observations were 
made about the nursing role in completing incident forms this was not seen as 
a role for doctors. Some informants said they completed forms for needle stick 
injuries and patient falls but did not think that clinical mishaps fell into a 
reportable category. The following quotes by an intern and resident describe 
their experience of reporting: 
"I haven't noticed doctors reporting things. I think the nurses get into trouble more. They get blamed 
and so they have been told they have to cover. You would document in the notes but not fill out a fonn." 
(Intern 3) 
"Incident reports concern the nursing profession rather than medical profession. I've seen a lot of 
mistakes made by nursing and medical staff but almost all the mistakes made by medical staff are never 
reported." (RM01 (7)) 
The information gathered from the doctors indicates that formal reporting is 
not a part of their work routine. Rather, writing in the medical records and 
informally talking about the mistake to other health workers on the team 
appears to be the most common method for managing mistakes. Writing in 
the records, while recording treatment decisions made as a result of the 
mistake, is not reporting in terms of incident management. Noting a mistake in 
the medical records assists the health care team in their treatment of the 
patient but lessons from the mistake may be lost in terms of preventing a 
repeat of the same mistake. Medical record review may discover the mistake 
but long after the event. 
;;; Intern (8) 
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Nurses and doctors on the wards usually do not have responsibility for 
incident management or ensuring what action should be taken. Rather they 
are expected to report incidents to a hospital authorised person. One 
residentiv said that while they try to be open with each other about mistakes, 
the experience is not valued as learning. Work flowv also appeared to intrude 
on discussions about mistakes particularly in the surgical term when time was 
limited to discuss incidents. In addition the time lag between the mistakes and 
discussions hampered quality discussions about the events because of faded 
memories. 
The fear of being blamed for a mistake and the problems that might arise as a 
result (supervisors' reports and diminished career choices) was a significant 
issue for most interns and residents. One intern succinctly summarised the 
position felt by most informants: 
"There is the underlying feeling that people can be blamed. There is a fine line between an incompetent 
decision and natural human error. You are not sure that if you did something wrong that someone would 
be sympathetic towards you. It's always one of blame and you're trying to cover yourself left, right and 
centre. I've got into the habit of writing in my notes whenever I see someone and my first plan of action 
is to discuss with x and I'll write it in the notes -for example discussed with ED reg. I haven't seen that in 
other people's notes even though I know they do it." Intern {1 0) 
1.2 Are there better ways to report mistakes? 
The medical culture plays a significant role in the attitude of junior doctors 
towards reporting. One intern vi noted that from the beginning of medical 
school one is 'indoctrinated' into the hierarchical professional model. 
"I think it is indoctrinated in you from the first day of medical school that you've chosen a profession that 
works by hierarchy. You know you're entering a profession where all those above you have been where 
you've been now and you've just got to do the hard yards." {Intern 5) 
A common theme associated with reporting mistakes was the recognition that 
reporting and completing incident forms does not necessarily result in 
improved care. Many were aware of the necessity to report but as one 
residentvii noted, many drug errors are made in the hospital everyday with no 
drug error sheets completed. Overall, many viewed reporting as cumbersome 
'' RM01 {7) 
'Intern (8) 
~ Intern (5) 
'"RM01 (13) 
paperwork with few tangible benefits or health care improvement following 
reporting. 
191 
Another barrier to reporting was uncertainty among interns or residents as to 
whether a mistake had in fact occurred. viii There were times when doctors 
were unaware of the outcomes of their treatment. One resident said about 
reporting 
"It needs to be done in a way where no blame is placed and no one is made to feel guilty, in an 
anonymous setting which prevents it getting back to the head of a department, scenarios where people 
can talk about what's to be done (without fear). It's the awareness of the issue. No one formally reports 
mistakes." RM01 (15) 
1.3 Follow- up on reports 
Only fourix doctors said there was follow-up after the mistake was reported. Of 
the four cases reported, only one• was subject to a detailed analysis of the 
underlying factors leading to the mistake. This case concerned a 48-year-old 
male patient who was admitted for elective surgery. The patient died 8 days 
after admission. The analysis of this case uncovered the following issues: the 
admission process by multiple teams, delay in medical admission history and 
physical examination prior to elective surgery, an abnormal ECG result that 
was not reported, lack of management of abnormal potassium result and 
hyperkalaemic cardiac arrest and death .Xi 
~;; RM01 (15) 
;, Intern (3), intern (4), intern (5) ,RM01 (11) 
'RM01(21) 
"The RM01 (21) told the following story about this patient. "A resident was asked to admit a 
patient who came to the ward as an elective admission in the afternoon. She failed to do that within her 
shift, and went onto overtime on the same ward that the patient was admitted to. There is no excuse not 
to admit the patient even if they are on overtime. The patient was sitting on the ward and nothing could 
be done until the patient was admitted by the doctor. The patient remained sitting on the ward during 
the evening shift and still nothing was done. The resident handed over to the evening doctor the patient 
for admission. The evening doctor who started at 10:30 had to do the admission at midnight. He didn't 
take any blood at the time but put blood forms into the morning - it was an elective admission and he 
didn't think the patient was unwell until the next day, when he was to have a procedure. The patient had 
bloods taken early the next morning, and the potassium came back as significantly abnormal. The sister 
got the message from the lab and she phoned it onto the resident, saying the potassium was 6. The 
resident said it is probably haemolysed and donl worry about it. The nurse was concerned that wasn't 
the case (haemolysed is marked as 'haemolysed'). She called the surgical registrar who rushed down to 
the ward to repeat the blood sample and while he was repeating the blood sample, the patient arrested 
and subsequently died." 
One resident";; said that most people try to be open about their mistakes 
amongst their colleagues. But he clarified the situation when it came to 
making improvements as a result of a mistake. 
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"In terms of bringing it up so it becomes a valuable lesson, that's not done. You want to say that we are 
open with our colleagues about admitting mistakes but nothing more formal goes on". RM01 (7) 
In answer to the question "Are you aware of any efforts to follow up on 
incident or mistake reports, to make changes or evaluate the changes?" 
Some residents and interns confused follow-up on reports to prevent the 
mistake happening again with what action they took after recognising that a 
mistake had been made. For example, they described the steps they took to 
assist the particular patient suffering the adverse event rather than what steps 
were taken to prevent future patients experiencing a similar event. 
1.4 Communicating the mistake with the patient or the family 
In only seven cases (12%) did the health care providers disclose the mistakes 
to the patients or their families. The majority of patients or their families were 
not told of the mistake (39 of the 57 (68%)). Another eight said they did not 
know if the patient or family was told and three were unsure. In all 13 cases of 
patient deaths none of the families were told about the role mistakes played in 
the deaths. Interns and residents had direct knowledge of the absence of 
family information in 10 cases. The family of one patient who died was told 
there was a complication rather than an error.';;; There were three deaths 
where it was not known whether the family was told.'iv Table 6.2 sets out the 
patients' conditions and whether or not they or their families were told about 
the mistakes. 
~; RM01(7) 
~;; RM01 (6) 
"v See Chapter Four (p163) for an analysis of the deaths 
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Table 6.2: Position of Informant. tvpe of mistake. condition of the patient. outcome and 
acknowledgement to patient or family 
Identifier Position Type of mistake Condition of Outcome for Patient/family 
patient patient informed of 
mistake 
1 Intern Incorrect drug. Stable. No adverse Not informed. 
Beta blocker given outcome. 
from day of 
admission until day 
of discharge 
instead of anti 
depressant. 
Incorrect diagnosis Patient had Died. Unknown. 
(missed bowel dementia and 
obstruction). fracture of neck of 
femur. Very sick. 
3 intern Misdiagnosis Surgery 2 hours Extra few days Not informed. 
(pulmonary previously. Patient in hospital, 
oedema). for discharge with then 
wheezes in chest. discharged. 
Delay in treatment Very sick patient Died in ICU. Not informed. 
(high potassium with high 
reading). potassium level. 
Very slow 
breathing, 
4 intern Incorrect Worsening Returned to Yes. 
medication, creatinine level: previous level Patient told she 
given anti generally very sick of functioning. had been given 
hypertension patient with many wrong 
medication instead medical problems - medication. 
of calcium tablets. cardiac failure, 
diabetes, coronary 
and renal 
impairment. 
Incorrect treatment. Terminally ill with Pulled PEG out Not informed. 
Inappropriate end stage and bled to 
invasive Parkinson's death. 
procedures at end disease. Patient did 
of life. not want a PEG 
(percutaneous 
endoscopic 
gastrostomy). 
Incorrect fluid Patient with Extended Not informed. 
measured. hyponatremia on length of stay. 
wrong fluids. 
5 intern Wrong treatment Pain and no urine Return to Not informed. 
(surgical mishap- output. Showed theatre and 
Ileostomy). signs of peritonitis additional 
and infection length of stay. 
around the 
ileostomy site. 
5 Incorrect flushing Patient had Stable. Not informed. 
white cell filter with splenectomy and Extended 
saline. required blood length of stay. 
transfusion. Unwell 
nauseous and 
fever. 
No post-operative Patient with No permanent Not informed 
management ankylosing neurological about the 
plans. spondylitis -slipped defect. communication 
fixation. Extended problem. 
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len!llh of slav. 
6 RM01 Delayed diagnosis Patient with Died. Not informed. 
of surgical infiltrative lung Told there was a 
problem. disease - unwell complication. 
oost operatively. 
7 RM01 Medication not Very unwell patient No ill-effects. Cannot 
given. with numerous remember. 
complications post 
surgery. Infected 
graft and on long 
term antibiotics. 
Medication given to Both patients No adverse Not informed. 
wrong patient. stable. outcome. 
Intravenous 
antibiotics (right 
patient missed out 
on antibiotics). 
Misdiagnosis Sick patient with Survived the Not informed. 
(myocardial chest pains. infarct. Told second 
infarct). Extended reading showed 
length ofstay. diaanosis. 
8 intern Lack of monitoring Diabetic patient on No adverse Not informed. 
pre-operatively. nil by mouth. outcome-
Having pin and surgery 
plate for hip. completed on 
day. 
9 intern This is the same 
case as 21 and so 
has not been 
counted. 
10 intern Delayed treatment. Unwell patient. Unknown. Unknown. 
Medication given to Very sick patient. No adverse Not informed. 
wron11 oatient. outcome. 
Delayed diagnosis Elderly very unwell Extended Not informed. 
(endocarditis and patient. length of stay. 
sepsis). 
11 RM01 Delayed treatment. Unconscious, came Unknown to Unknown. 
in by ambulance. RM01. Patient 
transferred to 
I CU. 
12 intern Delay in treatment Motor vehicle Clinically Yes. 
and test results. accident victim. stable. 
Patient with Discharged. 
fractured tibia and 
external fixtures, 
fractured hand -
infection. 
Wrong tests and Patient had chest Discharged. Not informed. 
consultation. pain and recent 
endoscopy-had 
gastritis. 
Nil information and Patient on warfarin. Discharged. Not informed. 
delays in 
I 
management. 
13 RM01 Delay in attending Very sick patient Died. Not informed. 
cardiac arrest call with chronic 
(also delay in test airways disease 
ordering). with infected 
exacerbation. 
Incorrect dose of Patient admitted Acute renal Unknown. 
gentamycin. with normal kidney failure. 
function. Extended 
len!lth of stav. 
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14 intern Delay in treatment. Patient with Died. Not informed. 
pneumonia, Not told about 
dehydration, renal failure to monitor 
failure. but told about 
sepsis and 
tubing. 
15 RM01 Delayed diagnosis Complaining of Extended Not informed. 
(broken hip). pain. Conscious, length of stay 
confused and and 
demented. discharged. 
Delay in treatment. Sick patient and Extended Yes. 
hypotensive, no length of stay. 
urine output. Month in ICU 
Transferred patient on ventilator. 
with renal failure 
and cardiac failure. 
16 intern Inadequate Interstate patient- Discharged Not informed. 
discharge. had surgery for without x rays 
fracture. and reports. 
17 intern Wrong diagnosis Very sick elderly Died in ICU. Not informed. 
(no blood gas patient with 
done). pneumonia. 
Delay in cannula Patient with Died. Not informed. 
insertion. metastases and 
limited life 
expectancy-
months. Vomiting 
blood. 
18 RM01 Incorrect treatment Child patient. No adverse Not informed. 
(premature outcome. 
removal of drain). 
19 RM02 Misdiagnosis Patient had a fall. No adverse Not informed. 
(fracture). Nauseous and no outcome. 
neurological 
svmotoms. 
19 RM02 Misdiagnosis (too Patient with chest Extended Not informed. 
much oxygen). infection and length of stay 
chronic retention of in ICU and 
C02. ward. 
Incorrect treatment Patient with Extended Yes. 
(no medication). infected length of stay. 
exacerbation of No adverse 
chronic airways outcome. 
limitation. 
20 RM01 Misdiagnosis Patient had Arrested, Not informed. 
(tension numerous extended 
pneumothorax). orthopaedic length of stay. 
problems. Hip 
replacement turned 
septic. Short of 
breath. 
Delay in Patient had stents Extended Not informed. 
diagnosing and percutaneous length of stay. 
(acute myocardial nephrostomy tubes Recovered. 
infarct). put in. Obstructive 
urethra. 
21 RM01 Delay in admission Elective patient Died. Unknown. 
and treatment scheduled for 
(low potassium). surgery. 
Incorrect treatment Patient had No harm. Unsure. 
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(wrong patient on vertebral artery 
heparin dissection. Had 
management). been anti-
coagulated. Started 
on warfarin and 
heparin infusion. 
22 RM01 Incorrect Patient due for Surgery Cannot 
medication surgery - urinary proceeded with remember. 
(aspirin). tract infection. no adverse 
outcome. 
Delayed diagnosis. Patient had Extended Not informed. 
pneumonia and length of stay 
renal failure. in the gastric 
ward- no 
adverse 
outcome. 
Treatment Elderly patient in Died. Not infonmed. 
(defibrillator not rehab ward after 
available). fractures. 
23 RM02 Misdiagnosis Young boy in pain. Delayed Yes. 
(torsion of the surgery. By registrar. 
testis). Failure to Recovered. 
document history in 
notes in ED. 
24 RM01 Misdiagnosis Post-operative due Transferred to Unknown. 
(malnutrition). to fractured femur ICU. RMO 
in very unwell does not know 
patient- vomiting, outcome. 
weight loss, 
dumping syndrome 
from previous 
stomach cancer. 
Delayed treatment Difficult and No food for4 Not informed. 
(nil nasogastric confused patient days- tube 
feed tube). with oral cancer - reinserted. 
had trachea tube. 
26 RM01 Incorrect treatment. Patient with recent Extended Not informed. 
onset stroke having length of stay. 
atrial fibrillation. 
27 RM01 Delayed diagnosis Very unwell patient Unknown to Unknown. 
(hypertension and vomiting. RMO. 
s.,l'tic shock). 
Delayed treatment. Patient unwell in Died. Not informed. 
pre -respiratory 
arrest situation. 
Incorrect treatment Unwell patient in No adverse Not informed. 
(central line I CU. outcome. 
insertion into 
artery). 
28 RM01 Misdiagnosis Patient with Extended Not informed. 
(fistula). adhesions to bowel length of stay -
- post operative 3 mts. 
surgical transferred to 
complications - in teaching 
hospital for months. hospital-
discharged 
after surgery. 
Incorrect treatment Sick patient post - Died. Not infonmed. 
(wrong patient). cardiac arrest with 
uncontrollable 
seizures. 
2"' patient with 
perforated 
duodenal ulcer and 
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fitting. 
29 RM01 Delay in diagnosis. Spinal patient Extended Not infonned. 
admitted with length of stay. 
hypothennia, low 
_platelet count. 
Delay in treatment Patient had Extended Yes. 
(surgery). thoracic spine length of stay. 
fracture. 
30 RM02 Delay in treatment Patient had Extended Not infonned. 
(infected central complicated bums length of stay. 
line). and two central 
lines inserted. 
31 RM02 Misdiagnosis (post Patient post- Died. Unknown. 
-operative bleed). operative with 
abdominal pain. 
Delay in surgery. Patient had Discharged. Not informed. 
untreated fistula. 
32 Intern Delay in treatment Patient in motor No adverse Yes. 
(test resuM). vehicle accident - outcome. 
fractures. 
2 Response to mistakes 
2.1 Interns' and residents' feelings about the mistakes 
All interns and residents talked about their feelings associated with mistakes. 
Words such as 'upset', 'guilty', 'distraught', 'distressing', 'concerned', 'bad', 
'worried', 'awful', 'dreadful', and 'sick in the stomach' were used in response to 
a question about how they felt when they realised a mistake had been made. 
In relation to mistakes by others the words used by the interns and residents 
were 'surprised', 'frustrated', 'irritated', 'angry', and 'disappointed'. They were 
careful to clarify that while they experienced negative feelings about the 
mistakes made by others they did not blame people making mistakes 
because many could visualise themselves making similar mistakes given the 
circumstances. 
The feelings about mistakes were not confined to their having inadequate 
knowledge or skill. They covered other concerns such as misuse of 
resources, lack of available support and staff shortages. One internxv was 
irritated by a mistake associated with an aged patient receiving life-saving 
treatment against his wishes. The intern said 
"'Intern (4) 
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"I'm ethically opposed to prolonging a life. Spend the resources on kids in Ethiopia. The same dollar 
would save a couple of lives as opposed to spending it on unessential operations or on a 98 (year old 
man) who is going to die in a month anyway. You are making his life more miserable for the last month." 
(Intern 4) 
Another internxvi who misdiagnosed a patient with a bowel obstruction realised 
that time pressures on her to be in theatre contributed to the mistake. She 
said she felt 'really upset' because it was her responsibility to pick it up, but at 
the same time she felt that if more staff were available she would have had 
more time. 
How bad one felt was directly associated with notions of personal 
responsibility for patients. For example, a residen~;; who medicated the 
wrong patient said she felt 'very guilty' because it was her 'fault'. Her 
registrar's response to her mistake made her feel worse because she 
confirmed the mistake and told her she should have identified it earlier. An 
internxviii who did not provide adequate monitoring of a patient preoperatively 
said that her mistake made her feel like she 'had not done her job properly' 
and that one wants to do a good job and do what is best for the patient. She 
saw her failure as putting the patient at risk. A resident treating a patient who 
died said his bad feelings were made worse because of his feelings of 
attachment to the patient. He said:-
"Personally I felt bad because I was a little bit attached with this lady, who I thought was going to be 
another patient who just comes through. I put every effort into getting her better and getting her seen. I 
felt a little sad and sad for the husband too." RM01 (6) 
Mistakes were dominated by the feelings associated with them. One resident 
who described a misdiagnosis of a patient with a tension pneumothorax and a 
delayed diagnosis of patient suffering an acute myocardial infarct captures the 
feelings about mistakes in the following statement:-
"I think they (the mistakes he described) had the potential to cause problems. Everyone has their own 
way of dealing with things. One of the hardest things is an ego blow aside from anything else. You have 
concern when you have done something wrong that led to a mistake. You doubt your ability as a doctor 
which is a bad thing. You don't want to be so confident that you think that you can do everything on your 
own, but that's rarely a problem. I think having too much insecurity and not enough confidence is a 
bigger problem for junior doctors." RM01 (20) 
xv; Intern ( 1 ) 
xv;; RM01 (7) 
xv;;; Intern (8) 
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2.2 Who do Interns and residents talk to and how do they handle their 
feelings? 
Most doctors said that talking to others helped them deal with mistakes. 
Family members (14/32), registrars (7/32), other junior doctors (7/32) and one 
administrator helped interns and residents debrief. One resident";' said he 
sought advice from his friends because there was no support in the hospital 
system. In answer to a general question asking the doctors who they would 
go to if they had a problem, they all said they would talk to their registrars but 
when it came to a problem associated with errors or mistakes only seven 
actually talked to their registrars. Table 6.3 sets out the context for 
discussions with others about mistakes. 
Table 6.3: Position and response to question how handled feelings and who talked to after the 
mistake. 
Position How handled feelings and who talked to after the mistake. 
Intern t During the time the patient was having all these problems the wife transferred him to another 
consultant. The original consultant did show up and I felt he had more concern for the 
patient. The second one said well he had to die. I just felt that's bad when you get to that 
. point; it miaht be true but still. I could not talk to anyone about this. 
Intern 3 I found out more about the patients to make me understand the background of that patient. I 
speak to my husband about almost everything that's happening to me. Whether it bothered 
me or not or annoying me. I speak to my parents as well. I think I speak to family and 
friends more than other colleagues. I think you're just worried that you want to make sure 
you're doing the best you can. 
Intern 4 What a stupid thing. I find it irritating when people aren't careful. I talk mostly with my 
girlfriend. 
Intern 5 With the spinal case, I was quite frustrated. I once saw someone on overtime because of 
some tiny symptom they were having and I dismissed it as nothing and the next day it turned 
out that they'd had a minor stroke. I was feeling very bad about that. I spoke to the registrar. 
He said 'there was nothing you could have done anyway'. But I felt bad that I hadn't picked 
that diagnosis. You want your patients to have confidence in what you're doing and you've 
got to have confidence in yourself. If I felt I couldn't talk with the team, I would look to talking 
to the DCT (Director of Clinical Training). 
RM016 I felt bad. I speak with my partner, she's medical also. I talked about it with the registrar 
usina the 'retrosoectoscope'. 
RM017 I felt guilty for a while. I talked to my friends, but no one else in the hospital. I talked to my 
boyfriend and he's medical that also halos. 
Intern 8 I felt bad. I talked with my registrar who was present the entire time when the anaesthetist 
was upset and blamina my reaistrar. 
Intern 9 I would talk to the family and then the registrar. It comes back to the registrar all the time 
because that's the person you have most contact with. I haven't heard about anyone talking 
about any mistakes. 
Intern 10 I spoke to administration. I had been left the day before without cover because the registrar 
had been sick. Admin. are meant to provide locum cover during that time. They couldn't find 
anyone. On the Sunday I unfortunately had a fourteen hour shift on my own covering the 
entire hospital. It was the extra stress involved, knowing I would have to bother other 
people. Nothing happened and the consuttant came in eventually anyway. I felt quite put oul 
,;, RM02 ( 19) 
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by it. I was left with feeling inadequate. I also talked to the registrars. 
RM01 I only talked to that one person and my colleagues. But as time goes by and having 
11 discussed it wnh seniors I feel amazingly a lot better. 
Intern 12 I felt I was being badly treated and n was humiliating. At the time (of the mistake) my 
confidence was so poor and I was so scared and could not discuss anvthin!l with anvone. 
RM01 I spoke to my registrar and family. I didn't do anything else. I talk a lot at home. My registrar 
13 made me a cup of tea, which is good because you don't expect that at work. I also 
remember him telling me don't cry in front of the rest of the ranks which he was referring to 
the nursina staff. 
Intern 14 I discussed it with my registrar and he explained it. I told my girlfriend about it and my flat 
mate. 
RM01 I ranted and raged. Another intern on my team and I spend a lot of time whinging to each 
15 other about things that shouldn't happen. Most people talk to family or friends. There are 
very few people at my level who would discuss it with consultants or heads of deparlments. 
Most consultants are not approachable. I would never have a chat to them. I might ask them 
how are you doing, but thafs about it. 
Intern 16 If somethin!l has happened I will han!! around to see if I can help or watch it. 
Intern 17 We talked about what happened with each other. I don't talk to my family about these, just 
on the ward. Only my registrar. 
RM01 You could talk to other interns and residents. We all do that to some extent. You would not 
18 take it any further because you wouldn't want to get the blame. I think ifs a real blame 
problem. When we talk its mainly informal over a beer. You wouldn't discuss it a!ly further. 
RM02 I talked to friends to get some advice. There is no support in the hospital system. 
19 
RM01 One of the hardest things is an ego blow aside from anything else. You doubt your ability as 
20 a doctor. I talked to friends or other colleagues or friends I went through medical school with. 
RM02 The worse one is when someone dies or has a stroke which is quite devastating, ones that 
21 will become good stories in years to come. The other ones are little errors. They often 
happen. 
RM01 Other residents. 
22 
RM02 My husband or friend. 
23 
RM01 I talk to my husband who happens to be a doctor as well and sometimes I talk to my 
24 colleagues. 
Intern 25 I spoke to other interns about them, and I spoke to my partner who always gets an ear 
bashing when I get home each day. Definitely the informal way. 
RM01 I would speak to my fellow colleagues. And some doctors. If it were a mistake that I made, I 
26 would feel a little bit more intimidated speaking to someone more senior about it. I probably 
would feel more comfortable speaking to one of my colleagues about it. 
RM01 I spoke to my friend that's about it. 
27 
RM01 The intern on my team, we were able to talk about it. It was really frustrating. I think the 
28 re!listrar felt the same frustration. 
RM01 No one formally. Colleagues and friends 
• 
29 
RM02 A bit frustrated. 
30 
RM02 I've got a very good network of friends, colleagues. I wouldn't really talk to anyone non-
31 medical, and initially I would call a few of my friends. I would talk with my registrar, if I had a 
good relationship with them. Consultants I don't think so; I am on good terms but not those 
kinds of terms. 
Intern 32 Put myself in the shoes of the person. You feel you are left alone with a lot of patients and 
you can't work it out from a phone call and prioritize what are the most important things to be 
done. 
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2.3 How do interns and residents manage mistakes? 
No interns or residents identified an established system to help doctors deal 
with mistakes. A few"" emphasised the absence of any system. The majority 
said they talked amongst themselves or with their families. Registrars were 
mentioned as appropriate people to talk with but only if the relationship was 
good and the registrars were available and sympathetic. One resident""' said 
in relation to speaking to her seniors that it would depend on the relationship 
with the boss and who was primarily responsible for the mistake. She said 
many residents did not speak to people higher up preferring to speak to each 
other. 
Trying to forget about mistakes or shutting them out was another technique 
used. One intern""'' said 
"I think people take it to heart and are scared of being seen to be incompetent. Or they are not sure how 
things could have been done differently. I'm sure that a lot of mistakes you try and forget about and you 
move on. You take it as your own personal experience." Intern (10) 
Two out of 32 doctors said that interns could go to the Director of Clinical 
Training (OCT), but no doctor had done this. Knowing who to talk to was 
important. In addition to family and friends peers were also seen to be helpful 
if approachable because the person concerned knows they are not alone and 
that such things happen to others. Talking to senior clinicians was seen as 
beneficial particularly if they disclosed their own experiences. A few noted that 
it would help break down the myth of infallibility by hearing from senior people 
about their own mistakes. 
2.4 Interns' and residents' suggestions for better handling of mistakes 
The ideal method for handling mistakes, according to most interns and 
residents, was for them to be open and honest in their discussions about their 
mistakes with appropriate senior clinicians. A discussion with a senior person 
was important to help them understand why the mistake happened, and how 
to learn from it. Availability and willingness of senior clinicians were identified 
by the informants as the main reasons preventing this from occurring. One 
".Intern (3),RM01 (7), Intern (9) RM01 (24), 
"' RM01 (27) 
"";Intern (10) 
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intern"";;; noted that openness and greater acknowledgement of mistakes 
might provide better opportunities for discussing them. Another intern said in 
response to the question -what could have helped him better deal with the 
mistake: - "/ don't know, no one seemed to care that much. Shit happens on 
the Ward. oO<XiV 
All agreed that disclosing mistakes was hard and they were very concerned 
about talking to their supervisors and seniors about them. This intern sums up 
much of the concern: 
"The hierarchy is hard to overcome. I can't imagine if I had my consultant surgeon sitting here that I 
could talk about the things that I've spoken about freely today with him. If they said you were involved in 
this case and we acknowledge that it went badly then I'd be quite happy to do that but I couldn't bring it 
up. In some cases to admit errors is to admit negligence and therefore will someone be suing me for 
this. Who's going to read the information and if the lawyers get their hands on it, then it's serious stuff." 
Intern (5) 
2.5 Training to manage mistakes 
The following table identifies the position of the informant and their awareness 
of training and the type of training in mistake management. 
Table 6.4: Position of informant. the presence of training and type of training in mistake 
management. 
Identifier Position 
1 Intern 
2 Intern 
3 intern 
4 intern 
5 intern 
6 RM01 
7 RM01 
8 intern 
9 intern 
10 intern 
11 RM01 
12 intern 
13 RM01 
14 intern 
15 RM01 
16 intern 
17 intern 
18 RM01 
19 RM02 
20 RM01 
"";;; Intern (5) 
"";v Intern (14) 
Training Type for training/comment 
Yes. Grand rounds and discussion about the medico-legal 
environment. 
No response to 
question. 
No training 
No traininQ 
No training 
No traininQ 
No training 
Yes. A lecture on medico-leQal issues. 
No training 
No training 
No traininQ 
No training 
No traininQ 
No training 
No training 
No traininQ 
No training 
Yes. Communication skills course for dealing with the 
patient or the familv. 
No training 
No training 
203 
21 RM01 No trainina 
22 RM01 Yes. One interactive session. 
23 RM02 No training_ 
24 RM01 No training 
26 RM01 No training 
27 RM01 No training 
28 RM01 No training_ 
29 RM01 No training 
30 RM02 No training 
31 RM02 No trainina 
32 Intern No training 
Only four (13%) doctors said they received training for managing mistakes but 
the training examples they gave did not specifically relate to instructions for 
managing mistakes. While there was no specific training in mistakes, other 
forums discussed mistakes indirectly. For example, death certificate meetings 
identified by one resident, xxv involved discussion about all death certificates 
written in the previous three months, including the diagnoses and whether any 
errors were made in the patients' treatments. Morbidity and mortality meetings 
were also identified as opportunities for discussion about mistakes. One 
resident=; gave an example of a consultant who discussed his error during 
an ERCP (Endoscopic Retrograde Cholangiopancreatography). He did so so 
that others would learn from his mistake and not repeat it. 
A catastrophic mistake in a peripheral hospital led to lunch time meetings to 
discuss a range of medico legal topics. But the internxxvii who participated in 
these 'productive' meetings said that he was unaware of other similar 
programs at the teaching hospital. Fortnightly education forums were 
mentioned by the internsxxviii as an opportunity to raise problems. A 
sympathetic and available facilitator for these sessions permitted doctors to 
debrief. 
When mistakesxxix were included in educational forums they were seen 
mainly as responses to the difficult medico-legal environment and litigation 
""'RM01 (27) 
.,; RM02 (31) 
"""'' Intern (3) 
"""';; Intern (3) RM01 (20) RMP1 (26) RM01 (27) RM01 (29) 
""''Intern (1) Intern (3) Intern (8) 
rather than as opportunities to improve the system and prevent mistakes 
happening. 
2.6 Interns' and residents' knowledge of how the hospital manages 
mistakes 
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Sixteen informants said they did not think there was anyone in the hospital to 
take care of mistakes. Of the remaining 15,xxx eight said that while they 
thought there would be someone to take care of mistakes they did not know 
who. Four were aware of the quality assurance unit in the hospital. Two 
doctors referred to the good back-up available from senior doctors and one 
referred to the availability of advisers from the Medical Defence Union. 
3 Avoiding Mistakes 
3.1 Major ways for avoiding mistakes 
Table 6.5 describes the interns' and residents' suggestions for avoiding mistakes. 
Nineteen doctors said that good communication was a main way to avoid 
mistakes. They also mentioned having adequate knowledge (six times), 
supervision (six) and checking (checking). Additional suggestions included 
adequate back-up, approachable senior staff, permission to ask for help and 
education. Most of the suggestions concerned changing the immediate working 
environment of the doctors. The following table lists the suggestions for avoiding 
mistakes. 
Table 6.5: Position of informant and ways of avoiding mistakes 
Position Ways of avoiding mistakes 
Intern 1 Extra vigilance, believe the nurses, prioritise work. 
Intern 2 (Tape inaudible). 
Intern 3 Good communication and knowledge. 
Intern 4 Improve patient cognition (sic), management decisions based on accurate information. 
Intern 5 Double-checking, communicating with nurses and colleagues. 
RM01 6 Checking, careful attention, communication. 
RM01 7 Systematic approach, adhering to rules and protocols, communication, supervision. 
Intern 8 Communication, notification. 
Intern 9 Supervision, regular contact with consultants. 
Intern 10 Communication, supervision, back-up. 
RM01 11 Communication, approachable registrars and consultants. 
Intern 12 Care in writing medication and charts, clear writing, communication, induction program. 
""" Intern (2) tape was not audible for this part of the transcript. 
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RM01 13 Communication and knowledge. 
Intern 14 More time with patients, communication skills, team work, job/task allocation, knowledge 
about iob. 
RM01 15 Knowledge. 
Intern 16 Checking, permission to ask for help. 
Intern 17 Supervision, approachable senior colleagues, communication. 
RM01 18 Communication, coaching of junior staff, protocols. 
RM02 19 Education, communication. 
RM01 20 Supervision, support for junior doctors. 
RM02 21 Personal responsibility, knowledge, careful attention, good documentation, checks. 
RM01 22 Communication, more staff, checking. 
RM02 23 Reasonable workload, better availability of consultants, communication. 
RM01 24 Better support, more staff, patient-centred care. 
Intern 25 Communication, permission to ask for help. 
RM01 26 Careful attention, communication, checking. 
RM01 27 More staff, education to improve knowledge and skills, reporting mistakes. 
RM01 28 Ask for help, communication. 
RM01 29 Avoid working when tired, stop rushing, adequate back-up. 
RM02 30 Avoid rushing, ask for help. 
RM02 31 Keep informed, education. 
Intern 32 Communication, team work, job descriptions. 
3.2 Methods for avoiding mistakes used by departments/units. 
All but two of the 32 doctors were able to identify a method used by various 
hospital departments to avoid mistakes. Only one said no such methods 
existed. Availability of experienced people (nurses, registrars, pharmacists), 
holding meetings (multi-disciplinary, audit, team) doing rounds (daily, 
consultant led, pharmacist, nurse) following protocols and checking were 
nominated. Table 6.6 summarises their suggestions. Informants saw trained 
nurses as playing a key role in minimising and avoiding mistakes. But when 
asked for examples of methods used, regular meetings with senior colleagues 
around particular events were most often described: grand rounds, 
department meetings, case conferences, morbidity and mortality meetings, 
and discharge planning meetings. One resident"""; described the use of an 
adverse event to teach about mistakes:-
"In the mortality and morbidity meeting (without using any names) they mentioned a case of delayed 
treatment, but I didn't realise they were going to bring up my case." RM01 (7) 
XXXI RM01 (7) 
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Table 6.6: Summary of methods used to avoid mistakes 
Having experienced Nursing staff: 
• Experienced and trained nurses . 
• Experienced Nursing Unit Managers . 
• Regular tests of patients . 
• Providing information about patients . 
• Good relationships . 
• Advocates for patients . 
• Checking by nurses . 
• Clinical nurse consultant. 
Ward Rounds 
• Consultant registrar and head nurse . 
• Pharmacist- daily medication review . 
• Morning ward rounds . 
• With nurses and pharmacist. 
• With registrars . 
Ward orientation 
Meetings 
• Case conference . 
• Team meetings . 
• Multi-disciplinary . 
• Department meetings . 
• Audit meetings . 
Protocols 
Checks 
• By Nurses . 
• By Pharmacists . 
Open communication 
• Good relationships between allied staff, nurses and medical staff . 
Leadership 
• Consultant driven . 
• Available registrar. 
• Daily meetings with registrars . 
3.3 Role of nurses in minimising mistakes 
Table 6.6 shows that interns and residents value the role of nurses and 
thought they had a significant role in patient safety and minimising mistakes. 
Checking tests and medications, providing patient information and providing 
specialist advice were identified by the informants. 
3.4 Knowledge of hospital-wide methods used to avoid mistakes 
Twenty-six doctors identified hospital-wide methods for helping to avoid 
mistakes. Six doctors said they were unaware of any hospital-wide methods 
\ 
designed to help them avoid mistakes. Hospital-wide methods identified by 
informants centred on the availability of back-up clinical support, meetings 
and education. 
Table 6.7: Hospital-wide methods used to help avoid mistakes 
Back up staff 
• M1 (overtime registrar covering the hospital) . 
• Policy of not leaving inexperienced people unsupervised . 
• Pharmacists . 
• Registrars . 
• Consultants . 
Notices on wards ( about) 
• On call consultants . 
• M1 . 
• Surgical registrar . 
• Other senior staff . 
Patient reviews 
• Bv interns and residents . 
Quality assurance meetings 
• Incident reports . 
• Morbidity and mortality meetinQs . 
Good communication 
• Handovers . 
• Feedback . 
Resident medical officer handbook 
Education session 
• JMO education forums . 
• Resident forums . 
3.5 Interns' and residents' additional ideas for avoiding mistakes 
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Additional ideas about avoiding mistakes honed in on personal responsibility, 
availability of senior staff and hospital organisation. Personal responsibility 
included the necessity to prioritise and organise work, recognition of one's 
limitations, routinely requesting help, better communication with administration 
staff, better note-taking, and better communication with other health care 
workers via face-to-face contact and in writing. Ideas in relation to senior staff 
included consultants being more understanding and offering better 
supervision. Ideas relating to hospital organisation covered resources, system 
redesign and education and included compulsory morning ward rounds, 
additional staff, changing the culture of silence about errors to one of 
openness, immediate notification of medication errors and test results, not 
allowing interns to be unsupervised and having dedicated senior clinician to 
assist interns and residents. 
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3.6 What interns' and residents' think about 'going that extra mile' and still 
something goes wrong. 
The responses set out below in Table 6.8 show that interns and residents are 
philosophical about the limitations of their own knowledge and experience and 
the limitations of medicine. Despite their appreciation of the role of uncertainty 
in medicine and their acceptance of their limited knowledge and experience, 
most of the informants thought the main cause of bad outcomes related to 
their level of experience and lack of knowledge. While there was some 
understanding of the role of the system and the limitations of medicine as 
factors in the outcomes of care, only five doctors talked about it in relation to 
the role of medicine. 
Table 6.8: Attitude to the inevitability of mistakes 
Limitations of their own Limitations of medicine Limitations of the environment 
experience 
It doesn't matter how much you If you've done everything you We are expected work 14 hours 
try, you're still not experienced. can, and something still goes without stopping. That is really 
(Intern 4) wrong, than nothing can be dangerous. When you push 
helped. (Intern 3) yourself it doesn't work. (intern 1) 
Mistakes happen in any Part of the job (requires) that You have this expectation that 
profession, which is unavoidable. you realise that things aren't you should know what to do. It's 
You can be as careful as you going to go very well difficult to call someone else 
want but sometimes you lapse in sometimes. You've got to because you don't want to look 
concentration and things are accept that it is part of like a fool. You do not want to 
going to go wrong. Mistakes are maturing as a physician -to look like an idiot and not being 
not generally talked about in the realise that's what happens sure if you're out of your depth or 
medical profession. RM01 (7) sometimes. (Intern 5) not. Intern (8) 
I think with inexperience, but You can try your hardest and You work pretty hard. I liked to go 
probably at any level you can feel sometimes things just don't to all the operations. That was 
like you're doing all you can and work out. You can't save personal choice, so I didn't get 
you are stressed because you everyone; you have to know paid any overtime for that, I just 
can't quite think of anything more that you can only try your thought that during the surgical 
you can do. You think would hardest and get everybody term, you need to see the 
someone else think differently. I'm else to try their hardest. operations. It's important to be 
sure things go wrong with RM01(6) part of the team and so you work 
consultants. I'm sure they still get long hours in that particular term. 
upset about things. Intern (10) Intern (9) 
At times I think what's wrong, how Patients aren't textbooks, you I think they (doctors who make 
could I have prevented this can do every1hing you can mistakes) are very busy or tired 
problem? I take it personally. possibly conceive and still or stressed. I think this happens 
Intern (12) something else could go every day. RM02 (19) 
wrong which is unforseen and 
patients' conditions can 
change. You could do 
every1hing within a current 
assessment and they may not 
hold and again the situation 
could change .RMO 1 (21) 
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Residents have only so much Even the best intern is going There's a problem with people 
experience and knowledge. You to make a mistake, because who are on overtime, they don't 
need to accept limitations so that medicine is like that and feel they have a responsibility for 
you know when it's appropriate to things do go wrong. Even if the patient. RM01 {28) 
call in extra help. A year down the you've done everything and 
track you can manage and it only something happens or the 
takes you 30 seconds. You have patient dies you are still going 
limitations and you do all that you to ask what happened. Could 
can do as a resident but you need I have done something 
a system to back that up when different? So even if you're 
you can1 do it. RM01 {29) the best doctor in the world 
you always going to have 
that. RM02 {30) 
Interns and residents don't have I've been in a situation where you 
as much knowledge as the try and ensure that everything 
registrars and they do try and goes the way it's planned and it 
investigate things a little bit doesn't. You leam to expect it in 
further, but in doing so are a bit a way, you work in a system and 
slower and miss crucial everything is not always going to 
information that the registrars go as planned. I think the main 
might pick up straight away. thing is to expect it and to identify 
Everyone will make mistakes but it and try and do something about 
probably interns and residents are it which always doesn't happen. 
less knowledgeable. Intern {14) If something does go amiss tell 
someone that you have done 
something wrong or tell them that 
something has happened if it's 
their fault. RM01(1J) 
As an intern you don't have the 
experience of knowing where the 
mistakes are likely to come from 
or what the problems are. II 
doesn't matter how much work 
you put in, you may still miss the 
one thing that someone else who 
is 40 years older may not have 
missed. Intern (17) 
It's kind of a pride thing. It's 
I whether you can handle a 
situation before it goes badly 
wrong and I think the best doctors 
are the people who know when 
it's time to quit, when it's time to 
ask for help. You have people 
who cry wolf and ask for help for 
everything. RM01 {18) 
We are very tired and we try to 
think of everything we can do for 
these patients, but we can still 
make a mistake such as not 
calling for help at the right time. 
RM01 {24) 
It's why I often say shit happens, I 
think no one should actually 
blame himself or herself when 
something happens, especially 
when it's not their fault. We still 
tend to work too long and make 
decisions without experience. 
RM01 {27) 
You try your best and things don't 
end up being the way you wanted. 
It can take its toll. Intern (32) 
4 Awareness of medical mistakes 
4.1 Attitude to medical mistakes 
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Interns and residents said they knew other people in the hospital expected 
them to make mistakes and this was accepted by the medical hierarchy. 
Inexperience and inadequate knowledge were the two main reasons for this 
acceptance. But while the hierarchy accepted the fact of mistakes the 
approach to managing and learning from mistakes was less transparent to the 
interns and residents. The medical culture did not require interns and 
residents to document or report mistakes. One internxxxii said that concerns 
about documentation were not about the failures to document treatment errors 
but related to poor term assessments. Another factor concerned the lack of 
restrictions on doctors working while fatigued. One internxxxiii said that 
mistakes are inevitable because the system expects interns to work 14 hours 
straight without stopping. 
While the inevitability of mistakes was recognised within the closed 'medical' 
system, their acknowledgement and management was not part of any 
systematised response. The difference between a system response and an 
individual response to a mistake concerning a particular patient was not 
recognised. 
In summary, mistakes by doctors were not recognised and managed. The 
modus operandi after mistakes was to ensure the patient was looked after but 
with little documentation and discussion and no disclosure to the family if 
possible. 
"I think the atmosphere if there is a mishap is 'hush hush', and make sure the family doesn't know. No 
one does that actively or rushes to hide things but I think that is the culture and no one is encouraged to 
report the things, not to blame other people but to prevent it happening in future." RM01 (17) 
"""'; Intern ( 1) 
"""';'Intern (1) 
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4.2 Attitudes to patients 
It was common for interns and residents when describing their mistakes to 
also refer to existing co-morbidities and severity of the patients' illnesses. The 
process of rationalisation, when there was an adverse outcome, may indicate 
their fear of being blamed for the mistake or fear a judgement about their role 
in the patients' demise or extended length of stay in hospital. 
"Looking back, he was a very unwell man and was getting unwell for a couple of days. But something 
was going to go wrong with this man sooner or later any way." Intern (3) 
Young patients who suffered an adverse event were distinguished from 
patients who were elderly and 'expected' to die. One internxxxiv who described 
a man who died from a missed diagnosis of bowel obstruction rationalised the 
bad outcome by commenting that the missed diagnosis would not have 
altered anything because he was a very frail old man. 
4.3 Attitude to work routines 
Interns and residents saw their daily work routine commencing with and being 
determined by morning ward rounds with the registrars. Consultants did not 
as a rule attend these ward rounds. They tended to attend at unscheduled 
times and not necessarily on a daily basis. This often meant that junior staff 
participated in supplementary ward rounds. A typical work day for the 
informants commenced with ward rounds in the morning which established 
the work for the day and included undertaking investigations, ordering tests, 
chasing test results, reviewing medications, recharting medications, liaising 
with nurses and allied health and writing in the medical records. 
Communications with medical staff were usually face-to-face but instructions 
to nurses were usually written in the notes. 
Interns and residents did not usually have contact with the consultants during 
the day; rather this was seen as the role of registrars who then relayed 
information and orders to the junior medical staff. There appeared to be a 
correlation between consultants who were approachable and who accepted 
xxxiv Intern ( 1) 
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calls from junior medical staff and departments which were well organised 
with regular academic teaching sessions at the beginning of each day. xxxv 
Table 6.9 summarises the daily routine outlined by interns and residents. 
Table 6.9: Work routine(sl described bv interns and residents 
Position Activity Time Comments 
Intern (1) • Very early ward round morning • Little time to check on information from (registrar and the night before. 
consultant). • Consultant writes in notes . 
• Work through the written • Prepare for discharge as soon as 
instructions with admitted. 
registrar. 
Intern (2) • Ward round . Bam • Meetings to discuss any aspect of care. 
• Ward meeting 
sometimes (nurses, 
consultant, registrar, 
allied health and 
pharmacy). 
• Ordering and checking 
tests results and 
medications. 
• DischarQes . 
Intern (3) • Ward rounds for most of Bam • Very busy . 
the day. • Very rushed . 
• End of day undertake the • Helpful consultants 
tasks ordered during • No time for lunch . 
rounds. 
Intern {4) Tape inaudible for this section 
Intern (5) • Ward rounds with senior 7am • Big team . 
RMO and registrar. • Lot of people to talk to . 
• Carry out the tasks 
ordered by registrar until 
lunch. 
• Do the admissions in the 
afternoon and follow up 
on test results. 
• Handover to senior RMO 
or registrar at around 
4.30. 
RM01(6) • Ward round with B.30am • Consultants do not do ward rounds on 
registrar. daily basis. 
• Undertake tasks set • Consultants ring the registrar and arrange 
during rounds. to do a round a number of times a week. 
• See new patients . 
• Discuss patients with 
nurses. 
• Follow the registrar on 
ward or in clinics. 
RM01 (7) • Ward round with morning • We have regular x-ray meetings and a 
registrar. monthly department meeting. 
• Completing tasks • We do not have team meetings where all (recharting medications, the professional people get together to 
writing in patient notes). discuss the patients. 
• Theatre . • Very close communication with my 
• Outpatient clinics . registrar directly above me. 
• My registrar keeps the Fellow and the 
consultant abreast with the patients: we 
discuss them in theatre. 
XXXV RM01 (18) 
' 
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• Sometimes consultants do their own ward 
round again in the afternoon. 
Intern (8) • Ward round with morning • We are easy to contact if there's a 
registrar, nursing unit problem that arises during the day. 
manager and 
physiotherapist. 
• Order tests . 
• Document notes . 
• Theatre . 
• Preadmission clinics . 
lntem(9) • Ward round with morning • As a junior person you answer to the 
registrar. registrar. 
• Junior person does ward • You don't speak to the consultants very 
work. often. 
Intern (10) • Emergency ward . • Better than ward work where there are 
• Shift work- get a hand- multiple demands. 
over • Focus on a couple of patients. 
• Varied work. • Better learning environment. 
• Responsible for setting 
work agenda. 
RM01 • Ward round with morning • Consultants come in three times a week. (11) registrar. • Ward is not that busy . 
• Complete tasks set 
during round 
• Theatre . 
Intern (12) • Reliefterm . morning • Unfamiliar patients. 
• Get a list of the patients. • I am from a different culture, I found it 
• Do rounds on own or hard - I don't know their names, 
with registrar or sometimes it is difficult to remember their 
consultant. names because it is a different culture. 
• In a relief term it is difficult. 
RM01(13) • Ward round with morning • Weekly department meeting including 
re~istrar. allied health. 
• 2" ward round later with 
consultant. 
• Planned dav . 
Intern (14) • Ward round with morning • There is more of a team . 
re~istrar. • A weekly discharge planning meeting . 
2" round with • There is a focus on education . 
consultants if they 
attend. 
• Undertake tasks set for 
the day. 
RM01 • Ward round with Sam • The consultants' relationship is with the (15) registrar. registrar. 
• Organise tests . • We communicate verbally, over the 
• Sort out problems . phone, face -to - face, notes in the 
Consultants will do ward medical records. 
round during the day. • If we write something down and it's 
important. 
Intern (16) • Ward round with registrar • Work for 3 consultants (3 junior staff and 8 
or on one's own (if specialists). 
registrar in theatre). • You are working with a specialist who you 
• Undertake tasks set very rarely see . 
during rounds. • Also you are working with a specialist who 
• Discharge summaries . comes fairly regularly and does about 3-4 
• Follow up on x-rays . ward rounds a week as opposed to one a 
week. Depending on which one you're 
talking about. 
• The consultants have a mixture of patients 
they're looking after, their ability to be on 
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the ward, (operating in a private hospital 
somewhere else) 
Intern (17) • Ward rounds with Sam • It's dependent on the personalities as to 
registrar. how we work and communicate. 
• Undertake tasks set • Interns and residents are not to talk to 
during round. consults directly. 
• 2"' ward round at 5pm at • I've been asked by the registrar who has 
change over. been in theatres scrubbed, to discuss 
Consultants come something with a particular consuttant and 
occasionally been told to get the registrar to assess the 
unannounced. patient and then get the registrar to call 
me back. 
RM01(1S) • Academic meeting- 7- • There are usually fairly clear instructions 
lectures, presentations. 7.30am on what's to happen to the patients. 
• Ward round with • The consultants are quite happy to accept 
registrar. calls. 
• Undertake tasks set 
during rounds. 
• Theatre/clinic . 
RM02 • Look at notes. Sam • Regular weekly meetings . (19) • Ward round with registrar • Educational meetings . 
Irregular consultant • Haematology is very difficult. 
rounds (2-3 • Consultants are very nice and have good 
times a week). relations and communications with the 
registrars. 
• The nurses are quite good . 
RM01(20) • Read notes. Sam • Workload light in gynaecology 
• See the patients on own . Wednesday morning teaching session at 
• Registrars will also see 7:30 - pitched towards the registrars, but 
patients independently. the residents are welcome to attend. 
• Clinics . 
RM01(21) • Ward round with 9am • Different meetings during the week, 
registrar. (teaching for residents from S to 9). 
• Undertake tasks set. • I work for three consultants . 
• Do paperwork. • One consultant will come around at Sam, 
another consultant comes three times a 
week and the third consultant hasn't got 
any in-patients. 
• The registrar is fairly available, not always 
immediately contactable. 
• The medical side is communicated by 
conversation and liaison and dealing with 
health professionals, 
• Hand over to the medical staff is verbal. 
• Medicine is basically a 24 hour business 
but patients get 9-5 hospital care 
• There is only skeletal staff at weekends 
and nights. 
RM01 • Ward round with Sam • Multi disciplinary team meetings . (22) registrars. • I report to the registrar who talks to the 
• Ward meeting. boss . 
• Undertake tasks set • In a normal ward job, I talk to the registrar, 
during rounds. rather than the boss. 
• 2"' round with 
Consultants is 
unpredictable. 
RM02 • Quick ward round with 7.50am • In emergency, you may not see the (23) registrar. consultant who may attend and only talk 
• Registrar leaves orders to the nursing staff about the patient. I 
for the day 
• Undertake tasks set by I r~istrar. 
-- • ~" w13_rd round with - ____ j 
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consultants. 
• Consult with registrar at 
3pm about activity and 
niaht instructions. 
RM01(24) • Ward round with 7.45am • High patient turnover. 
registrar. • Face-to-face communication . 
• Theatre at Bam . 
• Clinics in the afternoon . 
• Sort out patients in 
between times 
Intern (25) Tape not clear for this section 
RM01(26) • I do angiograms . 7.30am • In Reliefthere are a new set of patients 
• Try and sort out on the every week. 
ward • Every day is the same structure. 
• Ward rounds around 
B:30 - 9am wHh the 
registrar until about 
11:30. 
• Work out any jobs from 
ward round. 
• The consultants are 
unpredictable when they 
attend. 
RM01(27) • Ward round with B.30am • Consultants come at different times, so 
registrar. you do a ward round with one of your 
• Make a plan for each bosses - there is no standard time. 
patient. • In rheumatology there is a grand round 
• Undertake tasks where all the consultants get together and (investigations, checking discuss all the cases on Monday midday. 
resutts, arranging • There are multi-disciplinary team 
consults from other meetings. 
departments). 
• Clinics . 
RM01(2B) • Ward round with registrar morning • The consultants' offices are on the same 
who sometimes comes in floor as the patients. 
later. • There is a lot of interaction with the senior 
• Undertake takes set clinicians during the day. 
during rounds. • I'd usually see one of the consultants 
• Meetings-teaching every day . 
sessions. • At the peripheral hospitals consultants 
• Admissions in the would come once a week and are difficult 
afternoon. for the registrar to contact. 
• You don't get much preparation for your 
relief term. 
RM01(29) • Round on own. Bam • In spinal there is more consultant contact . 
• Round with registrar. • Weekly multi disciplinary case conference . 
• Undertake tasks set • Monday ward round is big ward round with 
during rounds. two ofthe consultants and representatives 
• After lunch chasing test from allied health, physio or the OT, and a 
results. representative from the nursing staff. We 
• Finnish 5pm . do this twice a week. 
RM02(30) • Ward round with 7am • Weekly burns meeting. 
registrar. • Weekly clinic . 
• Theatre . 
• Discharge summaries . 
• Sorting out patients . 
• Chasing results . 
RM02(31) • Admissions from morning • There is one weekly formal meeting for 
casualty. registrars. 
In charge of out patient • Most communication with the nurses . 
dialysis clinic 
• Take calls . 
• Review sick patients . 
• Oraanisina lists . 
216 
Intern (32) • Ward round with 7am • Case conference . 
registrar. • Communicate with the registrars and the 
• Undertakes tasks set consultants as well as other health 
during rounds. professionals. 
Interns and residents nominated a range of work activities and situations that 
impacted on their attitude to the work place. See table 6.10 for a list of 
activities that impact on work routines. The effectiveness of ward rounds, 
hand-overs and joint-admissions raise significant organisational issues for 
hospital administration but the doctors interviewed appeared to accept that 
nothing could be done to improve the situation. 
Table 6.10: Activities imoactinq on ward routines 
Unprepared for work. RM01 28) 
• Unfamiliar hospital. RMO 2 (30) 
• Unfamiliar ward . 
• Inexperience at procedures . 
Multiple teams. RM01 (20) 
• Lack of responsibility. RMO 1 (29) 
Discharge summaries. lntern(3) 
• Inadequate . 
• Delaved . 
Ward rounds. Intern (1) 
• All day ward rounds . Intern (3) 
• Ad hoc rounds . Intern (12) 
• Too fast. RM01(13) 
• Too much paper work . lntern(12) 
• Unpredictable . 
Patients located out of department. Intern (3) -I 
• lnadeauate care . 
Meetings. RM01 (13) 
• Weekly . Intern (14) 
• Discharge planning . 
Paging. RM01 (20) 
• Nurses . Intern (8) 
• Allied health . RM01(11) 
• Communicating results . RM01 (13) 
• To senior staff-out of deoth . 
Overtime and weekends. RM01 (28) 
• Unclear role of doctor on overtime . lntern(3) 
• Less commitment to patients . Intern (4) 
• Less responsibility . Intern (14) 
• Failure to write up notes . 
• Failure to follow instructions . 
Hand-over (change-over). RM01 (7) 
• No formal verbal handover . Intern (3) 
• Unfinished work . Intern (10) 
• Important to have good communication . RM01 (20) 
• Require face-to-face meeting . RM01(13) 
• Failure of follow up on instructions . Intern (14) 
• Inadequate handover between terms . Intern (16) 
• inadeauate communication 
RM01(20) 
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RM02 C30l 
Tests/investigations. Intern (4) 
• Too delayed . RM01(21) 
• Delayed test results . RM01(29) 
• Timely ordering of tests . 
Stereotyping. RM02(19) 
• Overseas trained doctors . 
Communication. Intern (17) 
• Poor communications in surgery . lntem(10) 
• Importance of good communication between consultants 
and registrars and junior staff members. 
Relief. RM01(16) 
• Unsettling . 
• Long hours . 
• Unfamiliar oatients . 
Joint admissions. RM01(29) 
• Spinal admissions . 
• Continuity of care affected . 
• Communication difficulties and delays . 
Paging of interns and residents by nurses was an issue in relation to the need 
for interns and residents to prioritise and the nurse's request for immediate 
attention.lOCXVi 
''It's a complaint of a lot of junior staff. You'll get continually paged about cannulas and fluid orders, 
which can become irritating because they can wait for half an hour or an hour. It's frustrating on 
overtime shifts in general the way some staff prioritise problems." RM01 (13) 
4.4 Overseas trained doctors 
Four informants were trained overseas and were undertaking their 12 months 
compulsory hospital training. All four said they had communication difficulties 
with some nurses, registrars and consultants. They talked about their feeling 
'not accepted'. They believed that there was a general view in the hospital 
that overseas trained doctors have inferior knowledge and skills. The following 
quote explains some of the difficulties from their perspective. 
"If the doctor explained to me properly, maybe sometime the accent may be a problem with the different 
doctors, it takes a while to understand, if they speak to us slowly and explain. They don't know about 
AMC marks or anything about us, we are like an alien. There is no support within the hospital. No one 
discusses with me as an overseas doctor how are you feeling and how are you going so far and is there 
any way we can help you or discuss with the consultant, no support." Intern (12) 
""""; I discussed this in more detail in chapter four. 
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4.5 Attitude to Adverse Events 
Attitudes of interns and residents to mistakes fall into the following 
categories:- (1) personal responsibility, ('I think that was bad', 'shouldn't have 
done that', 'more careful', 'sweep under the carpet') (2) rationalisation 
('something was going to go wrong with the patient sooner or later', 'the 
patient was going to die in any event', confounding factors', 'patient had so 
many problems') (3) inevitability ('can't expect everyone to know everything', 
'unfortunate but cannot change', 'unavoidable', 'should not blame people') 
and (4) personal responses ('irritated', 'frustrated', 'annoyed', 'upset', 
'distress', 'easy to be critical in hindsight'). A theme running through most of 
the comments about mistakes was the importance of not blaming people or 
conducting 'witch-hunts'. 
4.6 Mental preparedness 
The majority of interns and residents appreciated the role 'inexperience' 
played in their preparedness for mistakes. This was counterbalanced by the 
preparedness to ask for help when one was out of his or her depth or did not 
feel confident in managing a situation. Balancing the need to gain experience 
and accept responsibility for patients with preventing harm to patients was 
also identified. Table 6.11 summarises intern and resident preparedness for 
mistakes. Most have an understanding that mistakes will be made but their 
comments reflect poor understanding of the causes of errors and concentrate 
on their personal responsibility and immediate work place. 
Table 6.11: Summary of intern and resident statements about mental preparedness for 
mistakes 
Position Comments 
Intern (1) • Mistakes will reflect badly on assessments. 
• Need to document carefully . 
• Awareness of the impact of tiredness . 
Intern (2) • Nurses are more difficult to communicate with . 
Intern (3) • Scared that would not know things expected of me . 
• Lot of back-up . 
• Lona workinQ hours . 
Intern (4) • Does not matter how much you try you are still not experienced . 
• If ethically opposed to a treatment difficult to object. 
• If one is careful there are sufficient safeguards in the system to protect 
patients. 
• Bei"!i careful will orevent hann to patients . 
RM01(6) • You trv vour hardest. 
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RM01(7) • Tend to concentrate on one thing and forget about the possibility of other 
diagnoses. 
Intern (8) • There is an expectation that one should know what to do . 
• Avoid looking like a 'fool' or an 'idiot' . 
• Try and recognise being 'out of one's depth' . 
lntern(10) • Try and take on board all infonnation and formulate a plan . 
• Avoid working with out proper cover. 
• Avoid jumping to conclusions . 
• You not feel that it is acceptable to call for help from other departments or 
sections in the hosp~al. 
• Being older means a lot more confidence (this was said in relation to 
graduates of the Sydney medical program). 
• Maintain focus on the patient. 
• Try and prevent patient hann due to inexperience . 
RM01(11) • Need to recognise mistakes and learn from them. 
Intern (12) • Work hard . 
• Don't repeat mistakes . 
• Try and not get angry . 
• Try_ and understand the famny's a~r andJJrief after mistakes . 
Intern (14) • No one seems to care that much . 
RM01(15) • You need to experience to learn . 
Intern (16) • Cover all your bases . 
• Prepare for the difficulties in obtaining out of department consults . 
Intern (17) • Prepare to work alone in the peripheral hospitals . 
• Know when it is time to quit and ask for help . 
RM02(19) • Acce_ptthat_you cannot do evervthing ll!>rfect . 
RM01(20) • Ask for help_if unsure . 
RM01(21) • Ensure appropriate handovers . 
• Need to understand patients' problems . 
• Understand that patients react differently . 
• Read the RMO Handbook . 
• Unforeseen things can go wrong with patients . 
• Patients' conditions can change . 
RM01(22) • Unprepared -did not know what to do. 
RM02(23) • Not prepared for working while fatigued. 
RM01(24) • Not prepared because of lethargy. 
Intern 25 • Be prepared to be wrong . 
• Be prepared to accept sole responsibility . 
RM01(26) • Accept small mistakes occur and move on. 
RM01(27) • Expect complications . 
• Patients are not 'guinea pigs' . 
RM01(28) • Prevent mistakes from happening . 
• Get tougher . 
• More resilient (does not hurt as much if something goes wrong) . 
• Maintain objectivity . 
RM01(29) • Expect to work 'flat-out' . 
• Expect to miss things . 
RM02(30) • Expect to be able to do 'every1hing' the nurses' request. 
• Expect mistakes . 
• Expect things to go wrong . 
RM02(31) • Prepared to ask for help . 
• Don't work beyond your capacity . 
• Avoid being 'out of your depth' . 
• Accept responsibilitY for the patient. 
Intern (32) • Overwhelming pressure to perfonn . 
• Be personally responsible for patients . 
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5 Limitations of the study 
At the time of my study xxxvii all state medical graduates were allocated to one 
of 18 public hospitals for their internships. The Postgraduate Medical Council 
of NSW allocated interns and Australian Medical Council graduates (trained 
overseas) to positions. Local medical graduates are given priority for intern 
placement. All applicants at the time of applying for hospital placement must 
state a preference for each of the 18 hospitals. Local medical graduates were 
allocated to a hospital by a computer which matched preferences with ranking 
on the combined 'order of merit' produced jointly by the Universities of 
Newcastle, New South Wales and Sydney.38 
Since the study hospital is a large metropolitan teaching hospital the students 
selected would be higher in ranking because students to date have preferred 
allocation to these hospitals. In 2000 the study hospital was in the top six 
choices of hospitals for local students and in the top 6 hospitals for all 
students.xxxviii Interns at the study hospital may have received better grades 
which might indicate that the study group was biased toward higher 
achievement. 
Another limitation is that the mistakes described by the doctors are based on 
their personal experience and observation and might not reflect the views of 
other health professionals involved in the mistakes. In addition, the current 
litigious environment and the medical culture which values high standards, 
sometimes amounting to perfection, may have stopped some doctors from 
fully disclosing their role in some medical mistakes. They may have failed to 
mention those mistakes that have been stressful or challenging to them in the 
past or self-censored significant mistakes for which they feared repercussion. 
xxxv;; Random selection of the preferences nominated by the applicants is the only criteria now 
used for selection. This came about because the Sydney University Program does not rank 
students. 
xxxvm Postgraduate Medical Council of NSW, August 2002 p7. 
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Some interns and residents may have been influenced in their decision to be 
interviewed because of my position in a medical facultyxxxix and my work in the 
hospital. I teach in a medical program and sit on a number of safety and 
quality committees. I also conduct health law and ethics sessions in the junior 
medical officer education program for the area health service. The informants 
may have wanted to demonstrate to me their commitment to patient safety. 
""";'I am an Associate Professor of Ethical Practice and Chair of Personal & Professional 
Development Theme Committee for the Faculty of Medicine, University of Sydney. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations of this 
study 
1 Conclusions 
1.1 Conclusions about underlying factors associated with mistakes 
This study shows that interns and residents think the main causes of mistakes 
are those associated with junior medical officer factors: inadequate medical 
knowledge and skills; poor interpersonal relationships; poor team work; poor 
or inadequate communication and unequal power relationships between junior 
and senior staff. While they recognise that poor systems design and bad work 
practices play a role in mistakes, they do not think these things can be 
changed. Interns and residents recognise in general terms that multiple 
factors are associated with mistakes but they have little understanding of how 
these factors impact on adverse outcomes for patients. 
Interns and residents believe their supervisors, registrars and consultants 
expect them to make mistakes but they were not able to give any specific 
examples of mistakes which had become a positive learning experience for 
them. Instead the informants described a consistent lack of opportunity to 
learn from mistakes; there was no routine method for incorporating mistakes 
or near misses into supervision and training. This situation reflects traditional 
views held by the medical profession about mistakes as personal failures 
rather than being viewed in the context of the wider organisation or system. 
Conclusions 
While junior doctors generally accept that mistakes occur, they had limited 
understanding of the nature and causes of the mistakes and the problems of 
mistakes in the health system. Ultimately they viewed mistakes as primarily 
the responsibility of individual nurses and doctors. But this did not mean they 
blamed individuals. Interns and residents did not generally blame individuals 
for mistakes because they could see themselves making similar mistakes. 
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1.1.1 Understanding of mistakes 
While nearly all the interns and residents interviewed thought mistakes were 
common or very common they were confused about what constitutes a 
mistake. For some a mistake implied a catastrophic outcome. Others had 
difficulties distinguishing mistakes from complications of health care. Mistakes 
of omission (failure to do something) and commission (doing the wrong thing 
or the right thing at the wrong time) were not easily classified as mistakes by 
many of the JMOs. Their uncertainty about whether a mistake had occurred 
may be linked to the limited understanding of errors by clinicians and hospital 
managers and an underdeveloped 'mistake' vocabulary for discussing them. 
Conclusions 
The main method used by interns and residents to talk about mistakes 
centred on narrative; the description of the events leading to mistakes and the 
aftermath from their own perspective and those of their patients. The 
framework used by the informants for mistake analysis is predominantly 
personal rather than professional. 
The language used by the interns and residents focussed on the 
circumstances and impact of mistakes rather than any multifactorial analysis 
of mistakes. The general lack of depth in discussions about mistakes 
suggests an absence of knowledge about errors, hence an absence of any 
framework to help with such discussions. While they were willing to discuss 
their mistakes with me in a safe and confidential environment, they indicated 
their general unwillingness to discuss their mistakes with clinical supervisors 
and hospital personnel. Such personal discussions do not easily fit into 
professional discourses. 
1.1.2 Knowledge about factors underlying mistakes 
Interns and residents identified many factors underpinning mistakes with 
system factors (supervision, organisation of work, work environment, location 
and situation) selected more frequently than other categories. Sub-optimal 
supervision was a constant theme in this study; the perceived success of a 
term often depended on the quality and availability of supervision. 
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Conclusions 
Interns and residents made minimal demands on clinical supervisors and had 
relatively low expectations in relation to the quality of their supervision. Well 
organised departments and units with regular and predictable ward rounds 
were seen by interns and residents to provide better supervision and 
enhanced training opportunities. 
1.1.3 Categories of mistakes described by interns and residents 
Mistakes described by the interns and residents fell into four categories; 
treatment, patient management, medication errors and diagnoses. The 
treatment mistakes (delayed treatment and incorrect treatment) category 
accounted for most of the mistakes described by the junior doctors. This 
category of mistakes raised issues of timeliness of attendance by registrars 
and consultants, quality and availability of supervision and personal factors. 
Conclusions 
The informants identified a range of antecedents to mistakes. The list below 
highlights the role of the system and organisation in mistakes. The uncertainty 
surrounding checking instructions from seniors, the lack of time, multiple 
tasks, and inadequate supervision cannot be remedied by the junior doctors 
alone. Organisational leadership is required to minimise these situations from 
occurring. 
The following list is a summary of the most commonly expressed antecedents 
of mistakes reported by those interviewed:-
• a misunderstanding of orders/instructions 
• a lack of specificity of instructions 
• a lack of opportunity to clarify instructions 
• competing demands 
• quick assessments 
• a lack of assertiveness on the part of junior doctors 
• fear and Intimidation (failing to call or question instructions) 
• a lack of preparedness 
• unavailability of senior staff. 
In addition to the above factors the informants identified the following pre-
existing conditions that indicated increased opportunities for mistakes; 
• requesting and obtaining out-of-department consultations 
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• treating patients who are allocated to wards not orientated towards the 
patient's particular condition 
• change-overs 
• treating patients with multiple problems 
• patients admitted to hospital with more than one clinician responsible 
for their care Ooint admissions). 
• week-end work, nights, overtime and relief 
• Unfamiliar patients, role confusion, delayed tests, inadequate staff, 
unfamiliar environment, inadequate back-up, and 
• high workloads. 
More research is needed on these conditions to ascertain how they impact on 
patient care and alternative methods to avoid adverse events. 
1.1.4 Main mistake places 
Interns and residents identified three specific places they associated with 
mistakes; the Emergency Department, the surgical wards and the peripheral 
hospitals. The Emergency Department (ED) has long been identified as a 
place where inexperienced staff are vulnerable to errors. Nevertheless interns 
and residents value the hands-on experience. Supervision in the Emergency 
Department therefore is crucial both for protecting patients (from incorrect 
diagnoses) and also to enable junior medical officers to practise diagnostic 
skills and exercise clinical judgement. The Emergency Department was 
described by many as chaotic, with a high workload and having multiple 
demands made on it. There was general acceptance that the elements 
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described above were inevitable and natural to all emergency departments. 
The surgical ward was also seen as problematic due to the unavailability of 
senior staff who were operating. While the informants recognised the high 
potential for mistakes in these locations the interns and residents did not think 
that anything could be changed. 
Supervision requires a pre-arranged relationship between the trainee (intern 
or resident) with a senior colleague. Availability and easy access are 
essential. It includes monitoring the decisions and treatments provided by 
interns and residents. Most junior doctors had minimal expectations of 
supervision and interpreted it as the availability of a senior clinician on the 
ward on a 'needs' basis. They appear to be satisfied with supervision as long 
as they are able to consult a more senior clinician when they need to confirm 
an intention or to seek advice. Registrars who regularly checked work were 
seen as diligent and most helpful but were considered rare. 
Conclusions 
Even though interns and residents recognise the presence of many system 
flaws in the peripheral hospitals, emergency and surgical areas, they do not 
think their susceptibility for mistakes can be lessened. Many times they were 
able to identify problems such as the absence of senior clinicians, inadequate 
supervision in peripheral hospitals, insufficient back-up and inadequate on-call 
arrangements but none saw any hope of change and accepted the current 
system for all its faults. This was the case even though the junior doctors all 
described the angst and stress they encountered when poorly supervised or 
with in sufficient backup. 
1.2 Conclusions about the medical structure 
The overall uniformity of descriptions by interns and residents of their 
experiences of clinical medicine and the hospital environment permit general 
conclusions to be made about the medical structure in the study hospital from 
their perspective. Most interns and residents discussed the medical hierarchy 
in terms of their low status and position where junior doctors quickly learn not 
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to talk to consultants. The quality of the teacher-learner relationship between 
junior medical staff and consultants was often judged by how approachable 
and available they were to the JMOs rather than the quality of the teaching. 
The impact of the prevailing medical structure on the position and role of 
junior doctors in the medical hierarchy is not confined to relationships with 
senior clinicians. It affects work practices as well. Nearly all the interns and 
residents said they would not record communication problems (about 
patients) between themselves and senior staff in the medical records. Fear of 
intimidation from some senior clinicians was frequently mentioned. 
Morning ward rounds were identified by all informants as key markers for their 
daily activities. Interns and residents said consultants did not usually attend 
daily ward rounds, rather they came at unpredictable hours and days. The 
interns and residents in my study appeared to mistrust taking instructions from 
a written order; they preferred face-to-face communications with medical 
clinicians. But when it came to communicating with nurses they preferred 
written communication. 
Conclusions 
The most important relationship for an intern and resident is the one with their 
registrar because most of their learning and problem-solving involves him or 
her. But when it came to patient care the informants mentioned their 
relationships with the nurses as central, particular in relation to avoiding 
mistakes. The relationship with consultants was not identified as important for 
learning and was also associated with negative experiences or being 'fobbed 
off'. Many said they learned early not to disagree or challenge decisions by 
consultants and registrars. 
Even though it was generally recognised that mistakes occur, the interns and 
residents believed the prevailing medical organisation (culture) did not require 
them to report mistakes. Instead they used a variety of techniques to manage 
mistakes. The main method used to explain mistakes, particularly those 
resulting in bad outcomes for patients, was rationalisation. (The patient was 
very sick and would have had a similar outcome even if there was no 
mistake.) 
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1.3 Conclusions about acknowledging mistakes to patients and their 
families 
The failure to acknowledge mistakes on the part of JMOs extends not only to 
their reluctance to complete incident reports but also to report or discuss 
mistakes with the patients themselves. The failure to make incident reports 
was partly caused by the general lack of confidence interns and residents had 
in existing reporting mechanisms. While many expressed general concern 
about the medico - legal environment, it was not mentioned as a factor for not 
telling patients or their families about mistakes. There was surprisingly little 
comment from the informants about failure to inform patients. This could have 
been associated with their lack of exposure to, or participation in, such 
discussions with patients or their families or to the relative lack of information 
provided to patients generally. The failure to provide information about 
mistakes to patients was therefore not seen as unusual. 
Conclusions 
The results show that interns and residents do not routinely report mistakes to 
patients their families, other clinicians or members of the health care team. 
Most of the patients in this study who suffered an adverse event caused by a 
mistake were not told about the mistake even when there was a catastrophic 
outcome. 
In addition to interns' and residents' general lack of trust in reporting 
mechanisms, they generally held the impression that they would be blamed 
and suffer punitive repercussions if they disclosed their mistakes to the 
hospital managers, clinical supervisors or patients and families. The preferred 
method used by most interns and residents for documenting mistakes is the 
medical record. 
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1.4 Conclusions about understanding and learning from mistakes 
The interns and residents interviewed did not routinely see senior clinicians 
disclosing their mistakes thus reducing one of the main ways for learning from 
the mistakes of others. Discussion of mistakes often used blame language, 
which did not encourage the informants to be open about their mistakes. Most 
interns and residents limited their discussions about mistakes to their own 
families and friends because they did not believe the hospital would support 
them even though the study hospital was a large teaching hospital with 
established mechanisms for reporting and managing adverse events. Nor was 
the Director of Clinical Training recognised as a person from whom they could 
seek assistance. 
Conclusions 
The study shows that interns and residents tend to worry about their mistakes 
and their impact on patients. They also worry that mistakes will damage their 
reputations and future career choices. In addition to a fear of being 'blamed', 
they also believe that mistakes can be avoided by individual effort; that people 
who make the effort and have the right experience will be able to avoid future 
mistakes. The mistakes reported by the informants obviously caused the 
junior doctors stress and actual harm to patients. Junior doctors were unable 
to identify any hospital system to help them manage mistakes but stressed 
they would not generally talk to senior clinicians about their mistakes. 
These findings relate specifically to the interns and residents working in a 
particular metropolitan teaching hospital. Therefore the findings may not apply 
to the experience of other interns and residents in Australian hospitals. 
However, because many of the contextual features are similar to all hospitals 
it may be appropriate to rely on these findings for further research. Research 
on hand-overs and out-of-department consultations may also be appropriate 
for research in other hospitals. Other features that hospitals share include the 
organisation into multiple departments, lack of standarised systems across all 
departments, the level of complexity in the care of patients and the medical 
hierarchy. 
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2 Implications of the study results 
The results of this study have implications for medical education, training of 
interns and residents in New South Wales, hospital organisation in New South 
Wales and within the medical culture generally. 
2.1 Medical education 
The results show that junior doctors in my study do not have the background 
knowledge about the extent of adverse events suffered by patients or an 
understanding of the broader system challenges facing health care. They 
report no training either at their undergraduate level or as part of hospital 
education programs. Recent initiatives of the Australian Council on Quality 
and Safety in Health Care in association with the Committee of the Deans of 
Australian Medical Schools; (CDAMS) have identified significant gaps in the 
medical curricula about safety. The Council in collaboration with CDAMS have 
funded the development of a Patient Safety Education Framework;; to identify 
patient safety competencies for all health workers, not just doctors. This 
framework will assist medical faculties to develop curricula. Managing and 
preventing medical mistakes is an important aspect of quality and safety. The 
skills and knowledge required by junior doctors to avoid and minimise 
mistakes cannot be divorced from learning their skills and knowledge about 
clinical medicine. 
Learning objectives in quality and safety need to be designed around basic 
skills acquisition and interdisciplinary learning in areas such as practising 
patient-centred medicine, practising evidence-based medicine and systems 
thinking. Learning objectives include the requirement to understand variation, 
knowledge of prevention strategies and clinical practice improvement tools. 
; Committee of Deans of Australian Medical Schools (CDAMS) is the peak representative 
body for the Deans of Australia's twelve existing and three prospective medical schools and 
faculties. CDAMS also works closely with the Deans of medical schools in New Zealand, Fiji 
and Papua New Guinea, providing a broad focus to the development of undergraduate 
medical education in the Australasian region. ( CDAMS website) 
;; I am the Director of the project and have developed the Framework that is the basis for 
curricula and training programs. See http://www.patientsafety.org.au 
Medical schools in Australia are only now examining topics about patient 
safety and interdisciplinary teaching and learning is still novel. 
Clinical and faculty staff have little experience of teaching about safety and 
their knowledge of quality and safety including medical mistakes is limited. 
This is not surprising since there is also very little research on the topic. 
2.2 Training of interns and residents 
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Interns and residents are employed in hospitals to provide clinical services to 
patients. At the same time the NSW Medical Board and the NSW 
Postgraduate Medical Council recognise they are still in training; interns are 
only conditionally registered. The gap between service delivery requirements 
by the employing hospitals and the training needs of the junior doctors has 
created a situation in which patients receive inadequate care by unsupervised 
junior doctors and junior doctors are not receiving the structured training they 
require. My results show that the current system which relies upon junior 
doctors to meet workforce needs but provides inadequate and unstructured 
training is likely to be associated with on-going problems of medical error in 
hospitals. The high number of mistakes made and the problems identified by 
the informants in relation to supervision and the role of consultants shows that 
the current system is not satisfactory as a training model. 
Encouraging interns and residents to be open about their mistakes and to use 
them for learning will not happen unless there are changes in hospitals and in 
the medical culture. This will include new standards for supervision and 
support for junior doctors. A change in attitude and approach to supervision, 
training and mistakes is required by senior clinicians. 
The results of this study have implications for the NSW Postgraduate Medical 
Council and other state Councils. The Councils accredit hospitals for training 
interns and first year resident medical officers. While standards have been 
developed to ensure that junior medical officers receive appropriate 
supervision and training during these crucial first two years, my results show 
that the standards are not always being applied. First, The Council needs to 
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recognise and acknowledge that junior medical officers are involved in 
mistakes on a regular basis. Making explicit statements about the potential for 
mistakes will help open up the discussion about them. Acknowledgement that 
mistakes occur and that steps must be taken to prevent them may also lead to 
better supervision, or at least discussions about what constitutes 'good 
supervision'. Other competencies required by junior doctors include 
management and prevention of medical mistakes and how to disclose 
adverse events to patients or their families. 
In New South Wales, Directors of Clinical Training (OCT) are appointed by the 
NSW Postgraduate Medical Council. They are responsible for training junior 
doctors in the hospitals. A potential conflict exists in that the OCT is required 
to both advocate for junior doctors as well as assess their performance. The 
consequence of this is that interns and residents are reluctant to disclose 
mistakes or problems. 
2.3 Hospital organisation 
Hospitals in New South Wales are making greater efforts to ensure that 
mistakes are reported, analysed and understood. But most hospitals have 
been collecting data about incidents for years with little evidence that any 
improvements in health care have been achieved. Mistakes involving medical 
clinicians have traditionally been excluded from such collections. For 
clinicians to be convinced that disclosing mistakes will lead to less adverse 
events, hospitals will need to establish a systematic approach to mistake 
management. They will need to demonstrate that openness about mistakes 
will result in better patient care and system wide improvements rather than 
'shame' and 'blame' the individuals involved. A trustworthy system of 
consistent and regular reporting, evidence of improved health outcomes and 
effective staff training will need to replace the political, legal and economic 
drivers that currently appear to determine how mistakes are managed. 
Hospitals need to resolve the above mentioned tension between service 
delivery and training requirements of junior doctors. More research on models 
for educating junior doctors is required. But in the mean time hospitals need to 
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explicitly acknowledge the particular vulnerability of junior doctors to mistakes. 
Hospitals need to seriously examine whether consultants have the time or 
commitment necessary to be supervisors. The role of registrar as the hospital 
lynch pin for medical supervision of junior staff and ensuring service delivery 
requires urgent examination. Whether a consultant led service is appropriate 
for Australia, as is proposed in the UK or whether dedicated clinical teachers 
and quarantined learning will reduce the tensions between the learning needs 
of junior doctors and the service requirements of hospitals are yet to be 
tested. 
Health administrators have largely left the medical profession alone to 
determine its own work practices and routines within hospitals. The study 
results suggest that certain hospital conditions, including change-overs and 
out-of-department consultations, play significant roles in mistakes involving 
interns and residents. The mistakes associated with these conditions are 
system wide problems and cannot be fixed by doctors alone. The willingness 
of medical clinicians to work with medical directors and health administrators 
is crucial for improving and standardising these activities. 
The results show a disturbing lack of information being given to patients and 
their families when mistakes have been made or after adverse events. 
Doctors have alone determined whether patients or families are fully informed 
about the circumstances of their care and treatment. The burden of disclosure 
of mistakes, bearing in mind the possible medico-legal implications, should be 
a shared responsibility with the hospital organisation. Doctors require 
organisational support for full disclosure after mistakes. The Australian 
Council for Safety and Quality in Health Care (2003) new guidelines on how to 
disclose mistakes to patients and families after an adverse event will assist 
doctors to better manage this process. 
2.4 Medical organisation 
The organisation of health care has changed with greater complexity and 
increasing technology. The hospital patient population has changed with 
shorter stays, sicker patients, and more dependency on technology (including 
234 
drugs). But the way doctors are trained in hospitals has changed little. The 
dependence on supervision and bedside experience with patients still 
underpins junior doctor training, but the role played by consultants in that 
training has changed. The demands on consultants in terms of their private 
practices have meant that less time is available for consultants to teach junior 
doctors. This forces the interns and residents to heavily rely on the registrars 
for their tuition. 
Today not all consultants routinely do daily rounds with junior staff, once a 
critical factor in training and education. Infrequent attendance on public 
patients also creates uncertainty in terms of patient instructions and indirectly 
places more responsibility onto junior medical officers in the first instance. 
Supervision in these circumstances becomes more important, not less. These 
arrangements also add pressure on registrars who have become the primary 
teachers of junior doctors. Registrars;;; are not trained to teach junior medical 
staff. Because consultants spend less time on the wards registrars take 
responsibility for patients and for communicating with consultants about those 
patients. At the same time they have their own very demanding training and 
study to undertake. 
The informants consistently identified the importance of good communication 
and relationships with nursing staff as one way to minimise mistakes. Good 
relationships were seen as 'lucky' if they happened. While most informants 
identified the registrar as the person they had most contact with, it was the 
nurses who gave them most help in relation to avoiding mistakes. 
3 Recommendations 
The following recommendations specifically apply for New South Wales but 
may also apply to other Australian States and Territories. 
3.1 Training and education 
Medical schools 
;;; There is no mandatory training for medical clinicians (of any rank) in medical education. 
• Medical schools should ensure the medical curriculum 
incorporates appropriate patient safety competencies. 
• Medical schools should explore the role of interdisciplinary 
educational opportunities for medical and nursing students 
Postgraduate medical councils 
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• Postgraduate medical councils should identify the key safety 
domains and associated core competencies required for interns 
and residents. 
• Postgraduate medical councils should require hospitals that 
accept interns and residents to meet standards around quality 
and safety. These standards should include the following 
components:-
( a) require interns and residents to be included in quality 
improvement activities 
(b) train and expose interns and residents in 'open 
disclosure' to patients and their families 
(c) teach interns and residents the importance of mistake 
reporting and incident management 
(d) introduce support mechanisms for interns and residents 
who are involved in mistakes causing significant adverse 
outcomes for patients and their families 
(e) identify the skills and qualities of an effective supervisor 
(f) identify the training needs of supervisors. 
• Define and describe supervision and the criteria for effective 
supervision. 
• Postgraduate medical councils should design a self-assessment 
instrument for interns and residents to evaluate their 
supervision. 
• The NSW Postgraduate Medical Council should introduce the 
role of Clinical Mentor in addition to the role of the Director of 
Clinical Training (OCT). This will resolve the possible conflict for 
Hospitals 
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the DCT in relation to being both a clinical supervisor (assessor) 
and support person after mistakes. 
• Until new models are developed to manage the tension between 
service delivery and learning, NSW hospitals should be required 
to provide protected time for interns and residents to engage in 
training and education distinct from their service requirements. 
• NSW hospitals should review the role and functions of 
registrars. This activity should include an examination of the 
teaching and service provision components. 
• The NSW Department of Health should review Visiting Medical 
Officer contracts in teaching hospitals to establish their role and 
responsibilities in teaching. 
3.2 Improving the work place 
• Provide an induction program for all interns and residents about 
'on call' and the names and numbers and roles of the 'on call' 
clinicians. Instructions should also include information about 
what to do if a clinician on call does not respond appropriately. 
• All teaching and peripheral hospitals should review the rostering 
of staff in surgical wards with a view to ensuring one senior 
clinician is rostered on the surgical wards (non-theatre duty). 
This will also facilitate timely out-of-department consultations 
involving pre and post surgical patients. 
• All hospitals should educate interns and residents on the 
mechanisms for reporting, analysing mistakes and how to make 
improvements. 
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• All hospitals should create an open culture for the reporting of 
mistakes by ensuring that all junior doctors know how and when 
to report adverse events and near misses, and that they can do 
so without 'shame'. 
• All hospitals should ensure all interns and residents are 
educated about the principles and practice of 'full disclosure' to 
patients or families of an adverse event. 
• All hospitals should establish a mentor program or 
network/panel of senior clinicians willing to provide guidance 
and advice to interns and residents (careers, educational 
matters, clinical problems, interpersonal problems, 
organisational difficulties) 
• All hospitals should establish a regular closed forum for interns 
and residents to talk about mistakes facilitated by someone 
trusted and respected by the junior doctors. 
3.3 Changing the medical culture 
• Colleges should educate trainees and fellows about medical 
mistakes and encourage senior clinicians to acknowledge and 
talk about mistakes (their own as well as others) in a safe 
learning environment. 
• Medical schools and colleges should address the role of 
uncertainty in medicine particularly in the context of the notion 
that good doctors do not make mistakes. 
3.4 Further Research 
• More research is required to ascertain if standardising the 
organisation of wards, the location of medical records, charts, 
technology and equipment, meetings, ward rounds and 
communications between team members will reduce adverse 
events. All interviewees described the problems caused by 
unfamiliar protocols, ward routines and environments. 
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• Research is also required in the areas of hand-overs, out-of-
department consultations, joint admissions, patient bed allocation 
during 'exit block' and paging. 
• The nature and quality of supervision as a teaching and learning 
instrument for supervisors and junior doctors 
• Research of the role and functions of registrars in the education and 
training of junior doctors. 
• Research and compare different methods for teaching interns and 
residents. 
• Investigate the different models including new ones for managing 
service delivery requirements and training and education needs of 
interns and residents. 
• Investigate the effectiveness of mentoring and role modelling as 
educational methods for interns and residents. 
• The place of interdisciplinary learning in health professions 
• The role of nurses and their interactions with junior doctors. 
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mishaps. My hypothesis is that there are multiple factors contributing to medical errors, not just the 
individual. The research will help us to understand the extent to which errors are the result of individual 
factors versus contextual, organisational, and system factors and their inter relationship. It is hoped that the 
research will help identify system improvements and improved medical curricula. 
This research involves interviewing interns and residents about their perceptions of medical mishaps. It is 
qualitative and is dependent on receiving as many representations of mishaps as possible. Your involvement 
is voluntary. This research will not identify any person and names will be destroyed once the interviews 
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research project and the confidentiality requirements. 
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(Monday-Tuesday) or at the University of Sydney Medical Faculty on 93513678 (Wednesday-Friday). My 
email address is mwalton@gmp.usyd.edu.au The interviews will be scheduled at the end of the day. Each 
interview will take about one to one and half-hours. A meal will be provided. The interviews will be in the 
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A/Professor of Ethical Practice 
Faculty ofMedicine 
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COVER SHEET 
Residents and Mishaps Study 
Filing and coding information 
Date: ______ _ Id Number: _____ _ 
Time: / Interviewer 
-------
Place, ______ _ No.of audio tape. ____ _ 
Date Transcription completed. __ _ 
Transcriber 
--------
Other data 
To be coded: ____ _ 
Coding completed ___ _ Attend Educational Session 
·---
Confidentiality statements attached: 
Interviewee; _________ _ 
Interviewer: 
------------

Background Information on the interviewee 
A. Year in residency 
B. Speciality 
C. Age 
D. Gender 
E. Other degrees 
F. Other work experience 
G. What rotation are you currently doing? 
Previously? 
H. Period in current rotation? 
I. Cases 
#! ______________________________________ _ 
#2 ____________________________________ __ 
#3 ____________________________________ __ 
3 
v# 
Introduction 
"I would like to tell you about this study and how we guarantee 
anonymity. Let us read and sign a confidentiality statement together. 
(Read statement together and include information about how interview 
data will be analysed and protected) 
"We also want to get your permission to audio tape this session. Is that 
okay with you? Yes NO ____ _ 
I. First question 
What do the words "medical mishap" suggests to you? 
II. Describe your typical work day 
A. What is it like working in your unit? 
B. Patterns of communication in your unit. How do you 
communicate with others during the day? 
C. With whom do you most often have contact? 
If "attending" is not mentioned, ask.) 
D. Who would you talk to first if you thought something was 
wrong? 
E What else do you want to add about your work environment? 
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III Mishaps Observed 
A Think about 2 or 3 mishaps you were involved with in the last 2 
months (no longer than 6 months ago). 
Let us talk about them one by one. 
(Note Cases) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
(Make sure the following topics are covered in the cases. 
Ask questions if they are not). 
B. Provide more detail on: Where it took place 
C. What was the general situation like? 
D. What was the condition of the patient? 
E. What kind of practitioners were involved 
F. How would you describe the outcome? 
G. How did you communicate with the patient? 
H. How would you categorise this mishap? (All that apply) 
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(Show the separate list) 
Omission 
Commission 
Diagnosis 
Treatment 
Rx 
Patient management 
J was the mishap acknowledged? If yes, in what form? If no, was 
anything said? Did it get reported? Was the patient told? 
Was the mishap acknowledged to the patient? 
K. What steps were taken to rectify the mishap? 
L. What do you think could have been done to prevent this mishap? 
IV Factors associated with this mishap (choose as many as fit) 
(Show the list) 
A. Factors: "which are the most important?" 
Practitioners' 
Knowledge 
Skill 
Supervision 
Interpersonal 
Communication 
Patient (eg. Demographics, condition) 
Situation in location (eg. Busy ED middle of the night) 
Equipment/Technology 
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Work Environment (eg. Sub-unit/speciality routines) 
Organisation of Work (eg. Structure/schedule of work) 
Hospital 
Outside the hospital (state regulation, etc.) 
Other 
B. Do you want to provide any more detail on the factors you're 
chosen? 
C. If you had to choose a single factor as most important, which would 
you choose? 
D. If one wanted to have a deeper understanding of this situation, 
whom would you talk to? What would you want to look at? 
Now let us go back and talk about another of your cases in the same way. 
C. 1 of all the cases you have described, which concerns you the 
most? Why? 
2. How common do you feel mishaps like these are? 
V. Let's talk about a "near miss" 
A. Can you describe your experience with or observation of a "near 
miss"? 
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B. What in your view specifically prevented this from turning into a 
mishap? 
VI A voiding Mishaps 
A. What do you think are the major ways to avoid mishaps in general? 
B. What methods do you think are in place in your unit? In the 
hospital? 
C. Do you have any additional ideas for avoiding mishaps? 
D. Sometimes residents "go that extra mile" and still something goes 
wrong. What do you think about that? 
VII Reporting Mishaps 
A. Are all your cases reported? 
B. In what form? 
C. If not. Why (If appropriate) 
D. What would be better ways to report? 
E. Are you aware of any efforts to follow up on mishap reports, make 
changes? Are the changes evaluated? 
VIII Discussing the mishap with others 
A. How did you feel about the mishaps you described? 
B. How did you handle those feelings? 
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C. Is there anyone you talked to about the mishap? 
D. What do fou think are the most common ways residents have for 
dealing with these mishaps? 
E. What could have helped you deal better with these mishaps? 
F. Is there anything in your training that helps you think about 
mishaps? 
G. Do you have the sense that someone else is there to take care of 
mishaps? 
IX what else would you like to add concerning any of the subjects 
we've talked about? 
X Closing Comments 
1 Reaffirm confidentiality 
2. What I will do with the interviews 
3. Possibility of inclusion in a second interview 
4. Thank you. 
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have been invited to pat1icipate in a research entitled: 
Supporting Interns and Residents: A Multi-Factorial Study of Medical Mishaps. 
In relation to this project I have read the Statement of Confidentiality and the Study 
Information Sheet and have been informed ofthe following points; 
Approval has been given by the Human research Ethics Comm1tlee (HREC) 
ofthei.- · -::.__ __ ; Jspital. 
2 The aim of the project is to: 
• Further understanding of the individual Intern's and Resident's 
experience and perception of the causes of medical mishaps. 
• To identify and categorise multiple factors correlated with medical 
errors 
• To understand the extent to which errors are the resul t of individual 
factors versus contextual, organisatiOnal, and system factors and their 
interrelationship. 
• To make recommendations fore the design of interventions to reduce 
medical mishaps. 
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01, • 
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involvement in this project, I am aware that I may contact-
Dr on ________ _ 
(phone and page nos.) 
Date: 
--------------------
Witness: _______ _ 
(please print name) 
Signature: ______________ _ Signature: ______ _ 
(of participant/volunteer) (of witness) 
Investigator's signature: 
4 Should I have any problems or queries about the way in which the study was 
conducted, and I do not feel comfortable contacting the researcher, I am aware 
I may contact the Coordinator of research Administration, on 992681 06. 
5 I can refuse to take part in this project or withdraw !Tom it at any time. 
6 After considering all these points, I accept the invitation to participate in this 
project. 
Signature of volunteer ____________ _ 
Signature oflnvestigator 
-----------------
Signature of Witness ___________ __ 
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Facsimile: 
Supporting Interns and Residents: A Multi-Factorial Study on 
Medical Mishaps 
Statement of Confidentiality 
Associate Professor Walton from the University of Sydney and member of 
the NSW Ministerial Advisory Committee on Quality is conducting a study 
to better understand and reduce medical mishaps among Interns ;md 
Resident Medical Officers. A goal shared by alL This study will result in 
peer-reviewed articles in professional journals aimed at raising awareness of 
the dimensions of medical practice and hospital organization that place 
residents at greater risk of having mishaps. 
Information about medical mishaps in medical practice is being gathered by 
interviewing a random sample oflnterns and Resident Medical Officers at 
this hospitaL The interviews will be approximately one and one half hours in 
length and is led by the principal investigator Merrilyn Walton. Notes will 
be taken and if the medical officer agrees, the discussion will be audio-
taped. You will be given a number for purposes of identification on the 
audio- tape and your name will not be recorded. 
Your participation is completely voluntary. If we come to a question that 
you do not want to answer, please skip the question and go onto the next 
Your responses will be kept strictly confidential and no personal 
identification of you will appear on the tapes or the notes. Your name will 
not be connected with reported findings in any way. Results will remain 
completely anonymous. No information based on individual interviews will 
be given to anyone on the staff of this hospitaL Information will only be 
provided in aggregate. The research protocols comply with all the 
institution's confidentiality requirements. 
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Mishaps 
During the study all notes, interview tapes and observation records will be 
kept in a locked cabinet in the Principal investigators office. The second part 
of the research requires a clinician and an expert in organisational 
management to examine medical records. They will be required to sign a 
statement obliging them to maintain confidentiality. Any lists used for 
recruitment purposes will be destroyed after the interviews are completed. 
The audiotapes will be immediately destroyed once the research is 
completed. 
Please note that medical records accessed for the second stage of the study 
will be accessed under the protection o~ and will have privilege 
attached to that process. 
This study has the approval ofth~Human Research Ethics Committee 
(HREC). 
STATEMENT OF NON-DISCLOSURE BY INTERVIEWEE, 
INTERVIEWER, AND CLINICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL EXPERTS. 
In order to encourage open and honest interviews and at the same time 
protect the anonymity of the interviewee we ask you that: 
I Report all events using the third person. Report on your personal 
experiences as if they happened to another person. Do not identify 
others by name if incidents involving them are described. 
2 We both pledge our commitment to not discuss any part of the 
interviews or case study material to anyone not connected with the 
research. Any information divulged or uncovered in the case 
studies must remain confidential. 
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Mishaps 
Please sigh below that you will not repeat any information reported in this 
interview to anyone outside this room. 
Interviewee's name (print) __________________ _ 
Interviewee's signature. ________________________________________ __ 
Interviewer's name 
-------------------------------------
Interviewer's signature. _________________________________________ __ 
VVimess __________________ ___ 
Date ________ __ 
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(F) Free Nodes 
(F 1) themes 
(F 1 1) attitude to AE 
(F 2) awareness of mistakes 
(F 3) overseas trained cultural aspects 
(F 51 business 
(F 6) mental preparation 
Index Tree 
I 1 l 
(2) 
Base data 
Adverse events 
I 2 1 I attributions 
(2 1 2) tasks 
(2 1 3 I response to mistake 
(2 1 3 1) patient told 
(2 1 3 2) patient not told 
(2 1 3 3) unknown 
12 1 3 4) family told 
(2 1 3 5) no one to tell patient died 
(2 1 3 6) family not told 
(2 1 4) possible alternatives 
(2 1 5) deeper understanding 
(2 1 5 1) failure to monitor 
(2 1 5 2) talk to admin 
(2 1 5 3) talk to DCT or RMO 
(2 1 6) emotional response 
(2 1 15) cause of mistake 
(2 1 15 1) infiltrated lung disease 
(2 1 15 2) failure to give medication 
(2 1 15 3) delayed diagnosis 
(2 1 15 4) mistaken identity 
(2 1 15 5) poor communication 
(2 1 15 6) overflow from ward 
(2 1 15 7) wrong dose of medication 
(2 1 15 8 information 
(2 1 15 9) delay in response to emergency 
(2 1 15 10) failure to do tests 
(2 1 15 11) incorrect dosage medication 
{2 1 15 12) delay in admission to ward 
(2 1 15 13) wrong medication 
(2 1 15 14) failure to diagnose fracture 
(2 1 15 15) failure to diagnose tension pneumothorax 
(2 1 15 16) misdiagnosis of infarct 
(2 1 15 17) failure to wake to page 
(2 1 15 18) failure to monitor and delay in admission 
(2 1 15 19) failure to give CPR 
(2 1 15 20) incorrect administration of heparin 
(2 1 15 21) failure to monitor BP and pulse over night 
(2 1 15 22) failure to monitor in reo 
(2 1 15 23) delay in tests for haematological problem 
(2 1 15 24) no indication of date for surgery 
(2 1 15 25 I delay in surgery 
(2 2) what could have been done 
(2 2 1) something 
(2 2 2) nothing 
(2 2 3) don't know 
I 2 3 I factors 
(2 3 1) knowledge 
a 
12 4 I 
12 5 I 
I 2 6 I 
12 3 2 I 
12 3 3 I 
12 3 4 I 
12 3 51 
12 3 61 
12 3 7 I 
skill 
supervision 
interpersonal 
communication 
patient condition 
external factors 
near miss 
system fault 
outcome of adverse events 
12 6 ll patient died 
{2 6 2) unknown outcome 
12 6 31 extended length of stay 
(2 6 4) no harm to patient 
12 6 51 good outcome 
12 6 61 poor outcome 
12 6 71 survived 
{2 7) organisation response 
12 131 type of mistake 
131 Places 
I 3 1 I 
13 2 I 
13 3 I 
I 3 4 I 
13 51 
I 3 6 I 
I 3 7 I 
{2 13 1) medication error 
12 13 21 
12 13 31 
12 13 41 
I 2 13 5 I 
I 2 13 6 I 
I 2 13 7 I 
I 2 13 8 I 
I 2 13 9 I 
12 13 101 
12 13 111 
12 13 121 
12 13 131 
12 13 141 
12 13 151 
12 13 171 
12 l3 181 
incorrect information on chart 
clinical error 
incorrect diagnosis 
delay in treatment 
treatment against wishes 
incorrect fluids 
surgical mishap 
incorrect treatment post surgery 
failure to monitor fluids oxygen pre surgery 
no information 
failure to monitor hydration 
failure to provide x rays on discharge 
central tension pneumothorax 
misdiagnosis infarct 
wrong patient 
delay in removing infected central line 
district hospital 
teaching hospital 
ward 
I 3 3 1 I aged care 
13 3 21 opthopaedics 
13 3 31 different wards 
I 3 3 4 I renal medicine 
13 3 51 spinal 
13 3 61 upper GI 
13 3 7 I medical ward 
I 3 3 8 I cardiology 
13 3 9 I urology 
13 3 101 gastro 
13 3 11 I head and neck 
clinic 
hospital 
ICU 
emergency ward 
141 Activities 
b 
I 4 1 I 
I 4 2 I 
I 4 3 I 
I 4 4 I 
I 4 5 I 
I 4 6 I 
I 4 7 I 
I 4 8 I 
I 4 9 I 
I 4 1 o I 
ward round 
hand overs 
follow up 
14 3 11 failure to follow up 
shift work 
supervision 
communication 
14 6 1 I face to face 
14 6 21 telephone 
(4 6 3) via medical records 
14 6 41 written on board 
14 6 51 ease of 
14 6 6 I difficult 
14 6 71 pager 
{4 6 8) failure to communicate 
(4 6 9) no one to communicate with 
{4 6 10) good communicators 
14 6 111 importance of 
14 6 121 common language 
(4 6 13) misinformation 
14 6 141 with the right person 
14 6 151 nurse reports 
14 6 161 written down 
14 6 171 discouraged 
14 6 181 failed to read notes 
14 6 191 not written clearly 
(4 6 20) miscommunication 
work routine 
14 7 11 week end 
14 7 21 nights 
14 7 31 different wards 
(4 7 4) overtime 
14 7 51 work independently 
(4 7 6) department meetings 
14 7 71 busy times 
(4 7 8) preparing for surgery 
14 7 91 public holiday 
14 7 101 end of day 
14 7 111 relief 
discharge 
documentation 
(4 9 1) failure to document 
14 9 21 handwriting 
14 9 31 inadequate 
I 4 9 4 I failure to follow 
I 4 9 5 I legal safeguard 
(4 9 6} insufficient time 
( 4 9 7) accurate 
reporting mistakes 
14 10 11 no reporting 
(4 10 2) outcome of reporting 
(4 10 3) report written 
(4 10 4) professional responsibility 
14 10 51 independent person 
14 10 61 uncertainty of 
(4 10 7) discussed with team 
14 10 81 QaRNS 
c 
14 111 
I 4 12 I 
I 4 13 I 
14 141 
I 4 15 I 
I 4 161 
14 171 
I 4 18 I 
I 4 19 I 
I 4 201 
14 211 
14 22 I 
I 4 23 I 
I 4 24 I 
14 251 
I 4 26 I 
I 4 27 I 
14 28 I 
I 4 29 I 
14 301 
I 4 31 I 
14 321 
I 4 33 I 
I 4 34 I 
I 4 35 I 
I 4 36 I 
I 5 I People 
14 10 91 recorded in medical notes 
(4 10 10) incident report completed 
14 10 111 role of registrar 
steps to fix mistake 
out of dept consultation 
meetings 
14 13 11 multidisciplinary 
(4 13 2) interns and residents 
14 13 31 department meeting 
14 13 41 M and M meetings 
14 13 51 grand rounds 
questioning 
debriefing 
back up 
referrals 
medical record review 
education of staff 
ordering tests 
fluids 
writing medications up 
pharmacy review 
checking identity 
clerical work 
taking bloods 
incidence reports 
checking medical records 
checking test results 
write in weekend book 
following protocols 
clinic work 
following orders 
CPR 
checking medications 
joint admissions 
15 11 registrar 
15 21 consultants 
15 31 rmo 1 
15 4 I rmo 2 
15 51 intern 
15 5 11role description 
(5 6) hospital administrator 
15 71 nurses 
(5 8) director of nursing· 
15 91 allied health 
15 101 patients 
15 111 family members 
(5 12) general practitioner 
15 131 lab staff 
15 14 I technicians 
15 151 pharmacist 
15 161 resident 
I 5 17 I Ml 
(5 18) patient representative 
15 191 friends family of doctor 
15 201 multi disciplinary 
15 211 anaesthetist 
d 
15 221 
I 5 231 
15 241 
15 251 
I 5 261 
15 271 
15 281 
I 5 291 
15 301 
ambulance officer 
director of clinical training 
medical defense advisers 
cardiology 
pre intern 
coroner 
clinical nurse specialist 
ward clerk 
locum at peripheral hospital 
(6) Work environment 
17 I 
16 11 predictable 
(6 2) resources 
16 31 stressful 
16 41 very busy 
16 51 unpredictable 
16 61 pressure on beds 
16 71 culture 
16 81 good 
16 91 inadequate staffing 
16 101 supportive 
16 111 long hours 
16 121 career 
16 131 cooperate 
16 141 confusing 
16 151 competing interests 
16 161 blame 
16 171 unsupported 
(6 18) hierarchical 
16 191 variability 
16 201 well organised 
{6 21) multiple teams with responsibility 
16 221 unprepared 
Training 
17 1 I 
17 21 
17 31 
I 7 4 I 
17 51 
17 61 
17 7 I 
I 7 8 I 
no training 
education seminars 
grand rounds 
mortality and morbidity meetings 
induction 
ward education lectures 
communication skills 
newsletters with reported mistakes 
(8) Definition of mishap 
(8 1) outcome focused 
(8 2) relates to bad outcome 
18 31 potential for harm 
(9} Behaviours 
19 11 availability 
19 21 supportive 
(9 3) unsupportive 
I 9 4 I stressed 
I 9 5 I tiredness 
19 61 concern 
I 9 7 I pleasant 
{9 8) uncertainty 
19 91 slowness 
19 101 open 
I 9 11 I denial 
e 
(9 121 careful 
(9 131 feeling bad 
(9 141 cooperative 
(9 151 casual 
(9 161 approachable 
(9 171 not available 
(9 181 organise 
(9 191 thinking for yourself 
(9 201 abusive 
(9 211 blame 
(9 221 asking for help 
(9 231 confidence 
(9 241 humiliation 
(9 251 multiple demands 
(9 261 irritating 
(9 27) uncooperative 
(9 281 complaining 
(9 291 unpredictable 
(9 301 panic 
(9 311 avoiding 
(9 32) inexperience 
(9 331 fearful 
(9 341 organised 
(9 35) insecurity 
(9 361 careless 
(9 371 reminding 
(9 381 calm 
(9 391 angry 
( 9 4 0 I learning 
(9 411 intimidated 
(9 42) communicate more clearly 
(9 431 frustration 
(9 441 autonomy 
(10) Patient condition 
(10 1) chronic condition 
{10 1 1) vertebral artery dissection 
(10 2) acute condition 
(10 2 1) bowel obstruction 
(10 2 2) pulmonary edema 
(10 2 3) nasogastric tube 
( l 0 2 4 I cancer 
(10 2 5) acute post operative pain 
(10 2 61 infection 
(10 2 7) myocardial infarction 
(10 2 81 pin and plate operation 
(10 2 9) endarcarditis 
(10 2 101 septic shock 
(10 2 11) unconscious 
(10 2 121 pulmonary embolism 
(10 2 13) injuries motor vehicle accident 
( 10 2 14) cardiac arrest 
(10 2 151 renal failure 
(10 2 161 fracture 
(10 2 171 pneumonia 
(10 2 18) infected chronic airflow limitation 
(10 2 19) complicated orthopaedic problems 
(10 2 201 septic nephrostomy tube 
f 
(10 2 211 urinary tract infection 
(10 2 221 tortion of the testes 
(10 2 231 dumping syndrome with stomach cancer 
(10 2 241 complications from drain 
( 10 31 stable condition 
(10 41 no adverse effects 
( 10 51 critical condition 
(10 61 fracture 
(10 71 confused 
(201 Questions 
( 20 11 position 
(20 21 planned specialty 
(20 31 age 
(20 41 sex 
(20 51 other degrees 
(20 61 cob 
(20 7) other work experience 
(20 8) current rotation 
(20 91 period in rotation 
(20 101 other rotations 
(20 111 define mishap 
(20 121 typical work day 
(20 14) patterns of communication 
(20 15) how communicate 
(20 161 most contact 
(20 17) contact with consults 
(20 181 talk first 
(20 19) other work environ 
(20 201 Ml 
(20 211 Ml about 
(20 231 Ml where 
(20 241 Ml situation 
(20 251 Ml patient condition 
(20 261 Ml practitioners 
(20 271 Ml outcome 
(20 281 Ml communicate Pt 
(20 291 Mlcategory 
(20 301 Ml omission 
(20 311 Ml commission 
(20 321 Ml diagnosis 
(20 331 Ml treatment 
(20 341 Ml Rx 
(20 351 Ml pt management 
(20 361 Mlacknowledged 
(20 371 Ml acknowledge how 
(20 381 Ml not acknowledge 
(20 391 Ml reported 
(20 401 Ml was patient told 
(20 411 MlFamily told 
(20 421 Ml rectify 
(20 431 Ml prevent 
(20 441 Ml factors assoc 
(20 451 Ml main category 
(20 461 Ml knowledge 
(20 471 Ml skill 
(20 48) Ml supervision 
(20 491 Ml interpersonal 
g 
(20 50) Ml communication 
(20 51) Ml patient factors 
(20 52) Ml location 
(20 53) Ml equipment 
(20 54) Ml work environ 
(20 55) Mlorganisation 
(20 56) Mlhospital 
(20 57) Ml non hospital 
(20 58) Ml other factors 
(20 59) Ml more factors 
(20 60) Ml main factor 
(20 61) Ml greater understanding 
(20 62) Ml what look at 
(20 63) M2 
(20 64) M2 about 
(20 66) M2 where 
(20 67) M2 situation 
(20 68) M2 patient condition 
(20 69) M2 practitioners 
(20 70) M2 outcome 
(20 71) M2 communicate Pt 
(20 72) M2category 
(20 73) M2 omission 
(20 74} M2 commission 
(20 75) M2 diagnosis 
(20 76) M2 treatment 
(20 77) M2 Rx 
(20 78) M2 pt management 
(20 79) M2acknowledged 
(20 80) M2 acknowledge how 
(20 81) M2 not acknowledged 
(20 82) M2 reported 
(20 83) M2 was patient told 
(20 84) M2Family told 
(20 85) M2 rectify 
(20 86) M2 prevent 
(20 87) M2 factors assoc 
(20 88) M2 main category 
(20 89) M2 knowledge 
(20 90) M2 skill 
{20 91) M2 supervision 
(20 92) M2 interpersonal 
(20 93) M2 communication 
(20 94) M2 patient factors 
(20 95) M2 location 
(20 96) M2 equipment 
(20 97) M2 work environ 
(20 98) M2organisation 
(20 99) M2hospital 
(20 100) M2 non hospital 
(20 101) M2 other factors 
(20 102) M2 more factors 
120 103) M2 main factor 
(20 104) M2 greater understanding 
(20 105) M2 what look at 
(20 106) M3 
(20 107) M3 about 
h 
(20 109) M3 where 
(20 110) M3 situation 
(20 111) M3 patient condition 
(20 112) M3 practitioners 
(20 113) M3 outcome 
(20 114) M3 communicate Pt 
(20 115) M3category 
(20 116) M3 omission 
(20 117) M3 commission 
(20 118) M3 diagnosis 
(20 119) M3 treatment 
(20 120) M3 Rx 
(20 121) M3 pt management 
(20 122) M3acknowledged 
(20 123) M3 acknowledge how 
(20 124) M3 not acknowledged 
(20 125) M3 reported 
(20 126) M3 was patient told 
(20 127) M3Family told 
(20 128) M3 rectify 
(20 129) M3 prevent 
(20 130) M3 factors assoc 
(20 131) M3 main category 
(20 132) M3 knowledge 
(20 133) M3 skill 
(20 134) M3 supervision 
(20 135) M3 interpersonal 
(20 136) M3 communication 
(20 137) M3 patient factors 
(20 138) M3 location 
(20 139) M3 equipment 
(20 140) M3 work environ 
(20 141) M3organisation 
(20 142) M3hospital 
(20 143) M3 non hospital 
(20 144) M3 other factors 
(20 145) M3 more factors 
(20 146) M3 main factor 
(20 147) M3 greater understanding 
(20 148) of most concern 
(20 149) why concerned 
(20 150) how common 
(20 151) near miss 
(20 152) prevent near miss 
(20 153) how prevent mishaps 
(20 154) methods in unit 
(20 155) methods in hospitals 
(20 156) ideas for avoid mishaps 
(20 157) extra mile 
(20 158) were reported? 
(20 159) how reported 
(20 160) why not reported 
(20 161) better ways to report 
(20 162) follow up 
(20 163) changes made 
(20 164) how feel 
(20 165) how handle 
{20 1661 who talk to 
{20 167 I ways for residents 
{20 1681 what would help 
{20 169 I training to help 
{20 1701 someone to take care of 
{20 1711 other comments 
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